The Reshaped Mind

SEARLE, THE BIBLICAL WRITERS, AND CHRIST'S BLOOD



LACE MARIE WILLIAMS-TINAJERO

BRILL

The Reshaped Mind

Biblical Interpretation Series

Editors

R. Alan Culpepper

Ellen van Wolde

Associate Editors

Rolf Rendtorff

Editorial Advisory Board

Janice Capel Anderson – Phyllis A. Bird
Erhard Blum – Werner H. Kelber
Ekkehard W. Stegemann – Vincent L. Wimbush
Jean Zumstein

VOLUME 104

The Reshaped Mind

Searle, the Biblical Writers, and Christ's Blood

By
Lace Marie Williams-Tinajero

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Williams-Tinajero, Lace Marie.
The reshaped mind : Searle, the biblical writers, and Christ's blood / By Lace Marie Williams-Tinajero.
p. cm. – (Biblical interpretation series ; v. 104)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-18840-2 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Bible. N.T.–Criticism, interpretation, etc. 2. Searle, John R. 3. Speech acts (Linguistics) 4. Language and languages–Philosophy. 5. Philosophy of mind. 6. Performative (Philosophy) I. Title.

BS2361.3.W55 2011
225.6'6–dc22

2010038210

ISSN: 0928-0731
ISBN: 978 90 04 18840 2

Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.

For Nancey Murphy

CONTENTS

List of Tables xiii
Acknowledgements xv
List of Abbreviations xvii
Introduction xxi

Chapter One. Understanding Searle's Philosophies of Language and Mind 1
1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. Wittgenstein and Austin 2
1.2.1. Wittgenstein's Theory of Language 2
1.2.2. Austin's Theory of Language 4
1.2.2.1. Performative Statements 5
1.2.2.2. The Performative-Constative Dichotomy 7
1.2.2.3. Illocutionary Acts and Illocutionary Force 9
1.2.2.4. Austin's Theory about Direction of Fit 14
1.3. Searle's Philosophies of Language and Mind 15
1.3.1. Searle and the Philosophy of Language 16
1.3.1.1. A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts 16
1.3.1.2. Indirect Speech Acts and Metaphorical Assertions 20
1.3.1.3. Performatives 23
1.3.1.4. Types of Speech Acts 25
1.3.2. Searle and the Philosophy of Mind 29
1.3.2.1. The Structure of Intentionality 29
1.3.2.2. Intentionality-with-a-t and Intensionality-with-an-s 39
1.4. Other Contributions Made to Speech Act Theory 44
1.4.1. Grice 45
1.4.2. Bach and Harnish 46
1.4.3. Recanati 46
1.4.4. Motsch 47
1.4.5. Hornsby 48
1.4.6. Vanderveken 48
1.4.7. Moulin and Rousseau 49
1.5. Summary 50

Chapter Two. Speech Act Theory, Scripture, and Theology 51
2.1. Introduction 51
2.2. Emerging Interest in Austin's Philosophy of Language 52
2.2.1. Michalson and Types of Statements 52
2.2.2. Evans and Self-Involvement 52
2.2.3. Funk and Language-Event 55
2.2.4. High, Robinson, Martinich, and McClendon and Smith 56
2.2.5. Thiselton and Philosophical Categories 57
2.3. Biblical Scholars and Theologians: Current Trends in Employing Speech Act Theory 58
2.3.1. Combining Several Speech Act Theories: Young and Botha 59
2.3.1.1. Young 59
2.3.1.2. Botha 60
2.3.2. God Speaking: Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer 61
2.3.2.1. Wolterstorff 61
2.3.2.2. Vanhoozer 62
2.3.3. A Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement: Neufeld, Thiselton, Briggs, and Adams 63
2.3.3.1. Neufeld 63
2.3.3.2. Thiselton 63
2.3.3.3. Briggs 67
2.3.3.4. Adams 68
2.4. Summary 69

Chapter Three. Single-Level Speech Acts: The Effects of Christ's Blood in Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 71
3.1. Introduction 71
3.2. Paul and Rom 3:25 75
3.2.1. Paul the Writer 75
3.2.2. Paul's Illocutionary Act and Intentional States 78
3.2.2.1. Paul's Assertive Act 78
3.2.2.2. Paul's Belief and Hope 79
3.2.2.3. Paul's Intentional Action 81
3.2.3. Paul's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background 81
3.2.3.1. Paul's Metaphorical Assertion 81

3.2.3.2. Paul's Network 88
3.2.3.3. Paul's Background 89
3.2.4. Paul's Assessors at Rome 90
3.3. The Author of Hebrews and Heb 9:12 96
3.3.1. The Writer of Hebrews 96
3.3.2. The Author's Illocutionary Act and Intentional States . 98
3.3.2.1. The Author's Assertive Act 98
3.3.2.2. The Author's Belief and Hope 99
3.3.2.3. The Author's Intentional Action 99
3.3.3. The Author's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background 100
3.3.3.1. The Author's Metaphorical Assertion 100
3.3.3.2. The Author's Network and Background 106
3.3.4. The Hebrews as Assessors 110
3.4. Summary 113

Chapter Four. Multi-Level Speech Acts: The Effects of Christ's Blood in John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14 115
4.1. Introduction 115
4.2. John, the Judeans, and Jesus in John 6:52–59 116
4.2.1. John's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional States in John 6:52a, 53a, 59 117
4.2.1.1. John's Assertives 117
4.2.1.2. John's Belief and Hope 118
4.2.1.3. John's Intentional Action 118
4.2.1.4. John's Network and Background 118
4.2.2. The Judeans' Illocutionary Act and Intentional (with t) States and John's Report and Intensional (with s) States in John 6:52b 123
4.2.2.1. The Judeans' Question and John's Report 123
4.2.2.2. The Judeans' Intentional (with t) States of Desire and Disbelief and John's Intensional (with s) State of Belief 123
4.2.2.3. The Judeans' Intentional Action 125
4.2.2.4. The Judeans' Network and Background 125
4.2.3. Jesus' Illocutionary Acts and Intentional (with t) States and John's Report and Intensional (with s) States in John 6:53b–58 128
4.2.3.1. Jesus' Direct Assertives and John's Report 128

4.2.3.2. Jesus' Intentional (with t) States of Belief and Hope and John's Intensional (with s) State of Belief 128
4.2.3.3. Jesus' Indirect Directives and Intentional State of Desire 129
4.2.3.4. Jesus' Indirect Commissives and Intentional State of Intention 130
4.2.3.5. Jesus' Intentional Action 131
4.2.3.6. Jesus' Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background 131
4.2.3.7. The Judeans as Jesus' Assessors 137
4.3. John and Rev 1:5b–6; John and the Elder in Rev 7:13–14 142
4.3.1. John and Rev 1:5b–6 142
4.3.1.1. John as God's Slave, Prophet, and Seer 143
4.3.1.2. John's Assertive and Expressive Acts 143
4.3.1.3. John's Belief and Hope 144
4.3.1.4. John's Intentional Action 144
4.3.1.5. John's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background 145
4.3.1.6. John's Assessors, the Seven Churches in Asia Minor 152
4.3.2. John and the Elder in Rev 7:13–14 154
4.3.2.1. John's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional States in Rev 7:13a, 14a 155
4.3.2.2. The Elder's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional (with t) States and John's Reports and Intensional (with s) States in Rev 7:13b, 14b 160
4.4. Summary 168

Chapter Five. Searle's Philosophies and the Motif of Christ's Blood: Some Proposals 171
5.1. General Observations 171
5.2. Summary and Synthesis: The Five Selected Texts on Christ's Blood 178
5.3. Summary and Synthesis: Christ's Blood in the NT and NT Theology 182

Appendix 1: References to Christ's Blood in the New Testament (NRSV) 189
1.1. Benefits of Christ's Blood 189
1.2. Blood and Water of Jesus Christ 192
1.3. Jesus Sharing in Flesh and Blood 192
1.4. Miscellaneous References 192
1.5. Indirect or Ambiguous References 193

Appendix 2: General References to Blood in the New Testament (NRSV) 195
2.1. Mortal Flesh and Blood 195
2.2. Blood and Health-Related Concerns 195
2.3. Abstaining from Blood 196
2.4. Blood, Animal Sacrifice, and Covenant 196
2.5. Blood, Killing, and Judgment 197
2.6. Miscellaneous References 198

Bibliography 199
Index of Authors and Subjects 215
Index of Scripture and Other Ancient Texts 227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Austin's taxonomy of English verbs based on illocutionary force 12
Table 2.1. Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts 40
Table 2.2. Searle's structure of intentionality 42
Table 3.1. Paul's assertive in Rom 3:25 90
Table 3.2. Paul's intentionality in Rom 3:25 91
Table 4.1. The author's assertive in Heb 9:12 107
Table 4.2. The author's intentionality in Heb 9:12 108
Table 5.1. John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states in John 6:52–59 119
Table 5.2. John's intentionality in John 6:52a, 53a, 59 121
Table 6.1. The Judeans' question in John 6:52b 126
Table 6.2. The Judeans' intentionality in John 6:52b 126
Table 7.1. Jesus' direct and indirect speech acts in John 6:53b–58 . 136
Table 7.2. Jesus' intentionality in John 6:53b–58 138
Table 8.1. John's assertive and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6 150
Table 8.2. John's intentionality in Rev 1:5b–6 151
Table 9.1. John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states in Rev 7:13–14 157
Table 9.2. John's intentionality in Rev 7:13a, 14a 158
Table 10.1. The elder's question in Rev 7:13b and assertive in Rev 7:14b 166
Table 10.2. The elder's intentionality in Rev 7:13b, 14b 167

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With gratitude, I acknowledge the following individuals at Fuller Theological Seminary who guided me through the dissertation phase of my doctoral studies: Colin Brown, Nancey Murphy, and the late David Scholer. My appreciation extends to Richard S. Briggs who, as the external reader of my dissertation, provided valuable feedback. Thanks also to John R. Searle, at the University of California Berkeley, for making himself available to clarify aspects of his philosophies of language and mind as needed.

For everyone who supported me during my years of doctoral studies and through the process of getting my dissertation published—family, friends, professors—thank you. Special thanks are due to my husband, Ernesto A. Tinajero, who always sharpens my thoughts. My husband and son are gifts of love in my life.

When I needed instruction on how to proceed with Searle's categories, Nancey Murphy stepped in. When some of the original members of my dissertation committee were no longer accessible, Nancey Murphy took on the role of mentor. When there was no one available to put my doctoral hood on and speak on my behalf at the graduation ceremonies, Nancey Murphy performed these tasks. With humility, I hereby dedicate this book to her.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	*Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Edited by D.N. Freedman. 6 vols. New York, 1992
ABRL	Anchor Bible Reference Library
ABS	Academia Biblica Series
ACNT	Augsburg Commentaries on the New Testament
ASBT	Acadia Studies in Bible and Theology
BDAG	Bauer, W., F.W. Danker, W.F. Arndt, and F.W. Gingrich. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 3d revised ed. Chicago, 2000
Bib	*Biblica*
BIS	Biblical Interpretation Series
BTB	*Biblical Theology Bulletin*
BZ	*Biblische Zeitschrift*
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CC	Continental Commentaries
Centrum	*Centrum*
Chm	*Churchman*
ChrSchol	*The Christian Scholar*
CR:BS	*Currents in Research: Biblical Studies*
CTL	Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics
CTP	Columbia Themes in Philosophy
DLNT	*Dictionary of the Later New Testament and Its Developments*. Edited by R.P. Martin and P.H. Davids. Downers Grove, 1997
DMAP	*The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*. Edited by J.R. Shook et al. 4 vols. Bristol, Eng., 2005
DPL	*Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by G.F. Hawthorne and R.P. Martin. Downers Grove, 1993
EBib	*Etudes bibliques*
EBS	Encountering Biblical Studies
EDB	*Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible*. Edited by D.N. Freedman, A.C. Myers, and A.B. Beck. Grand Rapids, 2000

EDBW	*Expository Dictionary of Bible Words: Word Studies for Key English Bible Words Based on the Hebrew and Greek Texts*. Edited by S.D. Renn. Peabody, 2005
EncJud	*Encyclopaedia Judaica*. 22 vols. 2d ed. Jerusalem, 2007
EP	*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by P. Edwards. 4 vols. New York, 1967
EvQ	*Evangelical Quarterly*
FCC	Foundations of Communication and Cognition
FM	*Faith and Mission*
FPS	Fundamentals of Philosophy Series
GTJ	*Grace Theological Journal*
Hermeneia	Hermeneia
HeyJ	*Heythrop Journal*
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
HvTSt	*Hervormde teologiese studies*
Int	*Interpretation*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JNL	The Jean Nicod Lectures
JPrag	*Journal of Pragmatics*
JPS	Jewish Publication Society
JSBLE	*Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
KJV	King James Version
LHBOTS	Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies
LLL	Longman Linguistics Library
LP	*Linguistics and Philosophy*
LPS	Library of Pauline Studies
LPT	Library of Philosophy and Theology
LQ	*Lutheran Quarterly*
LXX	Septuagint
MidwestSP	*Midwest Studies in Philosophy*
MMS	MasterMinds Series
MSPS	Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science
MSS	Manuscripts
NAB	New American Bible
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NCBC	New Cambridge Bible Commentary
NCV	New Century Version

NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIDNTT	*New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology*. Edited by C. Brown. 4 vols. Grand Rapids. 1975–1985
NIRV	New International Reader's Version
NIV	New International Version
NJPS	*Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures: The New JPS Translation according to the Traditional Hebrew Text*
NKJV	New King James Version
NLT	New Living Translation
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NT	New Testament
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
NTTh	New Testament Theology
NTTS	New Testament Tools and Studies
OCM	*The Oxford Companion to the Mind*
ODCC	*The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*. Edited by F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone. 3d ed. Oxford, 1997
OiC	*One in Christ*
OrgSci	*Organization Science*
ORP	Oxford Readings in Philosophy
OT	Old Testament
OTL	Old Testament Library
PB:NS	Pragmatics and Beyond: New Series
PC	Philosophers and their Critics
PhRev	*Philosophical Review*
RB	*Revue biblique*
ResQ	*Restoration Quarterly*
RevQ	*Revue de Qumran*
RM	Representation and Mind
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SBEC	Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity
Semeia	*Semeia*
SHS	Scripture and Hermeneutics Series
SILAPL	Summer Institute of Linguistics and the University of Texas at Arlington Publications in Linguistics
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology*
SLL:TSLP	Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy

TDNT	*Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated by G.W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids. 1964–1976
TGST	Tesi Gregoriana Serie Teologia
TynBul	*Tyndale Bulletin*
WAS	Wilson Authors Series
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*

INTRODUCTION

One way to think about the New Testament (NT) writings is that they consist of speech acts performed by various writers in the first century CE. Philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Umberto Eco, and J.L. Austin have proposed different theories of language. In a series of William James lectures at Harvard in 1955, later compiled and first published posthumously as *How to Do Things with Words* in 1962, Austin explored how a speaker employs language, which gave rise to speech act theory.[1] Originally, speech act theory was a branch of the philosophy of language. It is now a specialist discipline.

A number of speech act theorists have emerged since Austin's original inquiry such as John R. Searle, James Wm. McClendon Jr. and James M. Smith, H. Paul Grice, and Daniel Vanderveken. This raises a question. Whose theory of speech acts would be useful to examine some of the speech acts in the NT? Searle, a former pupil of Austin's and currently Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, has formulated his own theory of speech acts. Searle, with his five categories of 'illocutionary acts' (i.e., 'assertives,' 'directives,' 'commissives,' 'expressives,' and 'declarations'), corrects both Austin and Wittgenstein—Austin for confusing illocutionary verbs for illocutionary acts and other structural weaknesses of his taxonomy,[2] Wittgenstein for his theory of the countless uses of language.[3] Based on a concept that language arises from 'intentionality,'[4] Searle integrates the philosophy of language with the philosophy of mind, as outlined in the first chapter of this study. An understanding of Searle's technical distinctions of mind—intentionality, 'background,' and 'network'—can shed light on what the NT writers tried to accomplish with their speech acts.

---

[1] Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (eds. J.O. Urmson and M. Sbisà; 2d ed. paperback; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

[2] Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979; repr., 1999), 8–12.

[3] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, vii–viii, 29.

[4] Intentionality is "that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; repr., 1999], 1).

In chapter two of this study, a survey is provided on how biblical scholars and theologians have understood and applied speech act theory in recent decades. Speech act theory has gained the attention of Anthony C. Thiselton, J. Eugene Botha, Dietmar Neufeld, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, to name a few. Biblical scholars and theologians tend to combine theories of speech acts to examine Scripture and address hermeneutical matters. A number of scholars such as Neufeld, Thiselton, Richard S. Briggs, and Jim W. Adams employ Donald D. Evans's concept of 'self-involvement' to examine biblical texts and how readers can engage with those texts. Searle's categories remain, for the most part, either underrepresented or misrepresented in theological circles. Working exclusively with Searle's philosophies of language and mind in this study may help to establish a new point of contact between speech act theory and the world of theology.

To examine the speech acts in the NT according to Searle's categories of illocutionary acts, it is pertinent to narrow the selection since each verse in the NT occurs as a type of speech act. The 'blood-of-Christ' motif, for example, makes for an interesting case study. The Greek word 'blood [αἷμα]' occurs nearly one hundred times in the NT. The references concern blood in general (e.g., mortal flesh and blood, animal blood, bloodshed and judgment, etc.) or Christ's blood (compare appendixes 1 & 2). Certain NT writers asserted that Jesus Christ, with his blood, opened the way for people to receive the promises of eternal life, redemption, justification, reconciliation, purification, abiding with Jesus, freedom from sin, and victory over the enemy.

Of all the theological motifs in the NT, why examine speech acts about the blood of Christ? As the early church formed out of Israel's faith tradition, the conceptual framework of God's dealing with sin through the blood carried over. For some NT writers, Jesus Christ established an eternal covenant with his own blood once for all (Heb 9–10); the sacrificial animal blood in Israel's old temple cult had no lasting effect. Since the NT era, various church traditions have retained the language of Christ's blood in hymns, in long-standing positions on atonement theories, and in liturgies pertaining to the sacrament of the Christian meal.[5] Moreover, Christianity has understood Christ's blood solely as an expression of his death. Because of this linguistic collapse, the biblical writers' distinction between blood as a substance and death as an event has been obscured.

[5] Various church traditions use different names for the sacrament of the Christian meal (e.g., Lord's Supper, Lord's Table, Communion, Last Supper, Eucharist, etc).

To resolve such an impasse, five NT texts on Christ's blood have been selected for analysis using Searle's philosophies of language and mind. The five texts are Rom 3:25, Heb 9:12, John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14. Two questions arise. First, why choose these particular texts? Second, how did the various speakers associated with these texts (Paul, the author of Hebrews, John the evangelist, Jesus, John of Revelation, the elder, etc.) employ the blood-of-Christ language?

Each of the selected texts on the language of Christ's blood has theological import. The third chapter provides a detailed examination of Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12. Romans 3:25 is of interest because of the unresolved debate over what Paul meant by 'cover of the ark [ἱλαστήριον],' as seen in the various translations and interpretations. Did God put forward Jesus Christ as a 'propitiation' or an 'expiation' on behalf of sinners? It could be that Paul referred to ἱλαστήριον in a polyvalent sense. Searle's philosophies of language and mind, however, help to focus the discussion on the type of illocutionary act that Paul performed: an assertive. The type of assertive he made was a metaphorical assertion, which indicates that Rom 3:25 contains layers of meaning. Paul's sentence meaning (literal) differed from his speaker meaning (metaphorical).

The Greek word ἱλαστήριον literally means 'cover/lid of the ark.' The Torah depicts God dwelling above the cover of the ark and meeting with Moses and Aaron to deliver his commands to the Israelites (Exod 25:17–22; Num 7:89). To say that Paul shifted his thought about the ἱλαστήριον to Christ as the new meeting point between God and sinners is to recognize Paul's intentional use of a metaphor in Rom 3:25.

Hebrews 9:12 is of interest because the author performed a metaphorical assertion to compare Christ's blood against animal blood. Layers of meaning are detected. When the author asserted that Jesus Christ entered the sanctuary once for all with his own blood and not with the blood of goats and calves, he did not mean that Christ literally walked into a sanctuary carrying his own blood as high priests would take animal blood into the holy of holies once a year on the Day of Atonement. The author of Hebrews accessed familiar motifs from Israel's sacrificial system to make his case for the superiority of Christ and his blood as God's son. Christ has made the old sacrificial system obsolete with his superior death and blood. Further, the death of the sacrificial animal and the pouring out (application) of its blood were separate events. The author of Hebrews perhaps understood Christ's death as an event and his blood as an efficacious substance for obtaining eternal redemption for sinners, drawing attention to the superiority of Christ's blood to animal blood because it

was the blood (i.e., life) of God's son that he gave up in a sacrificial death. Distinguishing the sentence meaning from the speaker meaning in Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 sheds light on how Paul and the author of Hebrews had in mind Christ's blood in a literal sense to assert the new reality of God in Jesus Christ.

The fourth chapter contains an in-depth look at John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14. Romans 3:25 and Heb 9:12 can be classified as 'single-level' speech acts because one speaker and one illocutionary act were involved (e.g., Paul and the author of Hebrews each performed an assertive). John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14 can be classified as 'multi-level' speech acts because more than one speaker and illocutionary act were involved (e.g., the Judeans' question, Jesus' direct assertives, indirect directives, and indirect commissives, and John the evangelist's assertives and reports in John 6:52–59; John's assertive and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6; the elder's question and assertive, and John's assertives and reports in Rev 7:13–14). A speech act analysis helps to identify the levels of speech acts and different meanings associated with these texts and how the status of the speakers' words changed from illocutionary act to report depending on the linguistic structures of the texts.

The various speakers associated with John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14 revealed that Christ's blood had a certain efficacy (e.g., Christ, with his blood, offered eternal life, being raised up, abiding with him, freedom from sin, robes made white). In John 6:52–58 and its surrounding context, the motifs of bread, flesh, and blood have led to different theological interpretations, including sacramental, nonsacramental, and metaphorical for either Jesus' death or belief in Jesus. A speech act analysis indicates that Jesus did not literally mean to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man. Jesus' metaphorical assertion entailed both a sentence meaning and a speaker meaning. Jesus perceived that he, with his own flesh and blood, was unique compared to earthly food and drink that sustained the ancestors in the wilderness. In contrast to those who ate manna in the wilderness and still died, Jesus offered himself as the eternal source of life.

For both Revelation texts, it is common for interpreters to treat the language of Christ's blood as a metaphor for his death. A speech act analysis indicates that Rev 1:5b–6 and Rev 7:13–14, as metaphorical assertions, contain a sentence meaning and a speaker meaning. In Rev 1:5b–6, John said that Jesus Christ loves us, has freed us from sin by his blood, and made us a kingdom and priests to God and Father, yet he meant something besides Christ freeing sinners with his actual blood

and believers literally turning into a kingdom and priests. John's speaker meaning differed from his sentence meaning. One possible explanation is that John accessed familiar motifs of blood, kingdoms, priests, and sin to indicate how Jesus Christ, with his earthly existence, has opened the way to God and established a new community of believers. If John also had in mind Christ's blood as an atoning substance compared against animal blood in Israel's sacrificial system, then Christ's death was presupposed for him.

A similar concern arises from Rev 7:13–14 as John heard the elder literally speak about the great affliction, washed robes, and robes made white in the Lamb's blood. Again, the tendency among interpreters has been to treat the blood-of-the-Lamb motif as a metaphor for Christ's death. If the elder had in mind blood as a purifying substance, however, then perhaps he distinguished the event of Jesus' death from his blood.

The fifth chapter contains a summary of general observations ranging from Searle's categories to trends among biblical scholars and theologians who have employed speech act theory. Following these observations are two summary-and-synthesis sections, one on the findings of applying Searle's categories to the five selected texts for this study (Rom 3:25, Heb 9:12, John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14), the other on the blood-of-Christ language in the NT as a whole and for NT theology. Romans 3:25 is highlighted throughout chapter five as a model text based on Paul's obscure remarks that God put forward Jesus Christ as a ἱλαστήριον by his blood. Many of the findings for Rom 3:25 apply to other NT passages such as layers of meaning and how certain NT speakers performed their speech acts from a reshaped mindset attributed to the Christ event. In general, a speech act analysis using Searle's categories calls for a broader understanding of the blood-of-Christ language in the NT and in NT theology.

With Searle's philosophies, it is possible to uncover what the NT speakers had to say, or report what others had to say, concerning Christ's blood at the level of speaker intentionality. Ultimately, Searle can provide tools to differentiate between various types of speech acts and their meanings (i.e., the literal meaning of a word versus what a speaker intends a word to mean). Incorporated into this study are insights gained first-hand from a personal meeting and correspondence with Searle.[6]

[6] Searle's informal comments are used with permission.

CHAPTER ONE

UNDERSTANDING SEARLE'S PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE AND MIND

1.1. Introduction

Speech acts consist of generating and employing words. They involve acts of opening and moving one's mouth to make verbal sounds or moving one's hand to produce written marks and symbols. Philosophers distinguish among these acts. J.L. Austin categorized them in terms of the 'phonetic act,' 'phatic act,' and 'rhetic act.'[1] John R. Searle says, "How is it possible that when a speaker stands before a hearer and emits an acoustic blast such remarkable things occur as: the speaker means something; the sounds he emits mean something; the hearer understands what is meant; the speaker makes a statement, asks a question, or gives an order?"[2] Of the speech act theorists who have emerged in recent decades, Searle stands out by integrating of a philosophy of speech acts with a philosophy of mind.[3]

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and Austin (1911–1960) each had launched innovative inquiries into the different uses of everyday language, yet Searle examines the speech acts of a speaker/writer at the level of intentionality—a mental phenomenon. Understanding Searle's remarkable developments in the wake of Wittgenstein and Austin sets the foundation for later chapters on biblical scholars and theologians using speech act theory (chapter two) and an analysis of what four NT writers had to say about Christ's blood (chapters three & four).

---

[1] Austin identified the phonetic act as the act of speaking certain sounds, the phatic act as speaking words according to grammatical structures, and the rhetic act as speaking words with some 'sense' and 'reference' (*How to Do Things*, 92–98).

[2] Searle, *Speech-Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1969; repr., 1999), 3.

[3] Searle says, "the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind" (*Intentionality*, 160).

1.2. Wittgenstein and Austin

1.2.1. *Wittgenstein's Theory of Language*

New questions about ordinary uses of language began to surface in the early to mid-twentieth century. Wittgenstein opened the way for a philosophical investigation into the logic of everyday language. For Wittgenstein, many of the so-called philosophical problems had no basis in reality. Philosophers who label philosophical matters as problematic, said Wittgenstein, fail to understand how language works.[4]

Among some of Wittgenstein's critics stood Karl Popper (1902–1994), who argued for the existence of philosophical problems—a challenge to Wittgenstein's theory of philosophical 'puzzles.' In *Wittgenstein's Poker*, David Edmonds and John Eidinow capture the infamous brief encounter between Popper and Wittgenstein at King's College, Cambridge, in 1946. Popper was invited to deliver a paper on "Are There Philosophical Problems?" at a meeting of the Moral Science Club. The event took place in a room occupied by Richard B. Braithwaite (1900–1990), a moral philosopher who shared Popper's interest in certain scientific phenomena (e.g., probability, infinity, causation).[5] The eyewitness accounts vary (including Popper's version), but it seems that Wittgenstein, in a moment of rage early in the meeting, picked up a poker near the fireplace, waved it around as he challenged Popper's suppositions, dropped the poker when asked to put it down, and left the meeting.[6] It was the only time Popper and Wittgenstein met.

By 1945, Wittgenstein had formulated his concept of *Sprachspiele* (i.e., 'language games').[7] In *Philosophical Investigations* (1953; originally published as *Philosophische Untersuchungen*), he presented his concept of language games to support the theory that no language problems exist in reality and to challenge the logical positivists using the natural sciences to analyze statements for truth.[8] As with the game of chess, Wittgenstein

---

[4] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness; 1st paperback ed.; New York: Routledge, 1974; repr., 1994), § 4.003.

[5] Edmonds and Eidinow, *Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 7, 63–65.

[6] Edmonds and Eidinow, *Wittgenstein's Poker*, 253–288.

[7] See Wittgenstein's preface to *Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation* (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe; 3d ed.; Malden, Maine: Blackwell, 2001; repr., 2003), ix.

[8] Michael K. Mauws and Nelson Phillips indicate that Wittgenstein's theory of lan-

saw a countless number of moves in language games. Asking, answering, repeating, pointing, joking, and lying are among the endless ways human beings can employ language.[9] Enter Searle, who argues that Wittgenstein mistook lying for a language game since lying violates one of the rules for performing speech acts. Searle says, "Since the rule defines what constitutes a violation, it is not first necessary to learn to follow the rule and then learn a separate practice of breaking the rule."[10]

In contrast to Wittgenstein's theory of the limitless number of language games and puzzles, Austin argued that people use language in a fixed number of ways. Different language uses do occur, yet Austin criticized those philosophers who would carelessly invent new uses of language. Of Wittgenstein's influence on Austin, Stephen C. Levinson says, "Austin appears to have been largely unaware of, and probably quite uninfluenced by, Wittgenstein's later work, and we may treat Austin's theory as autonomous."[11] Austin, however, perhaps had Wittgenstein in mind with this rebuttal:

> It's rather a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-known philosophical tangle; we need more of a framework in which to discuss these uses of language; and also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the *infinite* uses of language. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time [Austin's italics].[12]

---

guage games stemmed from his interest in how language relates to reality ("Understanding Language Games," *OrgSci* 6/3 [1995]: 325).

[9] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I § 23, I § 93, I § 249.

[10] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 67.

[11] Levinson, *Pragmatics* (CTL; ed. B. Comrie et al; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983; repr., 1985), 227. Levinson cites the works of Mats Furberg and John Passmore, who argue that Austin was influenced not by Wittgenstein but by "a long established Aristotelian tradition of concern for ordinary language usage at Oxford, where Austin worked" (*Pragmatics*, 227–228, n. 2). See Furberg, *Saying and Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971); John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). See also Dallas M. High, *Language, Persons, and Belief: Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses of Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 73, n. 7 in which High refers to Furberg's comparison of Wittgenstein and Austin (Furberg, *Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts* [Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1963], 62–66).

[12] Austin, "Performative Utterances," in *Philosophical Papers* (ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock; 3d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 234.

James O. Urmson comments briefly on the differences between Austin and Wittgenstein. Austin studied linguistics and classical philosophy (i.e., 'Greats') and earned a degree in Literae Humaniores at Oxford. Wittgenstein had a background in science.[13] Hans-Johann Glock indicates that Wittgenstein studied engineering in Berlin and Manchester between 1906 and 1911, and then went to Cambridge to work with the British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell.[14]

1.2.2. *Austin's Theory of Language*

In his own right, Austin shifted the perspective on everyday language by inquiring into the specific actions a speaker performs with words, a discipline now called 'speech act theory.'[15] Levinson points out that Wittgenstein and Austin both operated at a time when the doctrine of logical positivism, which says a sentence has little or no meaning unless it can be verified objectively (i.e., tested for truth), fails to account for the complexities associated with the broader functions of language.[16] Austin launched a philosophical inquiry into the effects of a speaker's statements in which the speaker does more than merely describe or report what is true or false.[17] Austin proceeded to establish the ways in which a speaker employs words.

---

[13] Urmson, "Austin, John Langshaw," *EP* 1:215; John Wakeman and Stanley Kunitz, eds., *World Authors, 1970–1975: A Biographical Dictionary* (WAS; Bronx, N.Y.: H.W. Wilson, 1980), 37.

[14] Hans-Johann Glock, "Ludwig Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*," in *Central Works of Philosophy Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Moore to Popper* (ed. J. Shand; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 71.

[15] For a synopsis of speech act theory, see Kent Bach, "Speech Acts," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (vol. 9; ed. Edward Craig; London: Routledge, 1998), 81–87. Richard S. Briggs (*Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation: Toward a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement* [New York: T&T Clark, 2001], 3, n. 2) says that speech act theory did not originate with Austin and suggests the following resources on "its pre-Austin development": Alan White, "Speech Acts," in *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (ed. T. Mautner; Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 403–404; Brigitte Nerlich and David D. Clarke, "Language, Action and Context: Linguistic Pragmatics in Europe and America (1800–1950)," *JPrag* 22 (1994): 439–463. Searle attributes the founding of speech act theory, however, to Austin in "Response: Meaning, Intentionality, and Speech Acts," in *John Searle and His Critics* (eds. E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick; PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), 81.

[16] Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 227. On the significance of the doctrine of logical positivism, see Michael Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[17] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 1. For other aspects of Austin's philosophical thought, see

1.2.2.1. *Performative Statements*

In *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin created a special category called 'performative statements.' A performative statement occurs when a speaker does more than states or describes what is true or false. Austin provided examples of performative utterances spoken under the appropriate circumstances:

> 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)'—as uttered in the course of the wedding ceremony. 'I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*'—as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem. 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother'—as occurring in a will. 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.'[18]

Austin's subtle distinction calls attention to the way a speaker's successful or 'happy' speech acts affect others or even alter the world. Making a promise, said Austin, is a type of inner, sacred act. "'I promise to . . .' obliges me—puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle."[19]

Austin pointed to the effects of a speaker's utterances. His famous case of what happens when someone utters the two small words 'I do' in a particular context clarifies his idea about the performative aspect of a speaker's words: "When I say, before the registrar or altar, &c., 'I do,' I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it."[20] A new reality emerges between two people and two families in that declarative moment. A simple, everyday 'I do' ordinarily does very little. Under happy conditions, however, uttering this phrase during a wedding ceremony changes the nature of the couple's relationship forever.

To support his idea of performative utterances, Austin distinguished performatives from statements and descriptions of facts and from 'constatives.'[21] 'He is running' is one type of constative.[22] Austin's performative-constative distinction hinges on whether performatives meet at least two conditions: 1) that "they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false' "; 2) "the uttering of the sentence is, or

---

Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia: Reconstructed from the Manuscript Notes by G.J. Warnock* (first paperback ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964; repr., 1979).

[18] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 5.

[19] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 10.

[20] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 6.

[21] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 4.

[22] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 47.

is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not *normally* be described as, or as 'just', saying something [Austin's italics]."[23] To measure happy (successful) outcomes of performative statements, Austin adopted three sets of rules. Each rule consists of two parts:

> (A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely. (*Γ*.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further (*Γ*.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.[24]

Austin offered the following clarification for his rules. The A.1–2 rules stress the need for appropriate conditions, people, and conventions. The B.1–2 rules require that the speaker correctly and completely perform the speech act. Austin used the Greek letter *Γ* to distinguish the third set of rules from rules A.1–B.2 because the consequences resulting from a speaker's violation of the *Γ* rules differ from the A and B rules. When a speaker violates rules A.1–B.2, the speaker fails to perform the speech act. Austin dubbed it a 'misfire.' Austin returned to his example of a wedding ceremony to illustrate a misfire: "we are not in a position to do the act because we are, say, married already."[25] Quoting some of Austin's other examples,

> One could say that I 'went through a form of' naming the vessel but that my 'action' was 'void' or 'without effect', because I was not a proper person, had not the 'capacity', to perform it: but one might also and alternatively say that, where there is not even a pretence of capacity or a colourable claim to it, then there is no accepted conventional procedure; it is a mockery, like a marriage with a monkey. Or again one could say that part of the procedure is getting oneself appointed. When a saint baptized the penguins, was this void because the procedure of baptizing is inappropriate to be applied to penguins, or because there is no accepted procedure of baptizing anything except humans?[26]

---

[23] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 5.
[24] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 14–15.
[25] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 16.
[26] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 23–24.

If a speaker breaks the *Γ* rules, it results in an 'abuse' even though the speaker successfully performs the speech act. The *Γ*.1–2 rules require that a speaker have integrity and commitment. A speaker's inner state of feelings, intentions, and actions must align with the outer verbal expression. If a speaker utters vows during the wedding ceremony without the inner intention of staying committed in the marriage, the performative still takes effect; the marriage has become a reality. Happy speech acts mean that speakers succeed in their performances of speech acts even though 'abuses of the procedure' can occur.[27]

1.2.2.2. *The Performative-Constative Dichotomy*

The question becomes whether Austin's rules legitimately distinguished performatives from constatives. Austin's performative-constative distinction eventually collapsed. Beforehand, Austin tried to identify a 'pure' or 'explicit' performative. He said that first person singular present indicative active verbs function as true performatives as long as they avoid the descriptive work of constatives (e.g., 'I do,' 'I bet,' and 'I baptize')[28] Austin distinguished 'non,' 'primary,' and 'explicit' performatives in his discussion of a theory of 'evolution of language.' For Austin, primary utterances develop into explicit performatives over time: 'I am sorry' (impure, half-descriptive), 'I repent' (descriptive), and 'I apologize' (explicit performative).[29] Over time, a primary utterance such as 'I shall be there' evolves into the explicit performative 'I promise that I shall be there.'[30] Austin's attempt to quarantine true performatives expanded into a greater project of examining broader "*families* of related and overlapping speech acts [Austin's italics]."[31]

At first glance, performatives appear to differ from constatives. A speaker is doing something when uttering a performative, while a speaker is saying something when uttering a constative. Ultimately, Austin found it difficult to maintain a clear distinction between the two cate-

---

[27] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 14–25. For a detailed discussion of infringing upon the six rules, see Austin's third lecture on misfires (*How to Do Things*, 25–38) and Austin's fourth lecture on abuses (*How to Do Things*, 39–52).

[28] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 5, 32, 56. Austin gave four tests to help identify pure performatives (*How to Do Things*, 79–80, 83–84).

[29] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 71, 73, 83.

[30] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 69.

[31] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 150.

gories.[32] As it turns out, a constative is a type of performative because a speaker who makes a true or false statement performs the act of stating or describing. Austin continued with the four connection points shared by performatives and constatives.

> (1) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy, then the statement that I am apologizing is true. (2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain—those notably in Rules A.1 and A. 2—must be true. (3) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain other conditions obtain—those notably in our rule [C.1]—must be true. (4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example contractual ones, then statements typically of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular thing are true.[33]

Austin, aware of the disintegration of the performative-constative distinction, redirected his efforts in a final attempt. He returned to the basic idea that performatives are either happy or unhappy, whereas constatives are either true or false.[34]

Although Austin's original performative-constative distinction remains problematic, it merits further study because the distinction unlocks specific aspects of language function, and it seems to collapse only when based on grammatical rules or requirements for success. If constative utterances (e.g., 'He is running' or 'It is raining') are only one type of performative, perhaps a more promising criterion for distinguishing performatives from constatives involves measuring the results of stronger types of performatives in the world.[35] A performative may turn out successful but with little or no effect. Precise sentences like 'I declare war on Zanzibar' and 'I dub thee Sir Walter' function in a special way, says Levinson, because "the world has changed in substantial ways."[36] Austin's concepts of 'illocutionary act' and 'illocutionary force' may shed light on the question.

---

[32] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 47. Rules of grammar and vocabulary failed to support Austin's idea that statements function differently than explicit performatives (*How to Do Things*, 59–61, 91).

[33] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 53.

[34] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 54.

[35] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 5–6, 12–13.

[36] Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 228.

1.2.2.3. *Illocutionary Acts and Illocutionary Force*

Austin shifted the conversation away from the performative-constative dichotomy between his seventh and eight lectures. In response to traditional philosophers and grammarians who neglected certain nuances in language games, he began to promote the notion of the illocutionary act as a unique function of language.[37] The sudden change in Austin's terminology from performative to illocutionary came at a point when he realized that no clean line exists for distinguishing between performatives and constatives. He had failed to establish the performative as a unique category.[38] To what extent, then, did Austin's illocutionary language either replace or enhance the concept of performative language? I revisit the question later through the works of Searle. For now, the inquiry turns to Austin's interest in the different uses of language.

In lecture eight, Austin compared illocutionary acts to 'locutionary acts' and 'perlocutionary acts.' Illocutionary acts relate to, but differ from, the other two types. He noted the variations among these three acts by using the prepositions 'in,' 'of,' and 'by.' Austin described an illocutionary act as the "performance of an act *in* saying something as opposed to performance of an act *of* saying something [locutionary]." Perlocutionary acts are persuasive acts a speaker performs "*by* saying something [Austin's italics]."[39] Compare the connotations of Austin's examples:

> Locution: "He said to me, 'Shoot her!' …."
> Illocution: "He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her."
> Perlocution: "He persuaded me to shoot her."
>
> Locution: "He said to me, 'You can't do that.'"
> Illocution: "He protested against my doing it."
> Perlocution: "He pulled me up, checked me."[40]

For Austin, illocutionary acts belong to a special class because they occur inside an established system of conventions and rules. Illocutions and perlocutions both produce effects or consequences, so Austin had to

---

[37] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 104.
[38] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 94.
[39] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 94, 98–101.
[40] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 101–102. Austin noted that the formulas 'in saying *x*' and 'by saying *x*' fail to distinguish illocutionary from perlocutionary acts. The formulas merit consideration, however, because each conveys its own sense and meaning (Austin, *How to Do Things*, 108, 122–123, 127–131).

clarify their different functions. Successful or happy illocutionary acts must secure uptake, take effect, and invite a response. Austin elaborated:

> (1) Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed … the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of *uptake*. (2) The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways, as distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the 'normal' way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. Thus 'I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*' has the effect of naming or christening the ship; then certain subsequent acts such as referring to it as the *Generalissimo Stalin* will be out of order. (3) We have said that many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel. Thus an order invites the response of obedience and a promise that of fulfillment [Austin's italics].[41]

Austin's three features signal that illocutionary acts are conventional acts.

Another way to distinguish illocutions from other types of acts, said Austin, is to develop a concept of illocutionary force. Here, Austin seemed to replace 'performative' with 'illocution.' Touching briefly on what he meant by illocutionary force, he said, "I call the act performed an 'illocution' and shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces.'"[42] He classified English verbs according to their illocutionary force.[43]

Although Austin promised neither a dogmatic nor complete classification of verbs, his taxonomy of English verbs provided a framework for subsequent taxonomies by other philosophers of language. Austin's five categories included 'verdictives,' 'exercitives,' 'commissives,' 'behabitives,' and 'expositives.' Before explaining each category, it should be noted that Austin revisited the familiar performative-constative distinction in his eleventh lecture. He did so to elucidate the differences between illocution, locution, and perlocution. Two points are noteworthy:

> (a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. This is the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c. Perhaps it is

[41] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 121, 116–118.
[42] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 100.
[43] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 151.

> sometimes realized. (b) With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts.[44]

In his twelfth lecture, Austin offered further explanation on the theories of performative-constative and locution-illocution: "The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the *special* theory to the *general* theory [Austin's italics]."[45] Austin had now positioned himself to set forth his five broad categories of English verbs (see table 1.).

Austin said verdictives "consist in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable."[46] A list of approximately twenty-seven representative verbs range from 'acquit,' 'convict,' 'rule,' 'estimate,' 'grade,' and 'analyze.' Verdictives are 'judicial acts' as opposed to exercitives, which are 'legislative or executive acts' of authority.[47] Austin defined exercitives as "the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it." Examples include 'appoint,' 'dismiss,' 'excommunicate,' 'demote,' 'name,' 'pray,' 'pardon,' 'proclaim,' 'vote for,' and 'annul.'[48] Regarding commissives, Austin compared them to verdictives and exercitives, noting relational similarities.

> [They] are typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they *commit* you to doing something, but include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises, and also rather vague things which we may call espousals, as for example, siding with [Austin's italics].[49]

Commissives contain the following verbs: 'promise,' 'contract,' 'give my word,' 'undertake,' 'consent,' 'adopt,' 'propose to,' and 'agree.'[50]

Whereas verdictives, exercitives, and commissives were less complicated categories for Austin, the final two categories, behabitives and expositives, became problematic. He explained,

---

[44] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 145–146.
[45] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 148.
[46] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 153.
[47] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 153.
[48] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 155–156.
[49] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 151–152.
[50] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 157–158. Austin acknowledged that some overlap occurs among all five groups of verbs (*How to Do Things*, 152–162). Certain verbs appear in more than one category (e.g., 'describe' and 'understand' occur as both verdictives and expositives; 'agree' and 'swear' occur as both commissives and expositives).

Table 1. Austin's taxonomy of English verbs based on illocutionary force

Verdictives	Exercitives	Commissives	Behabitives	Expositives
acquit	appoint	promise	1. apologize	1. affirm
hold (as a	dismiss	undertake		deny
matter of law)	order	am determined to	2. thank	state
read it as	sentence	mean to		describe
reckon	levy	propose to	3. sympathy:	class
place	choose	envisage	deplore	identify
put it at	bequeath	guarantee	commiserate	
grade	warn	vow	compliment	2. remark
assess	pray	dedicate myself to	condole	mention
characterize	urge	adopt	congratulate	? interpose
convict	proclaim	espouse	felicitate	
interpret as	countermand	covenant	sympathize	3. inform
rule	enact	bind myself		apprise
estimate	dedicate	intend	4. attitudes:	tell
date	degrade	plan	resent	answer
make it	excommunicate	shall	don't mind	rejoin
rank	command	engage	pay tribute	3a. ask
value	fine	pledge myself	criticize	
diagnose	vote for	agree	grumble about	4. testify
find (as a	claim	declare for	complain of	report
matter of fact)	pardon	champion	applaud	swear
understand	advise	oppose	overlook	conjecture
calculate	entreat	contract	commend	? doubt
locate	press	give my word	deprecate	? know
measure	announce	declare my intention	non-exercitive uses	? believe
take it	annul	purpose	of blame, approve,	
rate	reprieve	contemplate	and favour	5. accept
describe	declare closed	swear		concede
analyse	demote	bet	5. greetings:	withdraw
	name	consent	welcome	agree
	direct	side with	bid you farewell	demur to
	grant	embrace		object to
	nominate	favour	6. wishes:	adhere to
	give		bless	recognize
	resign		curse	repudiate
	plead		toast	5a. correct
	beg		drink to	revise
	recommend		wish (in its	
	quash		strict performa-	6. postulate
	repeal		tive use)	deduce
	veto		7.	argue
	declare open		challenges:	neglect
			dare	? emphasize
			defy	
			protest	7. begin by
			challenge	turn to
				conclude by
				7a. interpret
				distinguish
				analyse
				define
				7b. illustrate
				explain
				formulate
				7c. mean
				refer
				call
				understand
				regard as

Source: Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (eds. J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà; 2d ed. paperback; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 151–163.

> Behabitives are troublesome because they seem too miscellaneous altogether: and expositives because they are enormously numerous and important, and seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself. It could well be said that all aspects are present in all my classes.[51]

Behabitives, said Austin, signal "attitudes and *social behaviour* [Austin's italics]."[52] Verbal expressions like 'apologize,' 'congratulate,' 'condole,' 'curse,' 'thank,' 'blame,' 'applaud,' 'welcome,' and 'bless' all express feelings or reactions to particular circumstances.[53] Expositives, Austin's final category, consist of "the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references."[54] Austin classified expositives into twelve interrelated groups, and included verbs like 'affirm,' 'remark,' 'answer,' 'ask,' 'testify,' 'postulate,' 'interpret,' 'explain,' and 'understand.' Austin summed up his efforts by affirming that speakers employ words in multiple ways.[55]

A point of interest was Austin's use of spiritual language. In making the case that a person's utterances can create a new reality, Austin said that a speaker's outer speech act becomes inseparable from the inner act. Austin anticipated criticism concerning this.

> For one who says 'promising is not merely a matter of uttering words! It is an inward and spiritual act!' is apt to appear as a solid moralist standing out against a generation of superficial theorizers: we see him as he sees himself, surveying the invisible depths of ethical space, with all the distinction of a specialist in the *sui generis*.[56]

Austin replied, "Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that *our word is our bond* [Austin's italics]."[57]

It is unclear whether Austin was religious and where he acquired the 'inward and spiritual act' phrase. The language resembles the definition of 'sacrament' in the Church of England Catechism of 1549. In dialogue format, it reads as follows:

---

[51] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 152.
[52] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 152.
[53] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 160.
[54] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 161.
[55] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 161–164.
[56] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 10.
[57] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 10.

> What meanest thou by this word Sacrament? I mean an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us, ordained by Christ himself as a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof. How many parts are there in a Sacrament? Two: the outward visible sign, and the inward spiritual grace.[58]

The catechism in the Book of Common Prayer of 1662 remained in use until the latter part of the twentieth century.[59] Though Austin, when comparing legal acts, outward or visible acts, and inner spiritual acts, attributed the idea of an inward spiritual act to the classics such as Euripides' *Hippolytus*.[60]

When acknowledging that a person can achieve the same results as a speech act apart from language (e.g., achieving marriage via cohabiting),[61] Austin appealed again to the inner spiritual act of the speaker:

> But we may, in objecting, have something totally different, and this time quite mistaken, in mind, especially when we think of some of the more awe-inspiring performatives such as 'I promise to …'. Surely the words must be spoken 'seriously' and so as to be taken 'seriously'? … But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, *true or false*, of the occurrence of the inward performance [Austin's italics].[62]

In the end, however, he said that the "fact remains that many illocutionary acts cannot be performed except by saying something."[63]

1.2.2.4. *Austin's Theory about Direction of Fit*

In a 1953 paper, "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways," Austin presented his theory of direction of fit. It deserves brief mention before discussing Searle's categories of speech acts. For Austin, direction of fit has to do with 'talk about the world.' He explained how each word has a fixed reference

---

[58] *The Anglican Catechism. A.D. 1549, 1662*. Online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds3.iv.xii.html.

[59] F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, eds., "Catechism, Prayer Book," *ODCC* 299; Cross and Livingstone, eds., "Common Prayer, The Book of," *ODCC* 384–385.

[60] Austin, "Performative Utterances," 236. See also Austin, *How to Do Things*, 9–10.

[61] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 8.

[62] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 9.

[63] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 120.

according to two types of conventions: 'I-conventions [name-giving]' or 'T-conventions [sense-giving].'[64] Then he pointed out "[the] difference in *direction of fit* between fitting a name to an item (or an item *with* the name) and fitting an item to a name (or a name *with* the item) [Austin's italics]" only to differentiate between direction of fit and the notion of 'onus of match.'[65] Direction of fit signals a horizontal relationship between 'X' and 'Y.' Onus of match indicates a vertical connection. In Austin's words, "If X matches Y, Y matches X: just as, if X fits Y, Y fits X. But if I match X to Y, I do not match Y to X, any more than, if I fit X to Y, I fit Y to X."[66]

Whereas Austin made few remarks about direction-of-fit, Searle incorporates it into his taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Searle restructures some of Austin's categories while making his own contribution to speech act theory.

1.3. Searle's Philosophies of Language and Mind

The contemporary philosopher John R. Searle was born in 1932 in Denver, Colorado. In 1949, he started his undergraduate studies at the University of Wisconsin, and went to Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship in 1952. From 1952 to 1959, he studied and taught at Oxford. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Austin under Peter F. Strawson's supervision.[67] Searle acknowledges philosophers such as Strawson, Austin, Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams, H. Paul Grice, and David Pears for shaping his philosophical development during that period.[68] As a speech act theorist, Searle roots his theory in the philosophy of mind. "The philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind" in that language originates out of intentionality.[69] What is intentionality? This mental phenomenon can be understand in light of Searle's philosophy of language.

---

[64] Austin, "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways," in *Philosophical Papers* (ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock; 3d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 136, 137.

[65] Austin, "How to Talk," 141.

[66] Austin, "How to Talk," 141, 143.

[67] Reinaldo Elugardo, "Searle, John Rogers (1932–)," *DMAP* 4:2175–2176.

[68] Ralf Stoecker, "Interview mit Professor John R. Searle," January 2000. Online: http://www.unibielefeld.de/ZIF/Publikationen/00–1-Stoecker.pdf.

[69] Searle, *Intentionality*, 160. He says that "language is dependent on mind" (Searle, *Intentionality*, 161; see also Searle, *Intentionality*, 5).

1.3.1. *Searle and the Philosophy of Language*

1.3.1.1. *A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts*

Searle's early work on speech act theory include "What is a Speech Act?" (1965), "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" (1968), *Speech Acts* (1969), *Expression and Meaning* (1979), and *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic* (1985).[70]

Searle, with his taxonomy of illocutionary acts, corrects both Austin who constructed a taxonomy of illocutionary acts (verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives) based on English verbs and Wittgenstein for his theory about the endless number of ways to use language. Austin separated locutionary acts from illocutionary acts. Searle says, "As initially presented, it is the distinction between uttering a sentence with a certain *meaning*, in one sense of 'meaning' which Austin characterizes as 'sense and reference' (the locutionary act) and uttering a sentence with a certain *force* (the illocutionary act) [Searle's italics]."[71] Illocutionary acts consist of locutionary acts; they are not "separate and mutually exclusive abstractions."[72] What constitutes an illocutionary act, says Searle, are its literal sense as well as the speaker's meaning by way of force.[73] Meaning is part of the successful performance of an illocutionary act.[74] The ability of a speaker to communicate precise meaning is otherwise known as the 'Principle of Expressibility.'[75]

Searle proposes that people use language in five basic ways known as 'performances of illocutionary acts':

---

[70] Searle, "What is a Speech Act?," pages 39–53 in *The Philosophy of Language* (ed. J.R. Searle; ORP; ed. G.J. Warnock; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); repr. of pages 221–239 in *Philosophy in America* (ed. M. Black; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965); Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," pages 141–159 in *Essays on J.L. Austin* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); repr. of *PhRev* 77 (1968): 405–424; Searle, *Speech Acts*; Searle, *Expression and Meaning*; Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Searle indicates that the article "Austin on Illocutionary and Locutionary Acts" is the key article (Searle, in discussion with the author, Berkeley, June 28, 2005).

[71] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 142.

[72] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 148.

[73] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 150–157. L.W. Forguson argues that Searle misinterprets Austin's locutionary and illocutionary distinction ("Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," pages 160–185 in *Essays on J.L. Austin* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973]).

[74] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 145, 153.

[75] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 150–151, 153–154; Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, ix; Searle, *Speech Acts*, 19–21.

> We tell people how things are (Assertives), we try to get them to do things (Directives), we commit ourselves to doing things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expressives), and we bring about changes in the world through our utterances (Declarations).[76]

His subcategory of 'assertive declarations' accounts for 'assertives' that intersect with 'declarations.' Austin confused illocutionary verbs with illocutionary acts.[77] By way of correction, Searle classifies speech acts based on their illocutionary force.[78]

What are the logical features of each type of illocutionary act?

1.3.1.1.1. *Assertives* $\vdash\downarrow B(p)$

Assertives allow a speaker to say how things are. The $\vdash$ symbol represents the illocutionary point to assert and to be committed to the truth of the statement. The $\downarrow$ stands for a word-to-world direction of fit, meaning the speaker's words match reality. The *B* reflects the speaker's expressed psychological state (sincerity condition) of belief that such and such is really the case. The (*p*) stands for any propositional content. 'I state that it is raining' or 'I predict he will come' are examples of assertives. A speaker can also make use of verbs such as 'assert,' 'state,' 'boast,' 'complain,' 'conclude,' and 'deduce' to perform assertives.[79] It is possible for a speaker to lie or make insincere statements, yet "it is part of the definition of an assertion that it is a *commitment* to truth [Searle's italics]."[80] Therefore, the conditions of satisfaction for assertives are truth conditions.[81]

1.3.1.1.2. *Directives* $!\uparrow W(H \text{ does } A)$

With 'directives,' the ! symbol represents the illocutionary point of the speaker requesting an action from a hearer. The $\uparrow$ stands for a world-to-word direction of fit in that the speaker hopes, desires, or expects to match reality with a spoken command. The *W* symbolizes the expressed psychological state of the speaker's wish or desire. The (*H* does *A*) rep-

---

[76] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, vii–viii, 29.

[77] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, ix, 8–12. Here, Searle identifies several weaknesses within Austin's taxonomy.

[78] Searle, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts," pages 1–29 in *Expression and Meaning*; repr. of pages 344–369 in *Language, Mind, and Knowledge* (ed. K. Gunderson; MSPS 7; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975). See also Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (MM; New York: Basic Books, 1998), 148–150.

[79] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 12–13, 21, 24–25.

[80] Searle, *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 146.

[81] Searle, *Consciousness and Language*, 146–147.

resents the propositional content of the speaker who wants the hearer (*H*) to follow through on some future action (*A*). 'I order you to leave' serves as an example. The speaker can also employ verbs such as 'ask,' 'beg,' 'pray,' 'command,' 'request,' 'plead,' 'invite,' 'advise,' 'dare,' or 'challenge' to perform directives.[82]

1.3.1.1.3. *Commissives C↑I(S does A)*
The illocutionary point of 'commissives,' *C*, is to commit the speaker to some future course of action. Every commissive has a world-to-word (↑) direction of fit because the speaker hopes to match reality with his/her speech act. The *I* stands for an expressed psychological state of intention. The (*S* does *A*) represents the propositional content of the speaker (*S*), who intends to perform an action (e.g., 'I promise to pay you the money'). 'Pledge' and 'vow' are other commissive-type verbs.[83]

1.3.1.1.4. *Expressives EØ(P)(S/H + property)*
The illocutionary force of 'expressives,' *E*, is for the speaker to express feelings or attitudes. "The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content."[84] The null symbol Ø means that no direction of fit occurs with the speaker's words. For example, says Searle, "when I apologize for having stepped on your toe, it is not my purpose either to claim that your toe was stepped on nor to get it stepped on."[85] The (*P*) stands for the various psychological states that a speaker might express (e.g., gratitude or sympathy). The (*S/H* + property) signifies that the speaker's proposition attributes some property to either the speaker or hearer (e.g., 'I congratulate you on winning the race' or 'I thank you for paying me the money'). The speaker can also 'deplore,' 'condole,' 'diagnose,' or 'welcome' something or someone.[86]

1.3.1.1.5. *Declarations D↕Ø(p) and Assertive Declarations D_a↓↕B(p)*
Of the five types of illocutionary acts, Searle treats declarations as a special type. The illocutionary point of declarations, symbolized by *D*, is for the speaker to "[b]ring about some alteration in the status or

[82] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 13–14, 21–22.
[83] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 14–15, 22–23.
[84] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 15.
[85] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 15.
[86] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 15–16, 23–24.

condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed."[87] The ↕ represents a dual direction of fit of both word-to-world and world-to-word. Searle explains,

> [s]uccessful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a candidate; if I successfully perform the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on; if I successfully perform the act of marrying you, then you are married.[88]

With declarations, the expressed psychological state of the speaker turns up null or empty (Ø). The (*p*) stands for any propositional content. A speaker who performs a declaration might use the verbs 'pronounce,' 'appoint,' 'declare,' 'resign,' 'fire,' 'excommunicate,' or 'christen.' Declarations have an additional feature called 'extra-linguistic institutions' (e.g., christenings and excommunications involve religious institutions, giving guilty sentences involves legal institutions, and declaring wars involve political structures).[89]

Searle creates a subcategory of declarations called assertive declarations $D_a{\downarrow}{\updownarrow}B(p)$ to account for times when assertives overlap with declarations. The illocutionary point of this type, symbolized by D_a, means that a speaker asserts with the force of a declaration (e.g., a judge delivers a verdict or a referee makes a call). The set of arrows ↓↕ represents a word-to-world (↓) direction of fit for the assertive and a dual direction of fit (↕) for the declaration. The *B* symbol stands for the speaker's expressed psychological state of belief in the proposition (*p*). Declarations resemble assertive declarations in that both involve extra-linguistic institutions. The main difference is that declarations have no expressed psychological state (sincerity condition), whereas assertive declarations have a sincerity condition of *B* that (*p*). With declarations, "[the] man who declares war or nominates you cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act." Judges, jury members, or umpires, however, can technically 'lie' when performing their assertive declarations.[90]

What does Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts have to do with Rom 3:25, Heb 9:12, John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14? In

---

[87] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 17.
[88] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 17.
[89] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 16–19, 26–27.
[90] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 19–20.

my third and fourth chapters, I shall explain how these texts fit Searle's assertive category. Specifically, Paul, the author of Hebrews, Jesus, John of Revelation, and the elder each performed a type of assertive called a 'metaphorical assertion.' What does Searle say about metaphorical assertions as well as about indirect speech acts?

1.3.1.2. *Indirect Speech Acts and Metaphorical Assertions*

It is possible for a speaker's words to carry different meanings. If a speaker tries to get someone to do something by way of making an assertive, for example, then the speaker performs one or more secondary speech acts. Indirect speech acts occur when

> the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.[91]

In saying 'Can you reach the salt?' the speaker asks a question, yet makes a request of someone to pass the salt.[92]

Metaphorical assertions differ from other types of utterances such as indirect, literal, and ironical expressions.[93] Searle asks how a speaker can mean something else besides what is said. Unlike some philosophers who propose "[t]wo kinds of sentence meaning, literal and metaphorical,"[94] Searle makes no distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning at the level of words or sentences, which simply mean what they mean. Rather, the difference has to do with 'sentence meaning' (i.e., literal meaning) versus 'speaker meaning' (i.e., metaphorical meaning). Searle explains:

> Strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the metaphorical meaning of a word[,] expression, or sentence, we are talking about what a speaker might utter it to mean, in a way that departs from what the word, expression, or sentence actually means. We are, therefore talking about possible speaker's intentions.[95]

So speaker meaning is tied to intention.

---

[91] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 31–32.
[92] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 30.
[93] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 76–81. See Searle's chapter on "Metaphor," pages 76–116 in *Expression and Meaning*.
[94] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 77.
[95] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 77.

For understanding to take place, both a speaker and a hearer must share a common language and set of background assumptions.[96] Of the two sentences 'The fly is on the ceiling' and 'The cat is on the ceiling,' the reader knows that only one of these sentences makes sense based on shared 'factual background information.'[97] Searle gives eight principles designed to enable a hearer to understand what the speaker intends to communicate in a metaphorical utterance. These principles can be summarized in logical form: a hearer must discern what is meant (*S* is *R*) when a speaker speaks (*S* is *P*).[98] The *R* symbolizes the metaphorical meaning of a word; the *P* stands for the literal value of a word.

The principles come as a response to other theories of metaphor such as comparison and semantic interaction theories that fail to separate clearly the meaning of a speaker's utterance from the meaning of a word or sentence.[99] The meanings of metaphorical statements differ from the meanings of similes, which use 'like' or 'as' to draw comparisons.[100] Searle states,

> According to the view I am attacking, [Richard is a gorilla] *means* Richard and gorillas are similar in certain respects. According to the view I shall espouse, similarity functions as a comprehension strategy, not as a component of meaning: [Richard is a gorilla] says that Richard has certain traits (and to figure out what they are, look for features associated with gorillas). On my account the *P* term need not figure literally in the statement of the truth conditions of the metaphorical statement at all [Searle's italics].[101]

About the logical structure of metaphorical utterances, Searle says,

> Firstly, there is the subject expression '*S*' and the object or objects it is used to refer to. Secondly, there is the predicate expression '*P*' that is uttered and the literal meaning of that expression with its corresponding truth conditions, plus the denotation if there is any. And thirdly, there is the speaker's utterance meaning '*S* is *R*' and the truth conditions determined by the meaning.[102]

The variables *S*, *P*, and *R* form the logical structures of *S* is *P* and *S* is *R*.[103]

---

[96] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 84.
[97] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 80.
[98] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 107–111.
[99] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 86.
[100] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 93–94.
[101] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 90.
[102] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 83–84.
[103] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 83–85, 94–96, 103–112.

A hearer must possess certain background assumptions to determine when a speaker utters a literal or a metaphorical statement. When processing a speaker's statement, a hearer must pass through three steps: 'determine,' 'compute,' and 'restrict.' First, a hearer must determine whether a statement requires a metaphorical interpretation. Second, the hearer must have a way to compute the potential values of *R* behind the metaphor. Third, a hearer must be able to restrict the choices for *R*.[104] A speaker's metaphorical assertion must 'call to mind' something in a hearer to achieve 'hearer understanding.'[105] Searle compares metaphorical statements with their corresponding paraphrases. Although insufficient, paraphrases can supply information about the meaning of a speaker's metaphorical utterance. The truth conditions for metaphorical statements (MET) must correspond to the paraphrases (PAR).[106]

> (MET) Sally is a block of ice.
> (PAR) Sally is an extremely unemotional and unresponsive person.
>
> (MET) Richard is a gorilla.
> (PAR) Richard is fierce, nasty, and prone to violence.
>
> (MET) Sam is a pig.
> (PAR) Sam is filthy, gluttonous, and sloppy, etc.[107]

Ice, gorillas, and pigs may have other characteristics besides those given in the paraphrases (e.g., gorillas may be "shy, sensitive creatures, given to bouts of sentimentality" and "pigs have a distinctive shape and distinctive bristles").[108] The hearer must therefore limit the variables for possible interpretations of *R*. Searle's metaphors reveal characteristics about Sally, Richard, and Sam rather than of ice, gorillas, and pigs. This is not about simile, argues Searle. The statement 'Sally is a block of ice' makes sense at the level of "perceptions, sensibilities, and linguistic practices" instead of at the level of comparison.[109] He explains,

> Temperature metaphors for emotional and personal traits are in fact quite common and they are not derived from any literal underlying similarities. Thus we speak of a 'heated argument', 'a warm welcome', 'a lukewarm friendship', and 'sexual frigidity'.[110]

---

[104] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 104–107.
[105] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 104.
[106] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 82, 83.
[107] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 82, 107.
[108] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 89, 106.
[109] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 97.
[110] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 98.

Searle's distinctions can provide a way to determine the speaker meaning, sentence meaning, and hearer understanding of the NT writers' metaphorical assertions about Christ's blood.

1.3.1.3. *Performatives*

Searle's distinguishes performatives from 'performances.' "[T]hough every utterance is indeed a *performance*, only a very restricted class are *performatives* [Searle's italics]."[111] Performative sentences, performative utterances, and performative verbs all differ.

> A *performative sentence* is a sentence whose literal utterance in appropriate circumstances constitutes the performance of an illocutionary act named by an expression in that very sentence in virtue of the occurrence of that expression. A *performative utterance* is an utterance of a performative sentence token, such that the utterance constitutes the performance of the act named by the performative expression in the sentence. A *performative verb* is simply a verb that can occur as the main verb in performative sentences. When such a verb occurs in such a sentence in a performative utterance I shall speak of the *performative use* of the sentence and the verb [Searle's italics].[112]

Searle follows Austin in saying that many performatives contain explicit verbs—those verbs in the first person, singular, present, indicative, active. Note the different performatives and performances identified by Searle.

> Performatives:
> 1) I *order* you to leave the room.
> 2) I *promise* to come on Wednesday.
> 3) We *pledge* our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor.
> 4) I am *asking* you to do this for me, Henry, I am *asking* you to do it for me and Cynthia and the children.
> 5) Passengers are hereby *advised* that all flights to Phoenix have been cancelled.
> 6) I'll come to see you next week, and that's a *promise*.
>
> Performances:
> 1) Leave the room!
> 2) I *promise* too many things to too many people [Searle's italics].[113]

---

[111] Searle, "How Performatives Work," in *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 158; repr. of *LP* 12 (1989): 535–558. Austin clarifies that a conventional speech act differs from a conventional physical performance (Austin, "Performative Utterances," 245–246).

[112] Searle, "How Performatives Work," 158.

[113] Searle, "How Performatives Work," 158–159.

Searle says that all performatives fit the declarations class. Some philosophers have questioned the consistency of Searle's taxonomy. The statement 'I order you to leave the room!' fits Searle's directives class, yet Searle identifies it as a performative because of the explicit verb in the first person, 'I order,' making it a declarative.[114] Jürgen Habermas posits that Searle's position on performatives "explodes the architecture of the classification of speech acts," that "declarations would lose their distinctive place."[115] The philosopher Jerrold M. Sadock raises a similar concern.[116] For clarification, I ask Searle,

> In your response to Habermas, you indicate that all performatives fit the declarations category because they contain a performative verb or expression. Based on your assessment, would it be reasonable to keep your original taxonomy of five classes but to add to the directives, commissives, and expressives categories a subcategory of declarations like you did to your assertives class (assertive declarations)? A modified version of your taxonomy might look something like this:
>
> Assertive: 'It is raining.'
> Assertive declaration: 'I hereby state that it is raining.'
>
> Directive: 'Leave the room!'
> Directive declaration: 'I hereby order you to leave the room.'
>
> Commissive: 'I will pay you the money.'
> Commissive declaration: 'I hereby promise you that I will pay the money.'
>
> Expressive: 'I am sorry for stepping on your toe.'
> Expressive declaration: 'I hereby apologize for stepping on your toe.'[117]

Searle offers the following response:

> All performatives are declarations because they fit the definition of a declaration. Not all declarations are performatives because sometimes in extreme cases one can make something be the case by simply declaring it to be the case. The favorite example is God saying: 'Let there be light.' Most performatives, but not all, require some extra-linguistic institution to function, and those purely linguistic declarations with performative verbs such as 'I hereby promise' or 'I hereby state' do not require an

---

[114] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 21–22; Searle, "How Performatives Work," 170.

[115] Habermas, "Comments on John Searle: Meaning, Communications, and Representation," in *John Searle and His Critics* (eds. E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick; PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), 28.

[116] Sadock, "Toward a Grammatically Realistic Typology of Speech Acts," in *Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives* (ed. S.L. Tsohatzidis; London: Routledge, 1994; repr., 2002), 394–395.

[117] Williams-Tinajero, letter to Searle, September 7, 2006.

> extra-linguistic institution. I don't see that Habermas' objections in any way count against my taxonomy. I think that taxonomy stands pretty much as I originally stated it in 1974.[118]

Keeping with Searle's original taxonomy, the next task is to identify other types of speech acts besides illocutionary acts.

1.3.1.4. *Types of Speech Acts*

The complete speech act (i.e., asserting, directing, ordering, and promising) consists of three types of acts: an 'utterance act,' a 'propositional act,' and an 'illocutionary act.'[119] First, utterances consist of uttering words in a particular language. Utterance acts consist of direct quotations. Propositional acts involve referring to objects and predicating expressions about referred-to objects. Illocutionary acts include promises, statements, commands, questions, and so forth.[120] According to Searle, the speaker of these two statements

> Sam smokes habitually.
> Mr[.] Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco[.]

performs the same propositional act (referring to a certain individual and a characteristic about him) and illocutionary act (assertive) but a different utterance act (words).[121]

Searle refers to different 'species' of utterances (e.g., 'predictions,' 'reports,' and 'promises'), and draws up rules for discerning their different illocutionary forces and illocutionary points.[122] In discussing quoted material and indirect discourse, Searle asks, "which of the original speech acts of the original speaker are *repeated* by the reporter and which are merely reported by the reporter [Searle's italics]?"[123] Searle deals with the status of words following 'that,'[124] as illustrated by the following sentences and explanations:

> The sheriff uttered the words, 'Mr. Howard is an honest man'—[here], the reporter is committed to repeating the speaker's utterance act but not his propositional or illocutionary act.

---

[118] Searle, e-mail message to author, September 13, 2006.
[119] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 23–25; Searle, *Intentionality*, 181, 185–187.
[120] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 23–24.
[121] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 22, 24.
[122] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 1–8.
[123] Searle, *Intentionality*, 185.
[124] Searle, *Intentionality*, 180–181.

> The sheriff said that Mr. Howard is an honest man—[here], the reporter is committed to repeating the speaker's propositional act but not his utterance act or his illocutionary act.
>
> The sheriff said, 'Mr. Howard is an honest man'—[here], the reporter is committed to repeating the speaker's utterance act and his propositional act but not his illocutionary act.
>
> The sheriff said then, and I do now say, Mr. Howard is an honest man—[here], the reporter is committed to repeating the speaker's propositional act and his illocutionary act, but not necessarily his utterance act.[125]

The reporter, committed to repeating all three acts—utterance, propositional, and illocutionary—might state the following: "As John said, 'Mr. Howard is an honest man.' "[126]

A speaker can perform an utterance act without performing either a propositional or an illocutionary act because a speaker can utter words and still say nothing.[127] "Utterance acts consist simply in uttering strings of words. Illocutionary and propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions."[128] Searle distinguishes propositional acts from illocutionary acts by their unique 'identity conditions.' Propositional acts are not illocutionary acts, yet illocutionary acts consist of propositional acts.[129] "[O]ne cannot *just* refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act. The linguistic correlate of this point is that sentences, not words, are used to say things [Searle's italics]."[130]

The illocutionary act is only one type of speech act. Searle, along with Daniel Vanderveken, presents a theory of illocutionary logic based on illocutionary acts and illocutionary force. Unlike some types of speech acts (e.g., 'implicit acts,' utterance acts, and propositional acts), illocutionary acts function as "the minimal units of human communication. All speaking and writing consists of illocutionary acts."[131] For Searle, the art of speaking a language is a "rule-governed form of behavior."[132] He follows Austin in saying that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. A

---

[125] Searle, *Intentionality*, 185–186.
[126] Searle, *Intentionality*, 186.
[127] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 24.
[128] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 24–25.
[129] Searle, "Austin on Locutionary," 155–157, 159.
[130] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 25, 159.
[131] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 136.
[132] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 16.

speaker performs them according to an established or agreed upon set of rules.[133] The act of promising differs from other types of acts like fishing, says Searle.

> Now there are, indeed, techniques, procedures and even strategies that successful fishermen follow, and no doubt in some sense all these involve (regulative) rules. But that under such and such conditions one catches a fish is not a matter of convention or anything like a convention. In the case of speech acts performed within a language, on the other hand, it is a matter of convention—as opposed to strategy, technique, procedure, or natural fact—that the utterance of such and such expressions under certain conditions count as the making of a promise.[134]

The act of promising is actually quite complicated. Searle says,

> I can't fix the roof by saying, 'I fix the roof' and I can't fry an egg by saying, 'I fry an egg,' but I can promise to come and see you just by saying, 'I promise to come and see you' and I can order you to leave the room just by saying, 'I order you to leave the room.'[135]

Searle presents no fewer than nine conditions and six rules for a successful illocutionary act such as making a promise. Logically speaking,

> [g]iven that a speaker *S* utters a sentence *T* in the presence of a hearer *H*, then, in the literal utterance of *T*, *S* sincerely and nondefectively promises that *p* to *H* if and only if the following conditions 1–9 obtain[.][136]

The first condition, dubbed 'input' and 'output,' means that the speaker can actually speak and the hearer can hear, and that both share a common language. Second, the speaker makes a promise that (*p*) in the utterance of *T*. Third, the speaker predicates a future act in expressing the proposition.[137] Fourth, the hearer wants the speaker to do the very thing promised and the speaker believes that the hearer anticipates the follow-through. Fifth, the speaker promises something out of the ordinary that the hearer normally would not expect. Sixth, the speaker intends to do what was promised. Seventh, the speaker is obligated and understands

---

[133] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 23, n. 1.

[134] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 37.

[135] Searle, "How Performatives Work," 156. For Searle, perhaps God could fry an egg just by saying so, but human beings lack such abilities (*Intentionality*, 167). Searle makes a similar argument when discussing 'supernatural declarations' (e.g., God says, 'Let there be light') in *Expression and Meaning*, 18.

[136] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 57.

[137] Searle devotes an entire chapter to 'predicates' where he argues that predication is only an abstraction from the speech act and not a separate speech act (*Speech Acts*, 97–127, especially 121–123).

so. Eight, the hearer understands from the speaker's intention that the speaker is under an obligation, an effect that the speaker has produced in the hearer. To quote Searle's ninth condition, "*The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1–8 obtain* [Searle's italics]."[138] These conditions underlie the dynamics of any speaker-hearer relationship.

Six rules also apply for the act of promising. Searle calls these 'illocutionary force indicating devices' (IFIDs). Despite some overlap between the six rules and nine conditions of successful illocutionary acts, the rules pertain to the illocutionary act whereas the conditions apply to the speaker and hearer. Under the first rule, the speaker must utter an illocutionary act (e.g., a promise), as part of a sentence, and the utterance must predicate a future action by the speaker. Second, the illocutionary act is uttered only if the hearer wishes that the speaker performs the action promised, and if the speaker believes that the hearer desires follow-through. Third, the illocutionary act is performed only if the speaker promises the hearer something unexpected. Fourth, the illocutionary act occurs only if the speaker intends to do what was promised. Fifth, the utterance of the illocutionary act obligates the speaker to make good on the promise.[139] These nine conditions and six rules apply to orders, assertions, and other types of illocutionary acts.[140]

In closing, a key question that Searle sets out to answer using a speech act model is, "How do words relate to the world?"[141] For about a century, philosophers were preoccupied with the role of language and linguistic methods to work out philosophical problems, says Searle, in his new release, *Freedom and Neurobiology*. The perspective on language, however, has shifted in analytic philosophy:

> Human language is an extension of more biologically fundamental forms of intentionality such as perception and action, as well as belief and desire, and we need to see language as derivative from these more basic, biological forms of intentionality.[142]

---

[138] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 57–61.

[139] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 62–63.

[140] For Searle's taxonomy of certain types of illocutionary acts like 'requests,' 'assertions,' 'questions,' 'thanking,' 'advising,' 'warning,' 'greeting,' and 'congratulating,' see Searle, *Speech Acts*, 66–67.

[141] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 3.

[142] Searle, *Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power* (CTP; ed. A. Bilgrami; New York: Columbia University Press, 2007; originally published as *Liberté et neurobiologie* [Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2004]), 29.

What makes it possible for verbal sounds, marks on paper, and objects in the world to take on semantic properties and meaning? The philosophy of mind enters at this point. For Searle, "the mind imposes intentionality on these sounds and marks [and objects]."[143] What constitutes the philosophy of mind and what bearing does it have on Searle's theory of speech acts?

1.3.2. *Searle and the Philosophy of Mind*

1.3.2.1. *The Structure of Intentionality*

Searle separates questions of what makes the world work (epistemology) from questions of how the world really is (ontology). Although the physical world exists, mental properties confined within the physical structures of the brain are 'irreducible' or nonphysical phenomena.[144] Searle's main interest is in intentionality because it gives rise to language. After presenting Searle's structure of intentionality, I shall turn to his 'intentionality-with-a-t' and 'intensionality-with-an-s' distinction.

Intentionality is "that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world."[145] Intentionality consists of mental states such as 'anger,' 'belief,' 'desire,' 'expectation,' 'grief,' 'hate,' and 'intention.' Intention is only one possible mode of intentionality.[146] Intentional states—also known as mental or psychological states—differ from 'non-intentional forms of consciousness' such as undirected emotional-states and states of 'depression,' 'anxiety,' 'joy,' or 'nervousness.'[147] Intentional states are directional in that they are about something or someone.

Searle clarifies that 'mind' does not equal 'brain' ("Minding the Brain," *The New York Review* [November 2, 2006]: 51–55).

[143] Searle, *Intentionality*, 27–29; Searle, *Consciousness and Language*, 146, 149.

[144] Searle, *Mind: A Brief Introduction* (FPS; eds. J.M. Fischer and J. Perry; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 126–131, 209; Searle, *The Mystery of Consciousness* (New York: New York Review of Books, 1997), 174, 210–214.

[145] Searle, *Intentionality*, 1. For an extended definition and historical account of intentionality, see "Intentionality," pages 383–386 in *OCM* (ed. R.L. Gregory; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[146] Searle, *Intentionality*, 3.

[147] Searle, *Intentionality*, 1, 3, 4; Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 64–65. 'Perception'

> If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; if I have an intention, it must be an intention to do something.[148]

Mental representations and intentional states also take on aspectual shapes. For instance, 'the Evening Star' (sunset) and 'the Morning Star' (sunrise) conjure of different images yet refer to the same object—the Venus.[149] (Consider the way in which the NT writers present Jesus Christ under different aspects—'Son of Man,' 'Son of God,' 'Messiah,' 'Lamb of God,' 'Christ,' 'the Word,' or 'Rabbi'—depending on the context).

Intentional states are 'pre-linguistic forms' in that human beings acquire and use language to relate their intentional states in the world (e.g., belief/assert, desire/direct, intention/commit, etc.).[150] "What would [human beings] need in order to get from having [i]ntentional states to performing illocutionary acts?"[151] The first of three steps entails the 'deliberate expression' of one's intentional state to let others know about them. The second step involves achieving 'extra-linguistic aims' of the intended illocutionary act such as providing information (assertive) or requesting a response from someone (directive). Third, recognizable 'conventional procedures' play a role in achieving perlocutionary aims of illocutionary acts—assertives, directives, commissives, etc.—in the speaker-hearer relationship.[152]

> Any conventional device for indicating that the utterance is to have the force of a directive (e.g., the imperative mood) will be one which by convention counts as an attempt by the speaker to get the hearer to do the act specified in the propositional content. Its utterance, therefore, provides a reason for the hearer to do the act and expresses a desire of the speaker that the hearer do the act.[153]

A theory of intentionality must account for human consciousness. Intentionality differs from, yet relates to, consciousness. The latter is the hub

---

and 'action' are two "biologically primary forms of Intentionality" from which intentional states such as belief and desire derive (*Intentionality*, 36–111).

[148] Searle, *Intentionality*, 1.

[149] Searle, *Mind*, 167; Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (paperback ed.; RM; eds. H. Putnam and N. Block; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 156–157.

[150] Searle, *Intentionality*, 169–177.

[151] Searle, *Intentionality*, 177.

[152] Searle, *Intentionality*, 177–179.

[153] Searle, *Intentionality*, 179.

of all mental phenomena called 'the central mental notion.'[154] Consciousness is like the awareness one has in a wakeful state.[155]

For Searle, neuroscientists have yet to discover exactly how consciousness and intentionality occur in the brain. He lists no fewer than eleven features that comprise the ontological structure of consciousness (with special emphasis on its inner, qualitative, and subjective qualities).[156] A pain in one's body is exactly that—a pain in one's body experienced and felt first-hand. The experience of riding a motorcycle has a qualitative feel different from the experience of air travel. An individual's experiences of pains and intentional states are ontological rather than epistemic. They exist independently from outside, third-person observation and opinion. Consciousness, as a first-person ontological and biological phenomenon, occurs within individual brain structures.[157] Yet what does Searle mean by a biological phenomenon?

A biological naturalism undergirds Searle's philosophy of mind. Certain biological phenomena are associated with mental properties, which give rise to representation and language.[158] Consciousness and intentionality are normal biological processes just like growth, digestion, reproduction, respiration, and photosynthesis.[159]

> To be thirsty is to have a desire to drink. When the angiotensin 2 gets inside the hypothalamus and triggers the neuronal activity that eventually results in the feeling of thirst it has *eo ipso* resulted in an intentional feeling. The basic forms of consciousness and intentionality are caused by the behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system, that is itself composed of neurons. What goes for thirst goes for hunger and fear and perception and desire and all the rest.[160]

---

[154] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 84.

[155] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 84.

[156] Searle, *Mind*, 134–145; Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 41–45.

[157] For an extended discussion of Searle's views on consciousness and subjectivity, see Searle, *Rediscovery*, 93–100.

[158] Searle thinks that the temporal and social aspects of consciousness are worth exploring (*Rediscovery*, 127). For philosophical works by Searle on society and social features of the mind as well as rationality and the concept of free-will, see Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995); Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*; and Searle, *Rationality in Action* (JNL; ed. F. Recanati; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).

[159] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 1, 90, 93, 106–109; Searle, *Intentionality*, 230; Searle, *Mind*, 103–104, 113–115, 130–131, 163–164, 301–304; Searle, *Mystery of Consciousness*, xiv, 210–211.

[160] Searle, *Mind*, 164.

This challenges the traditional views of materialism and Cartesian dualism concerning the mind-body.[161] For Searle, "[t]here is no mind-body problem or split because the brain and body function together as one unit."[162] Searle responds to philosophers who criticize him for his position on the mind-body relationship.

> Once you get rid of the traditional oppositions [Cartesian categories], it is not a very big step to see that the so-called 'mental' properties are both caused by the behavior of lower level elements in the brain and at the same time just are higher level features of the entire brain system (and perhaps the rest of the central nervous system). So on this view, which seems to me a kind of common-sense view, mental processes are caused by 'objective' micro-processes in the brain but are at the same time 'subjective' macro-level features of the brain.[163]

The structure of intentionality consists of 'propositional content,' 'psychological mode,' 'direction of fit,' 'conditions of satisfaction,' 'causal self-referential intentional states,' the network, and the background. Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts and his structure of intentionality share some common characteristics (e.g., propositional content, direction of fit, etc.).[164]

1.3.2.1.1. *Propositional Content and Psychological Mode*

Intentionality contains propositional contents (*p*) that occur in various psychological modes or intentional states (*S*) in a person's brain. The logical form is *S*(*p*). Searle says that any (*p*) can occur in different psychological modes or intentional states (*S*). Consider the possible intentional states (*S*) associated with the (*p*) of 'It will rain.' "Thus I can believe that it will rain, hope that it will rain, fear that it will rain, or desire that it will rain. In each case, the content remains the same, 'that it will rain,' but that content relates to the world in different psychological modes: belief, fear, hope, desire, etc."[165]

---

[161] Along with materialism and dualism, Searle surveys the inadequacies of behaviorism, monism, functionalism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism, and computationalism. Related concepts have to do with freewill, animal minds, conscious robots, cognition, and unconscious states. See Searle, *Mind*; Searle, *Rediscovery*; Searle, "Animal Minds," pages 61–76 in *Consciousness and Language*; repr. of *MidwestSP* 19 (1994): 206–219.

[162] Searle, e-mail message to author, September 13, 2006.

[163] Searle, "Response: The Mind-Body Problem," in *John Searle and His Critics* (eds. E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick; PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), 141.

[164] Searle discusses the four points of similarity between speech acts and intentional states (*Intentionality*, 5–11).

[165] Searle, *Mind*, 166.

1.3.2.1.2. *Direction of Fit*
Each *S*(*p*) has a direction of fit. If someone has a belief (*S*) that it is raining (*p*), and it is actually raining, then the belief-holder achieves a mind-to-world (↓) direction of fit because the intentional state matches reality. If someone desires (*S*) that it rain (*p*) and it starts to rain, then the direction of fit becomes world-to-mind (↑) because of the attempt to match reality with the intentional state.[166] When a direction of fit exists already in the world, then it is null or empty, symbolized by Ø. "Thus, if I am sorry that I stepped on your foot, or I am glad that the sun is shining, I take it for granted that I stepped on your foot and that the sun is shining."[167]

1.3.2.1.3. *Conditions of Satisfaction*
For Searle, conditions of satisfaction are essential for comprehending intentionality. Each *S* with a mind-to-world (↓) or world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit must meet the conditions of satisfaction. For a person's belief that it is raining to be true and fit reality, it must be raining. A person's desire for it rain is satisfied only if it rains.[168] Just as a person can perform pretend speech acts in fiction, it is possible to believe in fictional or nonexistent entities (e.g., 'Santa Claus').[169] Searle distinguishes between the propositional content of a belief and the object of a belief.[170]

1.3.2.1.4. *Causal Self-Referential Intentional States*
Searle separates regular intentional states from causal self-referential intentional states. Causal self-referential intentional states are visual perceptions, memories, and intentional actions. Unlike intentional states that have only directions of fit, each causal self-referential intentional state has both a direction of fit and a direction of causation. With visual perceptions or memories, the direction of fit is mind-to-world (↓) (e.g., 'I see that there is a yellow station wagon there,' 'The cat is on the mat,' and 'I remember that I went on a picnic yesterday'). The direction of causation is world-to-mind (↑) in that the way things occur causes a person to perceive or remember them that way (e.g., the presence of the cat on the mat causes the visual perception of seeing that the cat is on the mat; the event of going on a picnic yesterday causes the memory of having gone

[166] Searle, *Mind*, 167–168.
[167] Searle, *Mind*, 169.
[168] Searle, *Mind*, 169.
[169] Searle, *Intentionality*, 17–18; Searle, *Mind*, 160, 165.
[170] Searle, *Intentionality*, 17.

on a picnic). To meet the conditions of satisfaction, perceptions must be caused by visual experiences and memories must be caused by the events remembered.[171]

An intentional action is another type of causal self-referential intentional state.[172] Searle gives an example of intending to reach a book on the shelf. Succeeding in an intention to reach a book on the top shelf has a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit. The direction of causation is mind-to-world (↓) in that the intention to reach the book causes the person to succeed in reaching it. To meet the conditions of satisfaction, an intention to do something must generate the performance of the intended action.[173]

1.3.2.1.5. *The Network and the Background*

The structure of intentionality consists of two other mental phenomena, the network and the background. In *Intentionality*, published four years after *Expression and Meaning*, Searle develops his theories of the network and the background in terms of their 'holistic' and 'indexical' aspects. Just as consciousness is a subjective first-person mental phenomenon, the network and the background inform a person's experiences, perceptions, memories, and inclinations.[174]

Searle includes the background and the network to work out the problem of 'particularity' with respect to 'first-person intentionality.'[175] For example, Bill Jones has a visual perception of his wife Sally. His ability to identify his wife upon seeing her depends on his memories of past experiences with her. Sally causes his memories and perceptions of seeing and knowing her.[176] Jones's particular network and background allow him to have a visual perception of Sally, perhaps even of 'twin Sally.'

> From Jones's point of view, each of his experiences is not just an experience that happens to someone; it is rather *his* experience. The Network of Intentional states that he is aware of is *his* Network and the Background capacities he makes use of have to do with *his* Background. No matter how

---

[171] Searle, *Mind*, 170–171. Searle provides an extended analysis on "The Intentionality of Perception," pages 37–78 in *Intentionality*. The content of one's beliefs can be inconsistent with the content of one's visual experiences (e.g., the size of the moon appears to change); see Searle, *Intentionality*, 55–56.

[172] Searle distinguishes between *prior intentions* and *intentions in action* (*Intentionality*, 84–87; *Mind*, 171).

[173] Searle, *Mind*, 171. For details, see Searle's chapter on "Intention and Action," pages 79–111 in *Intentionality*.

[174] Searle, *Intentionality*, 66–71.

[175] Searle, *Intentionality*, 64, 65.

[176] Searle, *Intentionality*, 63.

> qualitatively similar Jones's experience is to twin Jones's and no matter how type identical his whole Network of Intentional states is to twin Jones's, from Jones's point of view there is no doubt that these are his experiences, his beliefs, his memories, his propensities; in short, his Network and his Background [Searle's italics and capitalization].[177]

The network consists of a mass of interrelated intentional states (i.e., beliefs, hopes, fears, and desires). Intentional states occur in "whole messy networks" rather than in "neat little packages," says Searle.[178] Consider the way in which a person's network operates with the belief that it is raining:

> If I believe, for example, that it is raining, I cannot just have that belief in isolation. I must believe, for example, that rain consists of drops of water, that these fall out of the sky, that they generally go down and not up, that they make the ground wet, that they come out of clouds in the sky, and so on more or less indefinitely. Of course, someone might have the belief that it is raining and lack some of these other beliefs, but in general it seems that the belief that it is raining is only the belief that it is because of its position in a '*network*' of beliefs and other intentional states. And we can think of the totality of one's intentional states as forming an elaborate interacting network. We can even say that an intentional state only functions, that is it only determines its conditions of satisfaction, relative to the network of which it is a part [Searle's italics].[179]

Likewise, according to the hypothesis of the network, owning a car comprises an assortment of related beliefs and other intentional states regarding transportation, roadways, cars as moving objects, and buying or selling automobiles.[180]

Whereas the network is a person's interconnected intentional states, the background is a person's pre-intentional capacities to represent and form intentions to perform an action.[181] The background is "a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place."[182] The background consists of non-intentional, presupposed mental abilities, capacities, dispositions, and ways of coping with the world.[183]

---

177 Searle, *Intentionality*, 66.
178 Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 154.
179 Searle, *Mind*, 172.
180 Searle, *Mind*, 172–173; Searle, *Rediscovery*, 176.
181 Searle, *Rediscovery*, 187; Searle, *Intentionality*, 144.
182 Searle, *Intentionality*, 20, 143.
183 Searle, *Rediscovery*, 196.

> All conscious intentionality—all thought, perception, understanding, etc.—determines conditions of satisfaction only relative to a set of capacities that are not and could not be part of that very conscious state. The actual content by itself is insufficient to determine the conditions of satisfaction.[184]

The background is about ontological 'know-hows' or 'assumptions' as opposed to 'knowing-that' (epistemological). "[T]he hardness of tables manifests itself in the fact that I know how to sit at a table, I can write on a table, I put stacks of books on tables, I use a table as a work bench, and so on. And as I do each of these things I do not in addition think unconsciously to myself, 'it offers resistance to touch.' "[185]

A person's background capacities also factor in when determining the literal meanings of words. For example, the connotations of 'open' differ depending on the context:

> Tom opened the door.
> Sally opened her eyes.
> The carpenters opened the wall.
> Sam opened his book to page 37.
> The surgeon opened the wound.[186]

Searle distinguishes between 'deep background' and 'local background.' The deep background consists of general know-how capacities such as eating, drinking, walking, perceiving, and recognizing. A person's local background consists of specific practices related to one's social or cultural environment (e.g., driving, handling money, or refrigeration).[187] A close relationship exists between both types of background.

> If you read the description of a dinner party at the home of the Geurmantes' in Proust, you are likely to find some features of the description puzzling. That has to do with differences in local cultural practices. But there are certain things you can take for granted. For example, the participants did not eat by stuffing the food in their ears. That is a matter of deep Background.[188]

An ambiguous line lies between discerning 'how things are for me' and 'how I do things.'

---

[184] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 189.

[185] Searle, *Intentionality*, 142; Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 117.

[186] Searle, *Intentionality*, 144, 145. On literal sentence meaning and background assumptions, see Searle's chapter, "Literal Meaning," pages 117–136 in *Expression and Meaning*.

[187] Searle, *Intentionality*, 143–144, 153–154; Searle, *Rediscovery*, 194.

[188] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 194.

> It is, for example, part of my preintentional stance toward the world that I recognize degrees of the hardness of things as part of 'how things are' and that I have numerous physical skills as part of 'how to do things'. But I cannot activate my preintentional skill of, say, peeling oranges independently of my preintentional stance toward the hardness of things. I can, for example, intend to peel an orange, but I cannot in that way intend to peel a rock or a car; and that is not because I have an unconscious belief, 'you can peel an orange but you cannot peel a rock or a car' but rather because the preintentional stance I take toward oranges (how things are) allow for a completely different range of possibilities (how to do things) from that which I take toward rocks or cars.[189]

A person's intentional states, perceptions, and thoughts reveal the background.[190] These background abilities expand to accommodate deeper levels of intentionality. A beginning skier may be able to form only a basic intention of putting weight on the skis. An intermediate skier can form a deeper intention to turn left or right. An advanced skier's intention, on the other hand, may be to 'ski this slope.'[191] Intentional content occurs inside the parameters of one's background capacities.

> The Background not only shapes the application of the intentional content—what counts as 'driving to work,' for example; but the existence of the intentional content in the first place requires the Background abilities—without a terrific apparatus you can't even have the intentionality involved in 'driving to work,' for example.[192]

Is the background a social phenomenon? Human beings are biological and social beings; however, says Searle, the background "is not a set of things nor a set of mysterious relations between ourselves and things, rather it is simply a set of skills, stances, preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, practices, and habits."[193]

Consider the background features required just for going to the refrigerator to get a cold beer:

> The biological and cultural resources that I must bring to bear on this task, even to form the intention to perform the task, are (considered in a certain light) truly staggering. But without these resources I could not form the intention at all: standing, walking, opening and closing doors, manipulating bottles, glass, refrigerators, opening, pouring and drinking.

---

189 Searle, *Intentionality*, 144.
190 Searle, *Rediscovery*, 196.
191 Searle, *Rediscovery*, 195.
192 Searle, *Rediscovery*, 195.
193 Searle, *Intentionality*, 154.

> The activation of these capacities would normally involve presentations and representations, e.g., I have to see the door in order to open the door, but the ability to recognize the door and the ability to open the door are not themselves further representations. It is such nonrepresentational capacities that constitute the Background.[194]

In *Rediscovery of the Mind*, Searle mentions how his concept of the background has evolved over the past three decades.[195] Although no one can prove its existence, Searle argues that whatever one chooses to call it, the mental phenomenon behind representation, intentional states, and language must be non-representational, non-intentional, and non-linguistic.[196]

The background remains one of Searle's most controversial theories.[197] To understand Searle, I asked him whether he considers the background and proper brain function to be one and the same or if proper brain function is what makes the background function. He replies,

> The situation with the background is much more complicated. I think there are several different sorts of things going in my account of the background, and they need to be carefully distinguished, but certainly the background has to be realized in brain capacities. And since the background consists of abilities and these abilities are realized in the brain, it follows that the background is realized in the brain.[198]

In summary, each individual has intentionality and a network, which occur against a set of background capacities (compare Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts with his structure of intentionality in tables 2.1. & 2.2.).[199]

---

[194] Searle, *Intentionality*, 143.

[195] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 175.

[196] See Searle's chapter on "The Background," pages 141–159 in *Intentionality*; Searle, "*Some Arguments for the Hypothesis of the Background*" pages 178–186 in *Rediscovery*; and Searle, "*Common Misunderstandings of the Background*" pages 191–196 in *Rediscovery*. Searle clarifies what he means by the term 'mental.' The function of a person's background is independent from the workings of the world in that "all of my [b]ackground capacities are 'in my head'" (Searle, "Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action," in *John Searle and His Critics*, [eds. E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick; PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991], 291).

[197] Barry Stroud, "The Background of Thought," pages 245–258 in *John Searle and His Critics* (eds. E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick; PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991).

[198] Searle, e-mail message to author, September 13, 2006.

[199] Searle, *Intentionality*, 55, 66–71. See also Searle, *Rediscovery*, 176.

Next, I shall take up Searle's distinction between intentionality (with t) and intensionality (with s) before moving to a survey of other contributions to speech act theory.

1.3.2.2. *Intentionality-with-a-t and Intensionality-with-an-s*

In *Intentionality*, Searle separates 'intentional-with-a-t' states and speech acts from 'intensional-with-an-s' states and reports.[200] The distinction has to do with the problem of universals and the logic of language.[201] "Intentionality-with-a-t is that property of the mind (brain) by which it is able to represent other things; intensionality-with-an-s is the failure of certain sentences, statements, etc., to satisfy certain logical tests for extensionality."[202] The two categories differ, yet confusion arises when attempting to find something intensional about intentionality.[203] "Though [i]ntentionality is a feature of both speech acts and mental states and intensionality is a feature of some mental states and some speech acts, there is a clear distinction between the two."[204] Of the many tests for 'extensionality' (i.e., everything that can be said about a 'class'), the two most common are the 'substitution test' and the 'existential inference test.'[205] In the following examples,

> Caesar crossed the Rubicon.
> Caesar is identical with Mark Anthony's best friend.
> Mark Anthony's best friend crossed the Rubicon.

the class 'Caesar' is extensional and passes the test for substitution in this case.[206] Conversely, from the statements

> Caesar is identical with Mark Anthony's best friend.
> Brutus believes that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

---

[200] Searle, *Intentionality*, 24–26, 180–196. For a condensed version, see Searle, *Mind*, 174–178.

[201] For a detailed rendering of these two categories, see Alan R. Lacey, "Intensionality and intentionality," pages 158–162 in *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (3d ed.; London: Routledge, 1996). Briefly stated, "Intuitively extensions can be thought of as the extents which certain kinds of terms range over and intensions as that in virtue of which they do so. Extensions correspond roughly to classes, and intensions to properties" (Lacey, "Intensionality and intentionality," 158).

[202] Searle, *Intentionality*, 24.

[203] Searle, *Intentionality*, 24–26; Searle, *Mind*, 177–178.

[204] Searle, *Intentionality*, 180.

[205] Searle, *Intentionality*, 23, 181; Searle, *Mind*, 175–176.

[206] Searle, *Mind*, 175.

Table 2.1. Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts

Features	Assertives	Directives	Commissives
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$	$!\uparrow W(H \text{ does } A)$	$C\uparrow I(S \text{ does } A)$
Illocutionary point	$\vdash$ commits speaker (S) to the truth of the expressed proposition	! stands for S trying to get hearer (H) to do something	C commits S to some future course of action
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$	world-to-word $\uparrow$	world-to-word $\uparrow$
Psychological state (sincerity condition)	belief (B) that p	want, wish, or desire (W)	intention (I)
Propositional content	any proposition (p)	H does some future action A	S does some future action A
Example sentences	I predict he will come.	I order you to leave.	I promise to pay you the money.
Example verbs	assert state boast complain conclude deduce	ask order beg pray command request plead invite permit advise dare defy challenge	promise pledge vow

Table 2.1. (*Continued*)

Expressives	Declarations	Assertive declarations
$E\emptyset(P)(S/H$+property)	$D\updownarrow\emptyset(p)$	$D_a\downarrow\updownarrow B(p)$
E = expressing the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs indicated in the propositional content	D = the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world	D_a = issuing an assertive with the force of a declaration
null Ø	word-to-world and world-to-word ↕	assertive: word-to-world ↓ declaration: both directions ↕
different possible states can be expressed (P)	null ($\emptyset$)	belief (B) that p
proposition ascribes some property to S or H	any proposition (p)	any proposition (p)
I apologize for stepping on your toe.	I nominate you.	You are out. You are guilty.
thank deplore apologize condole congratulate welcome	pronounce appoint declare resign fire excommunicate christen [extra-linguistic institutions involved]	overlap between assertives and declarations [extra-linguistic institutions involved]

Source: Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979; repr., 1999), 12–29.

Table 2.2. Searle's structure of intentionality

	Possible intentional states (*S*)		
Features	Belief	Desire	Remorse
Propositional content (*p*)	I believe that it will rain.	I desire that it will rain.	I am sorry for stepping on your foot
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	null Ø
Direction of causation	…	…	…
Conditions of satisfaction	It must be raining for my belief to be true and fit reality.	My desire is fulfilled only if it rains.	I take it for granted that I previously stepped on your foot.
Network	a person's indexical (i.e., particular) interconnected system of intentional states (e.g., If I believe that it is raining, then I must also believe that raindrops consist of water, that they fall downward from clouds in the sky, that they make the ground wet, etc.)	idem	idem
Background	non-intentional presupposed mental capacities that allow a person to have intentional states and causal self-referential intentional states	idem	idem

Table 2.2. (*Continued*)

Causal self-referential intentional states		
Perceptions	Memories	Intentional actions
I see that the cat is on the mat.	I remember that I went on a picnic yesterday.	I intend to reach the book on the top shelf.
mind-to-world ↓	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑
world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑	mind-to-world ↓
The cat's being on the mat causes me to see that the cat is on the mat.	My going on a picnic yesterday causes me to remember that I went on a picnic.	My intention to reach to book causes me to succeed in reaching it.
idem	idem	idem
idem	idem	idem

Source: Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983; repr., 1999); Searle, *Mind: A Brief Introduction* (FPS; eds. J. M. Fischer and J. Perry; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 166–178.

it does not follow that

> Brutus believes that Mark Anthony's best friend crossed the Rubicon.

In this case, Brutus might disagree with the class 'Caesar' of having the 'property' of being Mark Anthony's best friend. "Such a sentence is said to be *intensional* with respect to the occurrence of Caesar. It fails the test of substitutability [Searle's italics]."[207] Note how a speaker can make intensional-with-an-s speech acts about someone's intentional-with-a-t speech acts and have intensional-with-an-s mental states about someone else's intentional-with-a-t mental states.

What does the intentionality (with t) and intensionality (with s) distinction have to do with the NT writers and their metaphorical assertions of Christ's blood later on? In my fourth chapter, when analyzing John 6:52–59, I shall distinguish John's own speech acts from his reports of what the Judeans and Jesus said about Jesus' flesh and blood. Likewise, in probing Rev 7:13–14, I shall separate John's speech acts from his report of what the elder said to him about the blood of the Lamb.

In closing, what sets Searle apart from other speech act theorists is that he situates the philosophy of language in the philosophy of mind. The next section touches on a number of other contributions to speech act theory.

1.4. Other Contributions Made to Speech Act Theory

Speech act theorists examine how a speaker employs language. Many of the essayists in *Foundations of Speech Act Theory*, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, and *Essays in Speech Act Theory* collected by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo attempt to question, improve, or expand Austin's and Searle's theories of speech acts.[208] These include semantic, pragmatic, or grammatical approaches and occurrences of speech acts in natural language, discourse, conversation, and theories of action.

---

[207] Searle, *Mind*, 175–176. To paraphrase Searle, the test for existential inference/generalization checks for the valid existence of objects with certain properties. Compare the sentences 'John lives in Kansas City' and 'John is looking for the lost city of Atlantis.' In the first sentence, one can make a valid inference that John lives in a city—Kansas City—that exists. In the second sentence, however, one cannot infer that John is actually looking for Atlantis since Atlantis may not exist (Searle, *Mind*, 176).

[208] Tsohatzidis, ed., *Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1994; repr., 2002); Vanderveken and Kubo, *Essays in Speech Act Theory* (PB:NS 77; ed. A.H. Jucker; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002).

In Armin Burkhardt's edited collection, *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions*, some philosophers trace the history of speech act theory by comparing Searle's theory of speech acts against theories of 'social acts' by Thomas Reid and by Adolf Reinach.[209] Several of the other contributors critique Searle's semantic approach to speech act theory, including his theories of meaning, metaphor, and intentionality.[210]

Austin and Searle analyze individual statements. Other philosophers go beyond a speaker's individual illocutionary acts to consider whole conversations and a speaker's greater linguistic community.[211]

1.4.1. *Grice*

Grice formulates an alternative theory of speech acts to the conventional approaches of Austin and Searle. Grice considers the natural flow and implicit exchanges of conversations known as 'conversational implicature.' His 'Cooperative Principle' consists of four Kantian tenets for successful conversation: 'quantity,' 'quality,' 'relation,' and 'manner.' Summarizing his four principles, Grice says, "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."[212] According to Grice, a speaker often means more than what is said. Grice addresses the complexities associated with utterance, sentence, and word meaning.[213]

---

[209] Barry Smith, "Towards a History of Speech Act Theory," pages 29–61 in *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle* (ed. A. Burkhardt; FCC; Library ed.; eds. R. Posner and G. Meggle; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990); John F. Crosby, "Speech Act Theory and Phenomenology," pages 62–88 in *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle* (ed. A. Burkhardt; FCC; Library ed.; eds. R. Posner and G. Meggle; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).

[210] See the various articles in Armin Burkhardt, ed., *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle* (FCC; Library ed.; eds. R. Posner and G. Meggle; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).

[211] An extensive bibliography on speech act theory has been published by Robert B. Meyers and Karen Hopkins ("A Speech-Act Theory Bibliography," *Centrum* 5/2 [1977]: 73–108).

[212] Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 24–28, 26.

[213] Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," pages 117–137 in *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); repr. of pages 54–70 in *The Philosophy of Language* (ed. J.R. Searle; ORP; ed. G.J. Warnock; London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Of Grice's approach, J.G. Du Plessis says that it addresses that which occurs 'between the lines.'[214] Searle purports that Grice minimizes how conventions are tied to meaning. On the relationship of literal meaning, speaker meaning, and authorial intention, Searle identifies two typical lines of argument: meaning located in an individual's intention to communicate (Grice) and meaning determined by social conventions (Austin and Searle).[215]

1.4.2. *Bach and Harnish*

In *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts* (1979), Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish set out to improve the theories of Jerrold M. Sadock[216] and Searle. Bach and Harnish assert that linguistic communication involves a speaker sending a message and a hearer inferring the speaker's intentional act. They challenge Austin's theory of illocutionary acts tied to conventions and Searle's emphasis on constitutive rules because both neglect the aspect of 'communicative illocutionary acts' in successful speech acts. The 'intention-and-inference' model proposed by Bach and Harnish factors in hearer participation to discern the meaning of a speaker's linguistic communication.[217]

1.4.3. *Recanati*

Philosophers approach the question of meaning from different angles. François Recanati uses a pragmatic approach to challenge traditionalists who separate semantic meaning from pragmatic meaning. He describes the traditional view of semantics and pragmatics as follows:

---

[214] Du Plessis, "Speech-Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation with Special Reference to G.N. Leech's Pragmatic Principles," in *Text and Interpretation: New Approaches in the Criticism of the New Testament* (ed. P.J. Hartin and J.H. Petzer; NTTS 15; ed. B.M. Metzger; New York: E.J. Brill, 1991), 133.

[215] Searle, "Individual Intentionality and Social Phenomena in the Theory of Speech Acts," pages 142–155 in *Consciousness and Language*.

[216] Sadock proposes a theory called 'abstract-performative' to argue that illocutionary force comprises the meaning of sentences (*Toward A Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts* [New York: Academic Press, 1974]).

[217] Bach and Harnish, *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979), xvi, 120–134. See also Strawson's contribution on the subject ("Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," in *Philosophy of Language* [ed. J.R. Searle; London: Oxford University Press, 1971; repr., 1974], 23–38; originally published in *PhRev* 73 (1964): 439–460).

> [S]yntax and semantics are concerned with language as such, that is, with language taken as a system of rules or conventions. Pragmatics, on the other hand, studies language from what might be called the outside; its object is not language itself, but what speakers and hearers do with it. As the study of the empirical behavior of language users, pragmatics is closer to psychology or sociology than to logic or linguistics.[218]

For both Austin and Searle, rules or conventions govern the meaning of illocutionary acts. In "Performative Utterances," Austin says that the necessary conventions must exist for performative utterances to take effect, despite the utterance functioning as a grammatically correct statement.[219] Searle and Vanderveken say that the components of an illocutionary act include a speaker, listener, time, place, and psychological states (e.g., desire or intention).[220]

1.4.4. *Motsch*

Austin asserts that the meaning of a word depends on its context in a sentence.[221] He says, "The truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances."[222] Wolfgang Motsch, however, considers the 'situational context' of a speech act. "A situation becomes a communicative situation due to the intention of a person to influence the mind(s) of an audience by means of an utterance."[223] Motsch's thesis resembles what Searle says concerning the context of a speaker's speech acts. Searle criticizes those philosophers who detach the literal meaning of a word or sentence from its context.[224] One must rely on a "background of practices, institutions,

---

[218] Recanati, *Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances* (CSP; ed. S. Shoemaker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5; originally published as *Les Enoncés performatifs* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981).

[219] Austin, "Performative Utterances," 235, 237. Austin affirms that at times a speaker can achieve the 'same acts' (e.g., to marry) by means of 'non-verbal procedures' ("Performative Utterances," 237).

[220] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 27.

[221] Austin, "The Meaning of a Word," in Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock; 3d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 56.

[222] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 145.

[223] Motsch, "Situational Context and Illocutionary Force," in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics* (eds. J.R. Searle, F. Kiefer, and M. Bierwisch; SLL:TSLP 10; ed. J. Hintikka and S. Peters; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), 158.

[224] Searle, "The Background of Meaning," in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics* (eds. J.R. Searle, F. Kiefer, and M. Bierwisch; SLL:TSLP 10; ed. J. Hintikka and S. Peters; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), 223.

facts of nature, regularities, and ways of doing things" as opposed to just semantic meaning.[225]

1.4.5. *Hornsby*

Jennifer Hornsby, in her critique of Austin's illocution category, says that conventions fail to create a true separation between illocutionary and perlocutionary categories.[226] She proposes a theory of 'reciprocity' to secure Austin's theory of illocution. "If reciprocity replaces convention as the key to illocution, illocution can assume its proper place in an account of language use."[227] Hornsby defines reciprocity as

> the condition which provides for the particular way … in which one speech act can arise from another, more basic one. When reciprocity obtains between people, they are such as to recognize one another's speech as it is meant to be taken.[228]

'Communicative action' between people in a greater socio-political context is the point of illocution.[229] She says, "[O]nly where reciprocity prevails, are you fully understood. One might say that 'perfect' illocutionary acts are done invoking reciprocity."[230] Conversely, however, Levinson remarks that the "interactional emphasis (on what the recipient(s) of an illocutionary act must think or do) in Austin's work has unfortunately been neglected in later work in speech act theory."[231]

1.4.6. *Vanderveken*

Daniel Vanderveken calls to task those speech act theorists who treat a speaker's individual statements in a disjointed fashion. He identifies the 'collective intention' of speakers who perform illocutionary acts in conversation. Vanderveken says, "Speakers seldom speak and talk just for

---

[225] Searle, "The Background of Meaning," 227. Searle gives examples of the different meanings of the word 'cut' depending on the context (e.g., 'Sally cut the cake,' 'Sam cut two classes last week,' and 'Bob can't cut the mustard') in "The Background of Meaning," 221, 227.

[226] Hornsby, "Illocution and its Significance," in *Foundations of Speech-Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives* (ed. S.L. Tsohatzidis; London: Routledge, 1994), 191.

[227] Hornsby, "Illocution and its Significance," 193.

[228] Hornsby, "Illocution and its Significance," 192.

[229] Hornsby, "Illocution and its Significance," 187.

[230] Hornsby, "Illocution and its Significance," 198.

[231] Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 237.

the purpose of making isolated individual utterances."[232] If a speaker's illocutionary acts directly impact a hearer, then a hearer is an active participant in the speech act situation. Searle and Vanderveken, in *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*, develop a theory of 'illocutionary logic' for illocutionary acts and illocutionary force. They say that unlike other types of speech acts (e.g., implicit, utterance, or propositional), illocutionary acts function as "the minimal units of human communication."[233] A theory of illocutionary logic must entail a theory of meaning.[234]

Searle and Vanderveken give importance to how a speaker's oral utterances occur in conversations and lengthy discourses.[235] They liken the pattern of a conversation to that of a game, yet in a different way than Wittgenstein's theory of limitless language games. For Searle and Vanderveken, games usually have a restricted number of moves. So a restricted number of illocutionary acts also occur in conversations. "The key to understanding the structure of conversations is to see that each illocutionary act creates the possibility of a finite and usually quite limited set of appropriate illocutionary acts as replies."[236]

1.4.7. *Moulin and Rousseau*

Bernard Moulin and Daniel Rousseau label speech acts as the 'building blocks' of conversations. Concerning conversational partners, Moulin and Rousseau follow Wittgenstein in describing a conversation as a language game between 'locutors' and 'interlocutors.'[237] They question Searle and Vanderveken's application of illocutionary logic to conversations because its conditions of success or satisfaction pertain only to a speaker's isolated statements. "Speech acts are not performed independently of

---

[232] Vanderveken, "Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory," in *Essays in Speech Act Theory* (eds. D. Vanderveken and S. Kubo; PB:NS 77; ed. A.H. Jucker; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002), 27.

[233] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 1. Searle and Vanderveken say, "A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are describing is essentially a theory of illocutionary commitment as determined by illocutionary force" (*Foundations*, 6).

[234] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 7.

[235] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 11.

[236] Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 21.

[237] Moulin and Rousseau, "An Approach for Modelling and Simulating Conversations," in *Essays in Speech Act Theory* (PB:NS 77; eds. D. Vanderveken and S. Kubo; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002), 175–176, 182, 184.

each other, but they participate in conversational structures (Winograd and Flores 1986) which are often influenced by societal conventions."[238]

1.5. Summary

Wittgenstein and Austin each developed their philosophies of language to examine how speakers employ words. Searle is the primary developer and contributor to speech act theory since Austin with his taxonomy of illocutionary acts and structure of intentionality. Searle roots his theory of speech acts in the philosophy of mind. Other contributors to speech act theory deserve recognition for bringing awareness to speaker intention and inference, reciprocity, linguistic communities, conversations, discourses and situational contexts, yet Searle's contribution to speech act theory and mind remains unprecedented.

[238] Moulin and Rousseau, "Approach for Modelling," 183.

CHAPTER TWO

SPEECH ACT THEORY, SCRIPTURE, AND THEOLOGY

2.1. Introduction

The emerging interest in speech act theory among biblical scholars and theologians over the last several decades has produced a new set of obstacles. It raises the question of how to bridge two distinct disciplines—the philosophy of language with biblical studies and theology. Another hurdle is getting familiar with the technical vocabulary of speech act theory and its different taxonomies and developments since Austin in the 1950s. Many biblical scholars working with speech act theory have yet to make the theory less convoluted and more accessible for the wider guild.

The following survey traces how biblical scholars and theologians have employed speech act theory the past forty years. Certain trends can be detected. The contemporary speech act theorist Searle has made a substantial contribution to the field, but biblical scholars and theologians have yet to utilize his philosophies of language and mind to their full potential. Speech act analyses of biblical texts tend to combine several theories of speech acts with mixed results, employing Searle's categories in a sporadic fashion. Next, whereas speech act theorists are concerned with the actions performed by a speaker or writer, some biblical scholars suggest that it is the language performing the action (e.g., "language which performs an act of asserting"[1]). Even so, speech act theory continues to gain recognition from biblical scholars and theologians interested in the function of biblical texts, religious language, hermeneutics, and reader involvement.

[1] Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 337.

2.2. Emerging Interest in Austin's Philosophy of Language

2.2.1. *Michalson and Types of Statements*

In the 1960s and 1970s, biblical scholars began to take notice of Austin's philosophy of language. Since then, awareness of and interest in speech act theory has increased.[2] Carl Michalson (1915–1965), who discussed the influence of analytical philosophy upon theology in a 1961 article, referred briefly to Austin. Michalson said that even simple phrases such as 'This is his' could have many connotations. Regarding this phrase, Michalson asked,

> Is it a descriptive statement, merely naming a thing? Is it an ascriptive statement, designating what belongs to whom? Or is it a 'performatory' statement (J.L. Austin) actually effecting a transaction?[3]

2.2.2. *Evans and Self-Involvement*

Donald D. Evans, with his hermeneutic of self-involvement, has influenced some biblical scholars working with speech act theory such as Dietmar Neufeld, Anthony C. Thiselton, Richard S. Briggs, and Jim W. Adams.[4] In *The Logic of Self-Involvement* (1963), Evans attempts to link self-involvement and Austin's theory of performatives. Evans, who had worked three terms under Austin at Oxford, had this to say of his instructor, "J.L. Austin's discovery of 'performative' language gives us a fundamental insight concerning linguistic or logical self-involvement."[5]

---

[2] I cover some but not all of the biblical scholars and theologians. For more details, consult Briggs, "The Uses of Speech-Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation," *CR:BS* 9 [2001]: 229–276, and Jim W. Adams, "Utilizations of Speech Act Theory in Old Testament Interpretation," pages 64–86 in *The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40–55* (LHBOTS 448; eds. C.V. Camp and A. Mein; New York: T&T Clark, 2006).

[3] Michalson, "The Ghost of Logical Positivism," *ChrSchol* 43 (1960): 224. Frederick Ferré makes an early reference to Austin's article "Other Minds" in which Austin discussed the proper use of language (Ferré, *Language, Logic and God* [New York: Harper & Row, 1961], 62).

[4] Vincent Brümmer includes Austin's distinctions and Evans's concept of 'onlooks' (*Theology and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction* [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982], 10, 127).

[5] Evans, *The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator* (LPT; eds. J. McIntyre and I.T. Ramsey: London: S.C.M. Press, 1963), 11, 27.

Thiselton refers to Evans's work as "Austinian 'logic of self-involvement.'"[6] Austin, however, did not use the term self-involvement.

Austin's description of a promise as an inner, sacred act comes close to what Evans means by self-involvement. Austin said, "'I promise to . . .' obliges me—puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle."[7] A question arises concerning where Evans acquired the notion of self-involvement. He credits two moral philosophers at Oxford, R.M. Hare and Patrick Nowell-Smith, for their concept of 'the language of morals.'[8] It is likely that both Hare and Smith were the sources of Evans's idea of self-involvement.

In part one of his book, Evans inquires into the philosophical uses of Austin's performative category and parts of Austin's taxonomy of English verbs as a basis for distinguishing between ordinary and religious language. Evans's category of 'flat constatives' applies to ordinary statements (e.g., 'Jones built the house'). He has a separate category for self-involving statements such as 'The Creator made the world.'[9] He retains Austin's original taxonomy of commissives, exercitives, behabitives, and verdictives, replacing Austin's fifth class, expositives, with flat constatives. He classifies all five categories as performatives.[10] Evans refers to moral philosophy when outlining his methodology for the first half of his book:

> Part I is very relevant to important issues in the philosophy of mind (for example, the nature of intentions, opinions and feelings), and in moral philosophy (for example, the 'autonomy of value': no statement of fact entails a value-judgment).[11]

In an attempt to bring in the philosophy of mind (e.g., a speaker's intentions or attitudes), Evans discusses a speaker's sincere opinions and feelings. The difficulty is that he does not distinguish his concept of 'self.' Evans says,

> [I] shall argue that a study of linguistic self-involvement in religious language fails to answer important questions concerning the nature of

---

[6] Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 570.

[7] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 10.

[8] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 11. See Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954).

[9] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 11, 12.

[10] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 30–40. Evans summarizes the differences between his work and Austin's (*Logic of Self-Involvement*, 71, n. 1).

[11] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 13.

> personal or 'existential' self-involvement in religion; but such a study [linguistic?] is an indispensable prerequisite.[12]

Evans avoids the problem and works toward a linguistic analysis of self-involvement apart from 'personal' (i.e., ontological) phenomena.[13]

In part two, Evans inquires into the theological implications of self-involving statements (e.g., 'God as Creator'). God's self-involvement shows up in the creation of Israel and what Evans calls 'world-nature.' Believers reciprocate with their own self-involvement in the sense of Christian commitment, duty, or moral obligation to the Creator God. Evans, appealing to Austin's categories, says,

> The efficacious word of God in Creation has not only supernatural causal power but also Exercitive, Verdictive and Commissive force; and man's word concerning the Creator who is Lord, Appointer, Evaluator and Guarantor is a self-involving acknowledgment.[14]

Proper feelings, attitudes, behaviors, and 'onlooks' reflect one's inner commitment to God and the public expression of that commitment in proper worship and lifestyle choices.[15] Evans's theory of self-involvement is more characteristic of morality than speech act theory.[16]

In his final chapter, "Some Further Problems," Evans revisits the subject of self by distinguishing existential self-involvement from linguistic self-involvement. He argues that a study of 'linguistic acts' must come first.

> A philosophical study of religious self-involvement should include an analysis of linguistic self-involvement. Linguistic analysis is necessary; but it may nevertheless be *inadequate*, not only religiously but philosophically. My own account of 'sincerity' or 'meaning what one says' was inadequate. The main point was a negative one, a rejection of introspective psychology or phenomenology as a solution; I said that there need not be any special mental event or activity concomitant with, and in addition to, the utterance

---

[12] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 82, n. 2.

[13] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 82, n. 2.

[14] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 158.

[15] Evans devotes a chapter to feelings and another chapter to attitudes (*Logic of Self-Involvement*, 79–141). In his chapter on attitudes, Evans develops his concept of onlooks, defined as a person's perceptions of life and material items. For Evans, onlooks are similar to views, perspectives, opinions, outlooks, and conceptions, yet they differ in the sense of 'looking on' or 'considering' (*Logic of Self-Involvement*, 125–134). Evans also distinguishes religious onlooks from secular onlooks (*Logic of Self-Involvement*, 254–257).

[16] Evans's ongoing interest in ethics and religion is detected in his later works (*Struggle and Fulfillment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality* [Cleveland, Ohio: Collins, 1979]; *Faith, Authenticity, and Morality* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980]).

> of the words in which I express my intention or opinion. No positive account was offered, however, and we seemed be left with an ultimate mystery concerning private meaning [Evans's italics].[17]

Evans deserves credit for applying Austin's philosophy of language to religious utterances (e.g., creation language). For the purposes of this study, however, Searle's philosophies of language and mind are employed to analyze the speech acts of five NT texts at the level of speaker intentionality.

Searle indicates that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind and that language arises from intentionality. This relates to Austin's idea of 'utterance-origin.'[18] The value in working exclusively with Searle's categories is discovering how it was possible for the biblical writers and characters to perform their speech acts about the efficacy of Christ's blood, and for their hearers to understand what they meant.

2.2.3. *Funk and Language-Event*

Robert W. Funk (1926–2005) published a book on the NT parables and letters as 'language-event' in 1966.[19] He mentioned Austin's article "Performative Utterances"[20] to suggest that *Sprachereignis* and *Wortgeschehen* (both translated as language-event in English) fit Austin's category of performative language.[21] Funk traced the idea of language-event back to Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling. Funk explained that these theologians modified Rudolf Bultmann's concept of *Heilsereignis* (i.e., 'salvation event'). He also indicated that elements of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of language could be detected in Fuchs, Ebeling, and Bultmann.[22]

Funk followed Austin's original distinction of performative language. Funk said, "a person is not merely *saying* something, he is doing something [Funk's italics]." He suggested the idea that "language itself is an

---

[17] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 260–261.

[18] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 60.

[19] Funk, *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God: The Problem of Language in the New Testament and Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

[20] Austin's article, "Performative Utterances," appeared originally as a BBC talk in 1956.

[21] Funk, *Language*, 26, 28.

[22] Thiselton, who sees the value of self-involving speech acts in the Word and sacraments, affirms what Funk says concerning Heidegger's heavy influence on Fuchs, Ebeling, and Bultmann (Thiselton, "The Hermeneutics of Word and Sacraments: Baptism and the Lord's Supper or the Eucharist," in *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007], 517).

act."[23] Evans has made a similar claim when describing "language as activity, words as deeds."[24] For Austin, speaking is an act. Language is not an act. Austin said, "Actions can only be performed by persons, and obviously in our cases the utterer must be the performer."[25] This challenges the notion that Scripture contains words loaded with special power or magic—a point made already by James Barr, Thiselton, and Kevin J. Vanhoozer.[26]

2.2.4. *High, Robinson, Martinich, and McClendon and Smith*

Several other scholars deserve brief mention. Dallas M. High, in his 1967 book, mentions Austin and Wittgenstein when discussing theological speaking and believing.[27] James M. Robinson makes an indirect reference to Austin in his 1968 article, "Jesus' Parables as God Happening." Robinson compares 'performatory'[28] to a new hermeneutic of 'language as meaningful happening.'[29] A.P. Martinich provides a speech act analysis of seven sacraments (1975).[30] Despite developments of speech act theory after Austin, some theologians such as James Wm. McClendon Jr. (1924–2000) and James M. Smith held to Austin's theory of language to analyze religious language.[31]

---

[23] Funk, *Language*, 26–27.

[24] Evans, *Logic of Self-Involvement*, 162.

[25] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 60. Austin separated the acts that a speaker can perform into phonetic acts, phatic acts, and rhetic acts. He also distinguished among locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts (*How to Do Things*, 96, 92–120).

[26] Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; repr., 1969); Thiselton, "The Supposed Power of Words in Biblical Writings," *JTS* 25 (1974): 283–299; Vanhoozer discusses biblical infallibility and warns against bibliolatry and a quasi-magical or talisman view of Scripture ("God's Mighty Speech Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today," in *First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics* [Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002], 131, 153; repr. of pages 143–181 in *A Pathway into the Holy Scripture* [eds. P.E. Satterthwaite and D.F. Wright; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994]).

[27] High, *Language, Persons, and Belief*, 73, 142 n. 12, 150–153.

[28] Austin replaced the term performatory with performative (*How to Do Things*, 6).

[29] Robinson, "Jesus' Parables as God Happening," in *Jesus and the Historian: Written in Honor of Ernest Cadman Colwell* (ed. F.T. Trotter; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 142.

[30] Martinich, "Sacraments and Speech Acts," *HeyJ* 16 (1975): 289–303, 405–417.

[31] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism* (rev. ed.; Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press, 1994); rev. of *Understanding Religious Convictions* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1975). Nancey Murphy appeals to Austin, McClendon and Smith, and the later works of Stanley Fish to demonstrate the need for understanding the language and meanings of biblical texts in the contexts of the early church and the

2.2.5. *Thiselton and Philosophical Categories*

In the wake of Funk, who employed the concept of language-event to interpret Scripture, Thiselton published his 1970 article titled "The Parables as Language-Event." He introduces Austin by way of acknowledging Funk for making a connection between language-event and Austin's performative category.[32] For Thiselton, philosophical categories are helpful for improving upon Fuchs's hermeneutic of language-event for studying the parables. Thiselton incorporates the philosophies of Austin, Wittgenstein, and others to analyze Fuchs's approach. He also brings in Evans's logic of self-involvement and Austin's five classes of speech acts.[33] Thiselton employs Austin's categories of performatives and assertions to challenge Fuchs's conclusion that the only point of Jesus' parables hinges on creating a new world for the hearer rather than asserting theological and ethical axioms.[34] The parables of Jesus were assertions. Thiselton argues that the lack of assertions in a language is "a featureless waste;" assertions contain necessary presuppositions and implications as part of their meaning.[35]

Three years later, Thiselton published an article to promote three philosophical traditions as hermeneutical tools for NT interpretation:

- existentialism in the work of Heidegger
- three philosophical distinctions made by Hans-Georg Gadamer concerning "the hermeneutical circle, the notion of merging horizons, and the logic of question and answer"[36]
- Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Austin's theory of performatives[37]

---

church today apart from deconstructionist and reader-response approaches. ("Postmodern Philosophy of Language and Textual Relativism," pages 131–151 in *Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics* [Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997]). See Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[32] Thiselton, "The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs's Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy," *SJT* 23 (1970): 438. For a related article, see Thiselton, "The New Hermeneutic," pages 308–333 in *New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and Methods* (ed. I.H. Marshall; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977; repr., 1985).

[33] Thiselton, "Parables as Language-Event," 462, 463.

[34] Thiselton, "Parables as Language-Event," 438–439.

[35] Thiselton, "Parables as Language-Event," 464, 465.

[36] Thiselton, "The Use of Philosophical Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics," *Chm* 87 (1973): 93.

[37] Thiselton, "Use of Philosophical Categories," 88–89, 96–98. Thiselton credits Roger

Thiselton returns to Austin's distinction on performative language in his 1974 article about the 'power' or 'magic' of biblical words.[38] Thiselton, in line with Barr, calls attention to the problem of placing theological or magical layers of meaning onto biblical words and concepts (e.g., 'blessing' and 'cursing'). Austin's categories of performative utterances and conventions help Thiselton to argue that successful speech acts have nothing to do with a magical perception of words. A proposition (*p*) accomplishes nothing apart from the illocutionary point, illocutionary force, and intentional states of the speaker. Searle comments that verbal sounds and written marks acquire semantic meaning:

> [W]hatever else speaking and writing a language consists in, it does consist in the production of certain physical events, such as making sounds out of one's mouth or making marks on paper. In that respect, it is just like any other human behavior. What is special is that those sounds and marks acquire semantic properties. They acquire representational properties relating them to the rest of the world.[39]

Thiselton argues that certain biblical characters (e.g., Isaac, God, prophets, kings) blessed and cursed successfully because of the appropriate circumstances and their authority to do so. These variables shift the perspective concerning the nature of theological language.[40]

2.3. Biblical Scholars and Theologians: Current Trends in Employing Speech Act Theory

Interest in speech act theory for theology and biblical studies increased in the 1980s. Thiselton has made a significant contribution to hermeneutics and philosophy of language with emphasis on Wittgenstein. In 1988, Hugh C. White edited a collection of articles published under the title, *Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism*.[41] Articles range from speech act theory and literary criticism or Old Testament hermeneutics[42] to a

---

Lapointe for mentioning these three philosophical traditions in an article that came out a year before Thiselton's article. See Lapointe, "Hermeneutics Today," *BTB* 2 (1972): 107–154.

[38] Thiselton, "Supposed Power of Words," 283–299.

[39] Searle, *Consciousness and Language*, 149.

[40] Thiselton, "Supposed Power of Words," 293–296.

[41] White, ed., *Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism* [*Semeia* 41] (Decatur, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1988).

[42] White, "Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism," *Semeia* 41 (1988):

discussion of God's speech in which the author attacks Searle and his style of debate.[43] In recent decades, scholars have examined the speech acts of biblical characters and have considered how speech act theory plays a role in biblical interpretation.[44]

2.3.1. *Combining Several Speech Act Theories: Young and Botha*

2.3.1.1. *Young*

The trend among biblical scholars who access speech act theory reflects a limited application of Searle's philosophies of language and mind. Most scholars combine the efforts of several speech-act theorists. Richard A. Young, in a 1989 article, draws from Grice, Searle, and Levinson to examine some conditional statements in the NT (e.g., Martha's words to Jesus concerning Lazarus's death in John 11:21). For Young, Grice's theory of conversational implicature (i.e., a speaker implies more than what is said) can help determine the meaning of Martha's expression. Martha softens her rebuke to Jesus in the form of a conditional sentence because "[t]he last thing she would want to do is to offend him."[45] Traditional grammatical approaches fail to provide a full understanding into the situational context behind Martha's statement and other NT texts.[46] Martha's statement, however, could fit either Searle's assertives class or his expressives class of illocutionary acts. Young asserts, "Speech act theory categorizes utterances according to function rather than form."[47] Young's statement points to the idea that illocutionary force is part of the meaning of conditional statements in Scripture.

1–24; White, "The Value of Speech Act Theory for Old Testament Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 41 (1988): 41–63.

[43] Michael Hancher, "Performative Utterance, the Word of God, and the Death of the Author," *Semeia* 41 (1988): 27–40.

[44] See Karl J. Franklin's article, "Speech Act Verbs and the Words of Jesus," pages 241–261 in *Language in Context: Essays for Robert E. Longacre* (eds. Shin Ja J. Hwang and W.R. Merrifield; SILAPL 107; Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics and the University of Texas at Arlington, 1992).

[45] Young, "A Classification of Conditional Sentences Based on Speech Act Theory," *GTJ* 10/1 (1989): 40.

[46] Young, "A Classification," 32.

[47] Young, "A Classification," 39.

2.3.1.2. *Botha*

J. Eugene Botha, in *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman* (1991), states that he will employ Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts to analyze John 4:1–42,[48] yet Botha accesses Grice's Cooperative Principle and theory of implicature, Geoffrey Leech's modification of Grice's structure in terms of 'interpersonal rhetoric' and 'textual rhetoric,'[49] and Bach and Harnish's taxonomy of communicative illocutionary acts and 'conventional illocutionary acts.'[50] Botha combines separate theories to examine John 4:1–42 as a means of understanding the overall style of John's Gospel.[51] Botha refers little to Searle. Botha does mention Searle's five classes of illocutionary acts, though without explanation he replaces Searle's assertive category with 'representatives.'[52]

Botha analyzes John 4:1–42 at two levels—that of the implied author/reader and that of the characters within the narrative, dismissing the real author. Botha writes, "Whenever we use the terms author or readers without any qualification, we are referring to these narratological constructs [i.e., Alan Culpepper's distinctions of 'implied author/narrator' and 'implied reader/narratee'] and never to real or flesh and blood instances."[53] Compare Botha's stance with Searle's perspective of an author's intentions even for a piece of fiction. Searle says,

> There used to be a school of literary critics who thought one should not consider the intentions of the author when examining a work of fiction. Perhaps there is some level of intention at which this extraordinary view is plausible; perhaps one should not consider an author's ulterior motives when analyzing his work, but at the most basic level it is absurd to suppose a critic can completely ignore the intentions of the author, since even so much as to identify a text as a novel, a poem, or even as a text is already to make a claim about the author's intentions.[54]

---

[48] Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1–42* (NovTSup 65; ed. D.P. Moessner et al; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 66.

[49] Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics* (LLL 30; New York: Longman, 1983); Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman*, 70–71.

[50] Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman*, 65, 98–187. Bach and Harnish create a taxonomy of communicative illocutionary acts organized into four classes: 'constatives,' 'directives,' 'commissives,' and 'acknowledgments.' Their category of conventional illocutionary acts includes 'effectives' and 'verdictives' (*Linguistic Communication*, 39–59).

[51] Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman*, 62.

[52] Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman*, 65.

[53] Botha, *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman*, 82.

[54] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 66.

Analyzing the illocutionary acts, speaker meaning, and sentence meaning of statements necessarily involves the real speaker. Botha's analysis comes closer to narrative or literary criticism than to speech act theory.[55]

2.3.2. *God Speaking: Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer*

2.3.2.1. *Wolterstorff*

Nicholas Wolterstorff, in *Divine Discourse* (1995), claims that divine discourse differs from divine revelation.[56] Scholars either collapse these two or neglect the phenomenon of a speaking God. Wolterstorff examines how it is for God to speak and to be heard from the perspective of 'double-agency' (e.g., God speaking through humans). Wolterstorff, when discussing how it is possible for a hearer to determine what a speaker means to say, mentions one of Searle's strategies on metaphor. The strategy enables a hearer to determine whether or not a speaker's statement requires a metaphorical interpretation.[57] Searle says to look for a meaning besides the literal if the utterance is faulty when taken in a literal sense (e.g., 'Sam is a pig').[58] For Wolterstorff, an interpreter's beliefs affect how the discourser is heard and understood. "It follows that interpreters cannot operate without beliefs about the discourser; specifically, beliefs as to the relative probability of the discourser intending and not intending to say one thing and another."[59] Wolterstorff reiterates this point in an

[55] Botha encourages exegetes to employ speech act theory for interpreting NT texts ("The Potential of Speech Act Theory for New Testament Exegesis: Some Basic Concepts," *HvTSt* 47 [1991]: 277–293; "Speech Act Theory and New Testament Exegesis," *HvTSt* 47 [1991]: 294–303).

[56] Wolterstorff, *Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Wolterstorff does not distinguish between 'discourse' and 'dialogue.' Discourse is more of an umbrella term for his argument to set divine discourse apart from divine revelation. He identifies several 'modes' of discourse (e.g., *double-agency*, *deputized*, and *appropriated*) in *Divine Discourse*, 37–57. Thiselton reflects on Wolterstorff's book, especially on how a speaker makes claims and takes stances in performing speech acts ("Speech Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorff's *Divine Discourse*," *SJT* 50 [1997]: 102, 109–110).

[57] Wolterstorff, *Divine Discourse*, 195.

[58] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 105.

[59] Wolterstorff, *Divine Discourse*, 196.

article on speech act theory for biblical interpretation. He proposes a type of interpretation called 'authorial-discourse' in place of 'textual-sense.'[60]

2.3.2.2. *Vanhoozer*

Vanhoozer's interests are in God's speech acts, Scripture as communicative action or divine discourse, and a trinitarian theology of the Bible (e.g., the Father = locution; the Logos or Jesus = illocution; the Spirit = perlocution).[61] In an article on scriptural acts (revised 2001), he employs theories by William Alston, Paul Ricoeur, Grice, and Austin. He comments only on Searle's definition of language as a rule-governed form of behavior and his class of declarations to compare it to Alston's 'exercitives' category.[62] Vanhoozer confuses intentionality (i.e., a category of the philosophy of mind) for authorial intention.[63] Intention is one of several possible intentional states. For Searle, intention has no unique status.[64] Recent works by Stanley E. Porter, Dan R. Stiver, and D. Christopher Spinks acknowledge Vanhoozer for his speech act approach to Scripture and theological interpretation.[65]

---

[60] Wolterstorff, "The Promise of Speech-Act Theory for Biblical Interpretation," in *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation* (eds. C.G. Bartholomew, C. Greene, and K. Möller; SHS 2; eds. C. Bartholomew and C. Greene; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 81–85.

[61] Vanhoozer, "God's Mighty Speech Acts," 154–156, 158. See also Vanhoozer, *Is There A Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1998).

[62] Vanhoozer, "From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant," *First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 174, 182; rev. of pages 1–49 in *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation* (eds. C. Bartholomew, C. Greene, and K. Möller; SHS 2; eds. C. Bartholomew and C. Greene: Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001).

[63] Vanhoozer, "From Speech Acts," 169–170.

[64] Searle, *Intentionality*, 3–4.

[65] Porter, "Hermeneutics, Biblical Interpretation, and Theology: Hunch, Holy Spirit, or Hard Work?," pages 97–127 in I. Howard Marshall, *Beyond the Bible: Moving from Scripture to Theology* (ASBT; eds. C.E. Evans and L.M. McDonald; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2004). Porter also identifies several problems with Vanhoozer's methodology such as attaching an ontological status to genres and illocutionary acts ("Hermeneutics," 115–118); Stiver, "Felicity and Fusion: Speech Act Theory and Hermeneutical Philosophy," pages 146–156 in *Transcending Boundaries in Theology and Philosophy: Reason, Meaning and Experience* (eds. M. Warner and K. Vanhoozer; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2007). Spinks examines the methodologies of Vanhoozer and Stephen E. Fowl concerning theological interpretation and meaning in *The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the Theological Interpretation of Scripture* (London: Continuum, 2007).

2.3.3. *A Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement: Neufeld, Thiselton, Briggs, and Adams*

2.3.3.1. *Neufeld*

Evans's theory of self-involvement has been popular among biblical scholars working with speech act theory such as Neufeld, Thiselton, Briggs, and Adams.[66] Neufeld provides a speech act analysis of confessions and exhortations in 1 John to discuss how John attempts to involve the reader.[67] Neufeld's overall intent is to restructure how scholars exegete the epistle. He includes John so as not to divorce the writer from the text. Neufeld's theory of speech acts depends mainly on Austin, Evans, and Jacques Derrida. In describing speech act theory as "the power of language to make commitments, shape the self, and create new patterns of speech and conduct,"[68] Neufeld suggests that language, not the writer, performs the action. He also says that texts are 'effective acts.'[69] The thought that words are responsible for performing acts is a common misperception among biblical scholars accessing speech act theory.

2.3.3.2. *Thiselton*

Throughout the decades, Thiselton has explored the use of philosophical categories for biblical interpretation. He has presented theories from select philosophical thinkers (especially Wittgenstein) and speech act theorists.[70] In several articles during the 1970s, Thiselton referenced Ferdinand de Saussure, Wittgenstein, Austin, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Rudolf Bultmann, and others to explore ways to understand biblical texts.

---

[66] Thiselton refers to a recent work by Mervyn Duffy who examines ritual and sacraments via speech act theory. Thiselton connects Duffy's theory of 'self-implication' to Evans's hermeneutic of self-involvement (Thiselton, "The Hermeneutics of Word and Sacraments," 510). See Duffy, *How Language, Ritual, and Sacraments Work: According to John Austin, Jürgen Habermas and Louis-Marie Chauvet* (TGST 123; Rome: Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 2005).

[67] Neufeld, *Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John* (BIS 7; eds. R. Alan Culpepper and R. Rendtorff; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). Neufeld focuses on the following passages: 1 John 1:1–4; 2:18–24; 4:1–6, 16; 5:6.

[68] Neufeld, *Reconceiving Texts*, 5.

[69] Neufeld, *Reconceiving Texts*, ix, 41.

[70] Thiselton says that by 1964 he had an interest in Austin's work and Wittgenstein's later work (*New Horizons*, 16).

In *Two Horizons* (1980),[71] Thiselton draws from the work of philosophers and theologians like Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and Austin. Thiselton also takes notice of *Speech Acts* by Searle, commenting briefly about Searle's view of language linked to human behavior governed by rules and the 'institutional facts.'[72] In *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (1992), Thiselton explores some of the major new trends in biblical hermeneutics (e.g., semiotics, deconstructionism, speech act theory, liberation theologies). The discussion is set within the larger context of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern thinkers.

Thiselton gives more space to Searle's categories in *New Horizons* due to developments in Searle's philosophies of language and mind. He weaves together the work of Austin, Evans, Searle, and Recanati to analyze biblical texts. He classifies one of Paul's statements according to Austin's and Evans's verdictives class and Searle's and Recanati's declarations class. Thiselton says that Paul utters a declaration in 1 Cor 4:4. The verse reads, "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me" (NRSV).[73] Paul's words, however, fit Searle's assertives class because Paul made a case concerning himself and the Lord. Thiselton also classifies Jesus' 'Great Commission' speech in Matthew 28 as exercitives, behabitives, and commissives (Austin and Evans) and as directives, expressives, and commissives (Searle and Recanati).[74] Thiselton's interest in the effects of biblical texts on readers may explain his attraction to Evans's hermeneutic of self-involvement in *New Horizons*.

Searle's theory of the background is of interest for Thiselton, who sees some similarities between it and other concepts:

- the notion of 'horizon' espoused by Edmund Husserl and Heidegger
- Recanati's theory of 'a look behind the scenes'
- Friedrich Schleiermacher's ideas of 'pre-understanding,' and 'life' or 'life-world.'[75]

---

[71] *Two Horizons* is a revision of Thiselton's Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Sheffield (Thiselton, *The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980], xiii).

[72] Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 380, 401–402.

[73] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 284.

[74] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 286–287.

[75] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 147, 223, 362, 559, 562.

Thiselton demonstrates the use of these concepts for an inter-textual study between Paul's speech acts in 1 Cor 8 (preventing those who are weak from stumbling) and Jesus' words in Matthew 18:6 (avoiding doing any harm to little ones). Thiselton says,

> In *this* example textual meaning can be optimally determined only with reference to the *directedness* of its author's thought through a *communicative text*. This operates *in relation to the [b]ackground of a given life-world* in interaction with readers who are prepared to think *within its frame of reference* [Thiselton's italics].[76]

Thiselton acknowledges the importance of Searle's concept of the background. Pre-understanding, behind the scenes, and horizon are valuable concepts, yet they fail to elucidate Searle's theory of the background of how it is realized in the brain. Searle admits to the complexities and controversies associated with the background.[77] The same could be said of how Thiselton likens the background to Umberto Eco's idea of a professional training, Wittgenstein's theory of training, and Jonathan Culler's competency theory.[78]

Thiselton, in his speech act analysis of biblical texts, combines the work of several theorists. This methodology increases the chances of confusing or collapsing distinct concepts. Searle's word-to-world (↓) direction of fit for assertives and assertive declarations supposedly resembles Evans's hermeneutic of self-involvement. Thiselton bases this on a speech act analysis of biblical texts that involve and change both the speaker and the hearer (e.g., Ps 18:1: " 'I love you, O LORD, my strength' " [NRSV]).[79] The psalmist's illocutionary act, however, fits Searle's expressive class and has no direction of fit because "[t]he speaker is neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed."[80] Searle reiterates, "The utterance [expressive] can't get off the ground unless there already is a fit."[81]

---

[76] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 562.

[77] Searle, "Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action," 289–299.

[78] Thiselton, "Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and Theological Hermeneutics," in R. Lundin, C. Walhout, and A.C. Thiselton, *The Promise of Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 170–171.

[79] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 300. For a similar analysis of Psalm 25:2 by Thiselton, see *New Horizons*, 599.

[80] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 15, 16, 23.

[81] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 18.

The logical notation of expressives is *EØ*(*P*)(*S*/*H* + property). The *E* symbolizes the illocutionary force of the psalmist to express his feeling or attitude of love for God. The null symbol Ø means that no direction of fit occurred with the psalmist's words (i.e., a relationship between God and the psalmist is presupposed). The (*P*) stands for the psalmist's possible psychological states. The (*S*/*H* + property) represents how the psalmist attributed the property of strength to himself (the speaker) and to God (the hearer) as the source of that strength. The psalmist bears witness to a first-hand encounter with God in the expression that (*p*) in Ps 18:1. It is linguistically correct to say that the hearer or reader, separate from the psalmist, can only 'recite' (i.e., report) what the psalmist has expressed. Other conditions must be met before jumping to the conclusion that the psalmist's words alter something in the hearer or reader. If not, then Hippolytus's words ring true: "'My tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not' [ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνωμοτός]."[82]

Thiselton emphasizes the need for the psalmist's words and Scripture in general to transform the '*life and behavior*' of the reader (Thiselton's italics).[83] He says, "the work of Searle and Recanati on speech-act theory serves as a resource and model for the exploration of a hermeneutic of self-involvement."[84] Is it necessary, however, to improve upon or add to Searle's philosophies of language and mind with Evans? Searle's philosophies of language and mind stand on their own and give interpreters access to the speech acts and reshaped mindsets of the biblical writers based on their experiences of God.

Thiselton brings in Searle's concepts of intentionality, 'brute facts,' and 'institutional facts' to examine the nature of promise or covenant in Scripture.[85] Linguistic and extra-linguistic features comprise brute and institutional facts. Brute facts differ from institutional facts in that a dollar bill is only a piece of paper (brute fact), yet the paper has the value of a dollar because human beings have assigned it that value and recognize it as such (institutional fact).[86] Searle says,

> When, for example, it says on a twenty-dollar bill, 'This note is legal tender for all debts public and private,' the U.S. Treasury is not *describing* a fact

[82] Quoted in Austin, *How to Do Things*, 9–10.
[83] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 300, 599.
[84] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 24.
[85] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 293–307.
[86] Thiselton, "Communicative Action," 147; Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 112–115; Searle, *Construction of Social Reality*, 41–51.

> but in part *creating* one. The utterance is like a performative, even though it lacks a performative verb. Performative utterances are those in which saying something makes it true [Searle's italics].[87]

Ultimately, institutional realities involve performative language.

In his analysis of Heb 9:16, Thiselton identifies an institutional fact in relation to its covenantal language. The verse reads, "Where a will is involved, the death of the one who made it must be established" (NRSV). Thiselton says that the author "deliberately uses *diathēkē* to mean both *covenantal* promise and legal *testament* of a deceased person [Thiselton's italics]."[88] Searle's categories of language and mind are relevant for building on Thiselton's point. Hebrews 9:16 fits the assertives class of illocutionary acts, symbolized as $\vdash\downarrow B(p)$. The $\vdash$ represents the illocutionary point to assert and the author's commitment to the truth of his statement in Heb 9:16. The $\downarrow$ stands for a word-to-world direction of fit. The *B* reflects the author's belief associated with the propositional content (*p*) in the verse. At the level of intentionality, the author of Hebrews had a network of intentional states in relation to wills and the force of a will in effect after a person dies. The author's background consisted of the capacity to have beliefs and form an intention to assert that (*p*) in Heb 9:16 in the context of how Christ's death inaugurated a new covenant (Heb 9:15–22).

Thiselton concentrates his efforts on bridging philosophical categories and biblical interpretation. Biblical scholars such as Briggs depend on him to some extent for understanding and employing speech act theory and self-involvement.

2.3.3.3. *Briggs*

Briggs wrote his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Thiselton, published as *Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation* (2001). Briggs borrows from Evans's logic of self-involvement to formulate his own hermeneutic of self-involvement as a speech act category.[89] Briggs states, "The basic point about self-involvement is that the speaking subject invests him or herself in a state of affairs by adopting

---

[87] Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 115.

[88] Thiselton, "Communicative Action," 147.

[89] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 5, 143, 148–166, 173. Briggs says that speech act theory neither resolves hermeneutical problems nor offers a complete philosophy of language (*Words in Action*, 6–12).

a stance towards that state of affairs."[90] He examines the NT themes of confession of faith, forgiveness of sin, and teaching through this lens.

Briggs typically identifies the speaking subject as the reader (as opposed to the original biblical author, implied biblical author, or biblical characters), yet he distinguishes this concept from postmodern theories of reader-response.[91] Briggs seems to abandon speech act theory in the second part of his book for what he describes as a "more overtly theological" approach.[92] Here he demonstrates how the Christian concepts of confession, forgiveness, repentance, prayer, and intercession occur as self-involving concepts. He develops the idea of how Scripture invites a response from the reader or hearer that can lead to potential change and restored relationship.[93] Briggs makes a contribution to the theory of self-involvement, though the weakness of *Words in Action* is a convoluting of speech act theory in a way never envisioned by actual philosophers of language.

2.3.3.4. *Adams*

Adams has published his doctoral dissertation under the title, *The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40–55* (2006). His selected passages include Isa 41:21–29; 49:1–6; 50:4–11; and 52:13–53:12. Adams emphasizes the need for 'the addressees/readers' to involve themselves in 'the prophetic strategy' of these texts. This results in forsaking other gods and sin and returning to Yahweh, worshiping Yahweh alone, and embracing their role as God's servants and God's children.[94] Self-involved readers become speakers who constitute Yahweh's 'interdependent illocutionary acts.'[95] Adams asserts,

> Yahweh's future people constitute a confessional community. Through self-involvement with the second and third servant passages [Isa 49:1–6; 50:4–11], speakers confess and embrace the open role of Yahweh's servant. Through their confession, they move from Babylon to the community of Yahweh's servants. Confessors incarnate the servant of Yahweh by uttering various illocutionary acts and thereby adopting particular stances and obligating themselves to the accompanied entailments.[96]

---

[90] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 148.
[91] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 152.
[92] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 147.
[93] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 147–290.
[94] Adams, *Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah*, 87–211.
[95] Adams, *Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah*, 211.
[96] Adams, *Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah*, 210.

Adams's argument calls to mind Searle's distinction of reporting versus repeating illocutionary acts. At what point do verbatim reports of another's illocutionary acts become confessions that reshape the belief system of linguistic communities (e.g., 'creeds')?[97]

Adams follows Evans by employing a hermeneutic of self-involvement. Adams says that self-involvement is a 'central component' of speech act theory.[98] The focus is on the speech acts of Yahweh and the addressees instead of the biblical writer (e.g., the prophet Isaiah). Few biblical scholars who work with speech act theory account for the biblical writers who produce texts consisting of their speech acts and reports of speech acts. Speech act theory is concerned with the speaker. This would include the writer(s) of Isaiah in Adams's analysis, yet Adams downplays Isaiah's role as speaker or reporter.

> An original speaker/writer, addressee, and occasion, lies behind [Isa 40–55], but recovering the actual, real events is extremely difficult .... Thus, the concern here centers on the prophetic function or strategy of these chapters and how they call the addressee/reader to adopt particular stances and entailments.[99]

By limiting his analysis to the illocutionary acts of Yahweh and the addressees, Adams is unable to develop the prophetic function of Isaiah in relation to his own recorded speech acts and reports about Yahweh as the true God over all idol-gods.

2.4. Summary

Since the 1960s, a number of biblical scholars and theologians such as Funk, Thiselton, McClendon and Smith, Botha, Neufeld, Wolterstorff, Vanhoozer, Briggs, and Adams have combined theories of speech acts to examine Scripture or theological and hermeneutical issues. Evans's concept of self-involvement in religious language has attracted biblical scholars such as Thiselton, Neufeld, Briggs, and Adams who emphasize reader involvement of biblical texts (e.g., participating in the NT themes of confessing, forgiving, and teaching; the OT call in Isaiah to return to Yahweh and be Yahweh's servant).

---

[97] An adequate response to this question would entail research beyond the scope of the topic at hand.

[98] Adams, *Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah*, 41, 62.

[99] Adams, *Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah*, 87–88.

In the next two chapters, Searle's particular usefulness will be shown by means of applying his categories of language and mind to five NT texts: Rom 3:25, Heb 9:12, John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14. It follows that the biblical writers and characters of these texts performed levels of speech acts (e.g., single-level assertives by Paul and the author of Hebrews; multi-level illocutionary acts and reports by John the evangelist and John of Revelation). This differs from the idea that words perform some type of action (e.g., scholars suggesting that a text performs multiple functions[100] or that texts are communicative acts consisting of matter and energy[101]). Searle's categories provide a way to analyze these five biblical texts at the level of speaker intentionality and to recognize their layers of meaning (e.g., literal and metaphorical) without dismissing the biblical writers.[102]

[100] Thiselton, "Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, and the Parables of Jesus," in *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics* (eds., R. Lundin, A.C. Thiselton, and C. Walhout; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 108.

[101] Vanhoozer, "From Speech Acts," 178.

[102] Briggs discusses the two "spheres" where speech acts can occur: the characters' speech acts within a biblical narrative and the speech acts of the biblical writers ("Uses of Speech Act Theory," 230).

CHAPTER THREE

SINGLE-LEVEL SPEECH ACTS: THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST'S BLOOD IN ROM 3:25 AND HEB 9:12

3.1. Introduction

What advantages can biblical scholars gain from Searle's philosophies of language and mind? In light of Searle's 'biological naturalism,' is it a conflict of interest to use his philosophies to study the speech acts of four New Testament writers at the level of intentionality? In response to my inquiry of whether the mental phenomena of intentionality, the network, and the background can be applied to the biblical writers, Searle says, "If no, then something is wrong with the categories. If the categories are good, then they apply."[1] Searle clarifies his position: "I do not wish to imply that I am endorsing the accounts of the biblical writers. The point is simply that the categories are intended to be perfectly general and should apply across any kind of discourse."[2]

For Searle, consciousness is a biological function like digestion or photosynthesis. He concludes that neither a worldview of God nor the immortality of the soul or the afterlife have measurable validity in the real world. Can one affirm Searle's stance while using his philosophies to study the biblical writers and their speech acts? Searle's methodology applies to all language regardless of his views of God, though some biblical scholars may find it problematic using a declared atheist's theories.[3] In asking Searle about reconciling his biological naturalism with the fact that most people have some form of religious or theological experience or thought at some point in life,[4] Searle replies, "From individual

---

[1] Searle, in discussion with the author, Berkeley, California, June 28, 2005.

[2] Searle, e-mail message to author, September 13, 2006.

[3] In *Mind, Language and Society*, Searle has a section called "Beyond Atheism" in which he explains that he (and others) have moved beyond atheism due to a lack of evidence for God in the real world (33–37).

[4] Williams-Tinajero, e-mail message to Searle, September 23, 2006.

experience, nothing much follows."[5] If something did follow for the NT writers, however, and they wrote about it from their own individual perspectives concerning Jesus Christ, then this raises the issue of subjectivity.

Most biblical scholars favor objective methods. Searle makes a similar claim regarding the prevalence of objective analyses and the prevailing worry about consciousness in philosophy. "The deepest reason for the fear of consciousness is that consciousness has the essentially terrifying feature of subjectivity."[6] Consciousness is subjective because it is unobservable, says Searle; yet, it exists and must be accounted for at the ontological level rather than at the epistemological level.[7]

What sort of study takes into account the consciousness and intentionality of the NT writers? Before the Christ event, Paul and the author of Hebrews each had a set of attitudes, beliefs, and stances about the God of Israel. For example, both writers operated out of a monotheistic mindset. Each of them, however, experienced a reshaping of mind—a shift in intentionality. They performed their speech acts out of their own shifts. Their intentional states reflected a new understanding of God in Jesus Christ. In some of their 'single-level' speech acts, for example, Paul and the author of Hebrews used the blood-of-Christ language to reinforce the new belief system in God for the early church communities.

A distinction is made between single-level and 'multi-level' speech acts for the five selected NT texts. Paul, for example, performed one illocutionary act in asserting that (*p*)[8] in Rom 3:25. The author of Hebrews also performed a single illocutionary act in asserting that (*p*) in Heb 9:12. In the next chapter, the multi-level speech acts about Christ's blood in John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14 will be examined. John 6:52–59 makes for an interesting case study because of the multiple speakers (e.g., John, the Judeans,[9] and Jesus). These speakers also performed multiple speech acts (e.g., John's assertives in addition to his reports of the Judeans' question and Jesus' speech acts; Jesus' direct assertives, indirect directives, and indirect commissives). In Rev 1:5b–6, John performed a multi-level speech act in asserting and expressing that (*p*). In Rev 7:13–

---

[5] Searle, e-mail message to author, September 25, 2006.

[6] Searle, *Rediscovery*, 55.

[7] Searle has a section titled "*Subjectivity*" in *Rediscovery*, 93–100.

[8] The (*p*) symbolizes any propositional content. The propositional content of Rom 3:25, for example, is "God put forward [Jesus Christ] as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins."

[9] See n. 23 in this third chapter for an explanation of my use of 'Judeans' and 'non-Judeans' in place of 'Jews' and 'Gentiles.'

14, multiple speakers and speech acts are detected (e.g., John's assertives in addition to his reports of the elder's question and assertive).

Although Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12, as single-level speech acts, differ from the other three passages, all five NT texts contain elements of 'intertextuality.' The various speakers associated with these texts alluded to OT motifs (e.g., Israel's sacrificial system, 'Passover,' 'Day of Atonement,' etc). Intertextuality, however, differs from the concept of the network. Intertextuality is a concept in literary theory. The network (as employed in this study) is a mental phenomenon consisting of a person's interconnected system of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states. Thiselton discusses how scholars such as Jonathan Culler, M. Riffaterre, and Michael Worton and Judith Still have understood intertextuality in different ways (e.g., Culler and presuppositions; Riffaterre and self-reference or texts with intralinguistic relations; Worton and Smith saying that intertextuality is more complex than texts alluding to other texts).[10] Concerning the intertextuality of biblical texts, Thiselton says, "Texts function in this approach as generative matrices of further meaning projected by other texts through a textual network or textual grid."[11]

Identifying the type of illocutionary act (and corresponding intentional states) that Paul and the author of Hebrews performed can help with determining the levels of meaning in Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12. Searle's categories provide a way to identify Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 as assertives. Specifically, Paul and the author of Hebrews each performed a metaphorical assertion about Christ's blood. The metaphorical assertion category indicates that a literal meaning and a metaphorical meaning were part of Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12. With Searle's categories, it is possible to ask whether both authors employed the language of Christ's blood as a metaphor for his death or if they accessed familiar motifs from Israel's faith tradition (e.g., the cover of the ark, blood, the sanctuary) to exhibit how Jesus Christ has rendered the old system obsolete.

A question arises as to why Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 fit better into the category of assertives rather than assertive declarations. These texts meet the requirements for assertives, yet not for declarations because they fail the 'hereby test' for performatives.[12] A declaration "creates a fact

[10] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 38–39.

[11] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 39. Thiselton clarifies that intertextuality differs from the concept of 'inner-textuality' employed by Michael Fishbane and from the theory of 'intratextuality' used by Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and Ronald Thiemann (*New Horizons*, 503).

[12] Austin, *How to Do Things*, 57; Searle, "How Performatives Work," 173–176.

corresponding to the propositional content."[13] Searle says, "Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed."[14] Paul, for example, stated what God has already accomplished rather than declared a new reality in saying, "God put forward [Jesus Christ] as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins" (Rom 3:25). Paul (and the author of Hebrews) each described the existing state of affairs in asserting that (*p*). They did not declare anything new into being in performing their illocutionary acts.[15]

An argument could be made that these texts fit the assertive declarations category because of the extra-linguistic institutions involved (e.g., the Day of Atonement ritual). Extra-linguistic institutions, however, pertain to the status of the speaker. Searle writes,

> Thus, in order to bless, excommunicate, christen, pronounce guilty, call the base runner out, bid three no-trumps, or declare war, it is not sufficient for any old speaker to say to any old hearer 'I bless', 'I excommunicate', etc. One must have a position within an extra-linguistic institution … Extra-linguistic institutions often confer status in a way relevant to illocutionary force, but not all differences of status derive from institutions. Thus, an armed robber in virtue of his possession of a gun may order as opposed to, e.g., request, entreat, or implore victims to raise their hands. But his status here does not derive from a position within an institution but from his possession of a weapon.[16]

If Paul had said, "I, Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, [hereby] pronounce your formerly committed sins passed over on account of God putting forward Jesus Christ as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness," then he would have performed an assertive declaration provided that certain extra-linguistic institutions were in place (e.g., Paul's status or position of authority as an 'apostle' in the early church). This differs from the idea that Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 refer intertextually to such things as the Passover and Day of Atonement. The linguistic structures of Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 indicate that God did not need Paul and the author of Hebrews to be apostles with special status for their propositional contents to reflect the new reality in Christ.

---

[13] Searle, "How Performatives Work," 169.
[14] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 17.
[15] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 19.
[16] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 7.

3.2. Paul and Rom 3:25

> ὃν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον διὰ [τῆς] πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων
>
> God put forward [Jesus Christ] as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins (Rom 3:25).[17]

3.2.1. *Paul the Writer*

At the start of Romans, Paul introduced himself as "a slave of Christ Jesus, a called apostle, set apart for the gospel of God" (Rom 1:1). These descriptors can be found in the undisputed and disputed Pauline letters (a 'slave' or 'prisoner' of Christ Jesus and an 'apostle' commissioned by Jesus Christ/God in 1 Cor 1:1; 9:1–2; 15:9; 2 Cor 1:1; 11:5; 12:11–12; Gal 1:1; Eph 1:1; Phil 1:1; Col 1:1; 1 Tim 1:1; 2 Tim 1:1; Titus 1:1; Phlm 1).[18] Paul, knowing that 'apostle' represented one with authority and that 'slave' or 'prisoner' had the connotation of indebtedness to Christ, identified with these titles.[19]

The Pauline corpus and the book of Acts serve as primary sources for learning about Paul prior to when Jesus Christ revealed himself to him on the road to Damascus (Acts 9:1–19; 22:6–16; 26:12–18; Gal 1:11–17) and to when Paul received the Holy Spirit (Acts 9:17–18).[20] As 'a Hebrew born of Hebrews,' Paul related to his own people whose religious practices involve observing the Torah, circumcision, dietary laws, and so forth. Paul, however, had more reasons to boast. He perceived himself to be blameless and zealous for the law, a Pharisee and member of 'the strictest

---

[17] All biblical passages are the translation work of the author unless indicated otherwise. Colin Brown suggests an alternative translation of 'through the faithfulness of Christ' for διὰ [τῆς] πίστεως in "Pistis Christou," (photocopy of faculty working paper; School of Theology; Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif. [n.d.]: 1–4).

[18] Scholars present a wide range of opinion about the genuineness of some of the thirteen letters attributed to Paul. See Raymond E. Brown, *An Introduction to the New Testament* (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 419, 585–589; and E. Earle Ellis, "Pastoral Letters," *DPL* 658–666.

[19] Cross and Livingstone, eds. "Apostle," *ODCC* 88–89; Paul W. Barnett, "Apostle," *DPL* 45–51; Daniel G. Reid, "Prison, Prisoner," *DPL* 752–754; Colin G. Kruse, "Servant, Service," *DPL* 869–871.

[20] Paul's Damascus experience is mentioned several times, yet the Holy Spirit is referenced only in the Acts 9:1–19 scene. Paul's indicates in 1 Cor 9:1 and 15:8 that he saw Jesus Christ and Christ appeared to him.

sect,' one who 'advanced in Judaism' beyond his peers because of his zeal for the Israelite traditions, and educated by Gamaliel (Acts 22:3; 23:6; 26:4–5; Rom 9:3–4; 11:1; 2 Cor 11:21–22; Gal 1:14; Phil 3:4–6, NRSV). Before his Damascus experience, Saul, also known as Paul (Acts 13:9), was a devout believer in the one true God of Israel and a persecutor of 'the Way' (Acts 9:2; 22:4; 24:14). In Acts 7:54–8:1, Luke records the killing of Stephen, which Paul condoned. He also imprisoned, threatened, and drove out believers in Jesus Christ (Acts 8:3; 9:1–2, 13, 21; 22:4–5; 26:9–11; 1 Cor 15:9; Gal 1:13, 21–23; 1 Tim 1:12–15).

The model of Paul as a complex human figure runs through Pauline studies. Treatises range from Paul's personality and thought-life to his teachings, rhetoric, work, and call (or conversion experience). Robert J. Austgen, in trying to understand Paul, has studied him from the perspective of 'natural motivation' or '*practical-life level* [Austgen's italics]' based on Paul's relationship to Christ.[21] Gerd Theissen has examined Paul's theology using a psychological approach.[22] Pauline scholars have tried to trace developments of Paul's theological views as reflected in *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* by Seyoon Kim, who ties Paul's initial transformation to the Damascus Christophany. Kim criticizes James D.G. Dunn for linking Paul's call to the 'Gentiles' (i.e., 'non-Judeans')[23] to his Damascus experience but Paul's doctrine of justification by faith to the Antioch incident.[24] Kim argues that Paul's call to the 'Gentiles,' his doctrine of

---

[21] Robert J. Austgen, *Natural Motivation in the Pauline Epistles* (2d ed.; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

[22] Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology* (trans. J.P. Galvin; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 7–8. Terrance D. Callan describes Paul's conversion to Jesus Christ as "a psychological turning point" in his life and personality (*Psychological Perspectives on the Life of Paul: An Application of the Methodology of Gerd Theissen* [SBEC 22; Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990], 123).

[23] Philip F. Esler, building upon Fredrik Barth's work on ethnicity, distinguishes between ethnicity and identity among people groups in the first century CE. Following Esler's thesis that 'Judean' and 'non-Judean' capture more precisely the ethnic and cultural dimensions of people groups in the first century CE, I refer to 'Judeans,' 'non-Judeans,' 'Judean Christ-believers,' and 'non-Judean Christ-believers' instead of 'Jews,' 'Gentiles,' 'Jewish Christians,' and 'Gentile Christians' (*Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul's Letter* [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003], 12, 41–43, 54–76). Esler contends that 'Judeans' is the proper translation of Ἰουδαῖοι and designates all adherents to Israel's faith tradition (i.e., all who came to Jerusalem to participate in the rituals) and not just those living in Judea in the first century CE. (*Conflict and Identity*, 66–68). The Greek word Ἰουδαῖος is translated as 'Judean' in BDAG, 478–479.

[24] Kim, *Paul and the New Perspective: Second Thoughts on the Origin of Paul's Gospel* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 27–35.

justification by faith, and receiving of the Holy Spirit all originated with the Damascus event.[25] Kim, clarifying that Paul's development and the shaping of his doctrines took time, says, "[Paul] developed those doctrines from the Damascus revelation of Christ through reflections on the primitive church's kerygma, the relevant texts of the Old Testament, the Jewish tradition, and partly also the Jesus tradition."[26]

The investigation into Paul's categories of mind and his assertive in Rom 3:25 continues with a look at Paul's intent for writing Romans. His language has led biblical scholars to assume that the main intent was to provide a theology lesson. "For the study of Pauline 'theology' is a flourishing industry in New Testament studies."[27] In recent studies, Pauline scholars have challenged the idea of treating Romans primarily as a theological or religious tract. It was an introduction letter.[28] If Paul wrote his letter to the Romans to introduce himself (he desired to meet them in person but was unable according to Rom 1:9–13; 15:22–32) and had different intentions for writing each of his letters, it limits certain attempts to systematize Paul's language into theological categories. At the same time, it neither precludes us from asking about his intentions for writing his letters nor seeing that Paul made a case for the gospel of Jesus Christ in the form of theological propositions.

---

[25] Kim, *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* (WUNT 2; eds. M. Hengel and O. Hofius. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1981; repr., 2007); Kim, *Paul and the New Perspective*, 1–84 (see especially Kim's section on Paul's experience of the Holy Spirit at his conversion/call in *Paul and the New Perspective*, 157–163). For other sources on more traditional views vs. the new perspective on Paul, see John G. Gager, *Reinventing Paul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21–75; and N.T. Wright, "Redemption from the New Perspective? Towards a Multi-Layered Pauline Theology of the Cross," pages 69–100 in *The Redemption: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on Christ as Redeemer* (eds. S.T. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O'Collins; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[26] Kim, *Paul and the New Perspective*, 4.

[27] Esler, *Conflict and Identity*, 3. Esler says, "A most curious feature of this whole enterprise, however, is that hardly anyone ever seems to ask whether investigating Paul's writings under the rubric of 'theology' is itself a good idea" (*Conflict and Identify*, 4). The work of Dunn is a case in point (*The Theology of Paul the Apostle* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998]).

[28] Douglas J. Moo argues for treating Romans as a personal letter, "written by a particular person to particular people in a particular time and place" (*Encountering the Book of Romans: A Theological Survey* [EBS; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002], 22); Thomas H. Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of Romans* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004), 1–2.

3.2.2. *Paul's Illocutionary Act and Intentional States*

3.2.2.1. *Paul's Assertive Act*

Romans 3:25 fits Searle's assertive category of illocutionary acts. Searle says,

> The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes *true* and *false* [Searle's italics].[29]

In contrast, David E. Aune suggests that Romans is a *logos protreptikos* [i.e., a 'speech of exhortation'].[30] If Aune is correct, then Paul's controlling illocutionary act for the whole letter would need to fit Searle's directive class. "The illocutionary point of [directives] consists in the fact that they are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something."[31] Aune's description of *logos protreptikos*, however, resembles the definition of assertives.

> That is, Romans is a speech of exhortation in written form which Paul addressed to Roman Christians to convince them (or remind them) of the truth of *his* version of the gospel (Rom. 2:16; cf. 16:25; Gal. 1:6–9; 2:1) and to encourage a commitment to the kind of lifestyle which Paul considered consistent with his gospel. Thus Romans is protreptic not only in the sense that Paul is concerned to convince people of the truth of Christianity, but more particularly in the sense that he argues for his version of Christianity over other competing 'schools' of Christian thought [Aune's italics].[32]

Paul, in his overall performance of an assertive, made the case for his gospel about God and Jesus Christ in Rom 3:25 and throughout the letter (especially Rom 1:1, 3, 9, 11, 15–16; 15:15–21; 16:25).

In Rom 3:25, Paul neither tried to get the Romans to do something (directive) nor committed himself to some future action (commissive); he neither expressed his feelings/attitudes (expressive) nor created changes in the world (declaration); rather, he made his case about Christ

---

[29] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 12.

[30] Aune, "Romans as a *Logos Protreptikos*," in *The Romans Debate* (ed. K.P. Donfried; rev. and exp. ed.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991), 278.

[31] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 13.

[32] Aune, "Romans as a *Logos Protreptikos*," 278–279.

and the effects of Christ's blood to the Romans (assertive). The logical notation of assertives is $\vdash\downarrow B(p)$. When applied to Rom 3:25, Paul asserted ($\vdash$) the proposition (p) that "God put forward [Jesus Christ] as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins." The $\downarrow$ symbolizes a word-to-world direction of fit that Paul achieved provided Rom 3:25 reflects the new reality of God in Jesus Christ on account of Christ's blood. The B represents Paul's corresponding psychological state (sincerity condition) of belief that (p). In Rom 3:25 and throughout, Paul asserted ($\vdash$) his belief (B) concerning this new reality. His controlling illocutionary act for Romans as a whole fits the assertives class.

What made it possible for Paul to perform his assertive? From where did his language arise?

3.2.2.2. *Paul's Belief and Hope*

Paul's language derived from his intentionality. Certain features of Paul's illocutionary act corresponded to the features of his intentionality. The ontology of intentional states—their 'mode of existence'—are caused by, and realized in, the brain.[33] The logical form of Paul's assertive $\vdash\downarrow B(p)$ overlaps with the logical form of his intentional state of belief, symbolized by $S(p)$. The $S(p)$ stands for the possible intentional states associated with any propositional content.

The (p) can occur in different mental or intentional states. If Paul, for example, had wished or desired that (p) in Rom 3:25, then he would have performed a directive speech act instead of an assertive. To classify Rom 3:25 as an assertive is to identify that Paul had an intentional state of belief that comprised part of the meaning of his assertive. "Every assertive is an expression of a belief. The simplest test for identifying assertives is to ask whether the utterance can be literally true or false."[34]

Searle defines a belief as "a propositional content in a certain psychological mode, its mode determines a mind-to-world direction of fit, and its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction."[35] The direction of fit of Paul's assertive matched the direction of fit of his belief. "Intentional states, again like speech acts, are related to the world

[33] Searle, *Intentionality*, 15.
[34] Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 148.
[35] Searle, *Intentionality*, 15.

in different ways."[36] Romans 3:25 had a word-to-world (↓) direction of fit. Paul's intentional state of belief that (*p*) had a similar direction of fit of mind-to-world (↓). For Paul's belief that (*p*) to fit reality (i.e., to meet the conditions of satisfaction), it had to be the case that

- sin continued to be a reality in the world that needed to be accounted for;
- Paul encountered Jesus Christ;
- God exists and became incarnate in Jesus Christ;
- Christ's blood really does cover sins.

Paul's assertive and belief, although they shared certain features, differed from each other. "There is one obvious disanalogy between [i]ntentional states and speech acts, which is suggested by the very terminology we have been employing. Mental states are states, and speech acts are acts, i.e., intentional performances."[37] Paul operated out of his own intentionality to make his assertive.

Paul also could have hoped that the recipients at Rome would believe his assertive. For Paul's hope to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the Romans

- were Christ-believers
- shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with Paul
- knew the Torah and scriptures
- understood Paul's metaphorical assertion concerning Jesus Christ as the cover and that Christ's blood made it possible for God to pass over the sins of the people
- believed that Jesus Christ superceded these OT scenes and made Israel's sacrificial system obsolete

If the Romans believed that (*p*) in Rom 3:25, then Paul met the conditions of satisfaction by achieving a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit for his intentional state of hope that they accept his proposition as true.

---

[36] Searle, *Mind*, 167.
[37] Searle, *Intentionality*, 26–27.

3.2.2.3. *Paul's Intentional Action*

Besides Paul's intentional states, he had a causal self-referential intentional state of an intentional action to assert that (*p*) in Rom 3:25.[38] Regular intentional states have only a direction of fit. Causal self-referential intentional states have both a direction of fit and a direction of causation to ensure that a speaker says what is intended and not something unintended. Paul's intention to assert that (*p*) had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. With direction of causation, the very attempt by Paul to assert that (*p*) in Rom 3:25 caused him to succeed in making the assertive. For Paul's intentional action to be successful, it had to be the case that he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) and that his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert that (*p*).

Distinguishing the type of assertive that Paul performed in Rom 3:25 is the natural turn in the inquiry.

3.2.3. *Paul's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background*

3.2.3.1. *Paul's Metaphorical Assertion*

Romans 3:25 fits the metaphorical assertion class. A study of Paul's intentionality in relation to his metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25 involves two other mental phenomena, the network and the background. These categories shed light on Paul's ability to form intentional states and intentional actions. Paul's metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25 pertained to God, Jesus Christ as the cover, and the effects of Christ's blood. Using the categories of mind to locate the evidence of Paul's theological shift in the performance of his metaphorical assertion allows for an inquiry into the subjective aspects of Paul's life, work, and letter-writing stemming from his encounter with God in Christ.

In Rom 3:25, Paul asserted literally *S* is *P* and meant *S* is *R*. The *P* stands for the literal value of a word. The *R* stands for the metaphorical value of a word.[39] When Paul asserted that God put forward Jesus Christ as a 'cover

---

[38] Intentionality consists of causal self-referential intentional states such as visual perceptions, memories, and intentions to do something (Searle, *Intentionality*, 49–50, 76–77, 85–86, 122; Searle, *Mind*, 170–172, 203–204).

[39] For metaphorical assertions, Searle discusses sentence meaning (*S* is *P*) and speaker meaning (*S* is *R*) in *Expression and Meaning*, 88–93, 107–111.

of the ark [ἱλαστήριον]' in Rom 3:25, he neither meant literally that Jesus Christ was the cover of the ark nor that Jesus and the cover were alike. The *P* of ἱλαστήριον need not have committed Paul to the literal truth of ἱλαστήριον as such that its physical features resembled those of Jesus Christ. For Paul, Jesus Christ had a special function.

The Greek noun ἱλαστήριον occurs twice in the NT (Rom 3:25; Heb 9:5). The author of Hebrews referred to the actual 'cover of the ark [τὸ ἱλαστήριον]' in describing the features of the OT tabernacle (Heb 9:1–7). In Rom 3:25, however, no precise definition exists for Paul's use of the term, reflecting its obscurity. Various English translations of its occurrence in Rom 3:25 include 'a sacrifice of atonement' (NRSV, NIV) or 'an expiation' (RSV). In BDAG, only two translations are given for ἱλαστήριον: (1) 'means of expiation' or (2) 'place of expiation.'[40] Douglas J. Moo, arguing from modern linguistic theory, translates ἱλαστήριον as 'propitiation' and sees a typology of the Old Testament 'mercy seat' in Paul's use of the term. The OT Day of Atonement, says Moo, foreshadows Good Friday.[41] Philip F. Esler translates ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25 as 'expiation,'[42] as does John McRay.[43]

Daniel P. Bailey challenges these (theological) translations in light of the linguistic evidence of ἱλαστήριον. He says, "Unfortunately, past studies of ἱλαστήριον have often allowed theological considerations to overshadow lexicography."[44] Bailey argues that Paul had in mind the actual ἱλαστήριον—"the centre of the sanctuary and focus of both the revelation of God (Ex. 25:22; Lv. 16:2; Nu. 7:89) and atonement for sin (Leviticus 16)"—and applied it to Jesus.[45]

The two senses of ἱλαστήριον as either expiation or propitiation have been at the heart of an ongoing controversy. The debates in biblical scholarship over expiation-propitiation indicate a lack of consensus on the proper translation and understanding of ἱλαστήριον. Interpretations generated by the debate have led to a limited understanding of Paul's use of ἱλαστήριον. Most if not all of the biblical translators and scholars never

---

[40] BDAG, 474.

[41] Moo, *Encountering the Book of Romans*, 84, 85.

[42] Esler, *Conflict and Identify*, 155.

[43] McRay, *Paul: His Life and Teaching* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2003), 319, 323.

[44] Bailey, "Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's Use of *Hilasterion* in Romans 3:25," *TynBul* 51/1 (2000): 155. This abstract summarizes Bailey's dissertation, "Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's Use of *Hilasterion* in Romans 3:25" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1999).

[45] Bailey, "Jesus as the Mercy Seat," 157.

return to the literal sense of ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25. I shall argue that Paul envisioned the literal cover of the ark when referring to ἱλαστήριον, borrowing from Israel's sacrificial practices to make his case concerning the new reality of God in Christ.

The debate over expiation and propitiation took place decades ago between Leon Morris and C.H. Dodd.[46] It involved the Greek verb ἱλάσκομαι and its cognates such as ἱλαστήριον. Morris favored propitiation because he thought it captured the essence of averting God's wrath away from sinners—"[t]he removal of the divine wrath by the offering of the Son."[47] In contrast, Dodd argued that expiation was a more fitting translation.[48] As a result, Morris accused Dodd of diminishing the concept of God's wrath.[49] Dunn, commenting on the debate, asserts, "The imagery is more of the removal of a corrosive stain or the neutralization of a life-threatening virus than of anger appeased by punishment."[50] Dunn's argument touches on a different way to interpret ἱλαστήριον and its cognates. These words have the sense of 'covering,' as seen with the Hebrew verb כָּפַר and the Septuagint rendering ἐξιλάσκομαι and its cognates (ἱλάσκομαι, ἱλαστήριον).[51]

The Hebrew verb כָּפַר (i.e., *kippēr*; ἐξιλάσκομαι LXX) occurs in the OT primarily in the Piel form with respect to Israel's sacrificial system. It literally means 'to cover,' as seen when the high priest would smear the blood of a bull and a goat on 'the cover of the ark [כַּפֹּרֶת]' on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur; Lev 16).[52] "The classic (and by no means obsolete) understanding of *kpr* devolves from the concept of 'covering' .... Thus one achieves atonement by means of covering one's sins from the deity's sight."[53] The covering-with-blood motif occurs in the Torah in relation to the Passover event and animal sacrifices.

---

[46] For a synthesis of positions held by Dodd, Morris, and other proponents/opponents on propitiation or expiation, see Judith M. Gundry-Volf, "Expiation, Propitiation, Mercy Seat," *DPL* 279–284.

[47] Morris, *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 277.

[48] Dodd, "Atonement," in *The Bible and the Greeks* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1935), 94; repr., of "Hilaskesthai, Its Cognates, Derivatives, and Synonyms, in the Septuagint," *JTS* 32 (1931): 352–360.

[49] Morris, *Apostolic Preaching*, 129, 136–138, 161.

[50] Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 214–215.

[51] The verb ἐξιλάσκομαι occurs in the LXX but not once in the NT.

[52] A bull was required for the high priest's own sin offering (Lev 16:6–14), and a goat was required for the sin offering of the people of Israel (Lev 16:15).

[53] Michael L. Brown, "*Kippēr* and Atonement in the Book of Isaiah," in *Ki Baruch Hu* (eds. R. Chazan, W.W. Hallo, and L.H. Schiffman; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 191. Brown addresses the complexities associated with כָּפַר and calls for a broader

At the Passover event, God directed the people of Israel to cover the two doorposts and lintel of their homes with the blood of an unblemished one-year-old male lamb. When God passed through and saw the application of the blood, God spared them from the plague of death (Exod 12:7, 13, 23). In Exod 24:6, 8, Moses sprinkled animal blood on the altar and people.[54] God required the perpetual sprinkling of animal blood to cover the people and secure their cleansing. It signified God's mercy for the community (a theological motif that corresponds to Rom 3:25; 5:9; Eph 1:7). Paul shifted his thought about the role of animal blood in dealing with sin in the God-Israel relationship (Lev 16:12–16) to the role of Christ's blood in justifying, redeeming, and forgiving sinners before God.

A distinction occurs between the sentence meaning and the speaker meaning of Paul's metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25. It involves the Hebrew word כַּפֹּרֶת in the Torah. Exodus 25:17 contains the first occurrence of כַּפֹּרֶת in the OT when God gave instructions for making a golden cover for the ark. All occurrences of כַּפֹּרֶת in Exodus and Leviticus refer to this golden lid, which Paul surely would have known while growing up in Jerusalem and studying under Gamaliel (Acts 22:3; 26:4–5). In the LXX, the Greek word for כַּפֹּרֶת becomes ἱλαστήριον.

God commanded Moses to have the cover of the ark made out of gold with specific measurements and instructions. God said to put the cover on the ark inside 'the most holy place' of the tabernacle (Exod 26:34, NRSV). God commanded Moses to tell Aaron to approach the ark and its cover wearing specific garments and bringing certain animals to offer lest Aaron perish, for God appeared in a cloud above the cover (Lev 16:2–5). Aaron had to shroud the cover of the ark with incense and sprinkle some of the animal blood on it for the Day of Atonement ritual. These actions were the means of dealing with Israel's sins, and the defilement of the sanctuary generated by their sins (Lev 16:1–19). God also met with Moses and Aaron between the two cherubim that topped the cover of the ark to deliver his commands to the Israelites (Exod 25:17–22; Num 7:89). If Paul was referring to the physical ἱλαστήριον, then one way to read Rom 3:25 is that Paul shifted his thought about the ἱλαστήριον to Christ as the new meeting point between God and sinners.

---

understanding in light of its "bloodless context" in Isaiah and wants to distinguish "between the varied senses of *kippēr*" ("*Kippēr* and Atonement," 190, 197).

[54] The author of Hebrews speaks about these OT scenes (e.g., the scroll and all the people and the tent with all its vessels had to be sprinkled with animal blood [Heb 9:19, 21]).

English translators use different phrases for כַּפֹּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον such as 'mercy seat' (Tyndale, RSV, NRSV), 'atonement cover' (NIV), 'the Atonement Slate,'[55] or 'a propitiatory sacrifice.'[56] In describing the theological significance of 'the Atonement Slate,' John E. Hartley says, "Since it stands as the boundary between the enthroned God and the tablets of the covenant, figuratively speaking, Yahweh looks down on the covenant through the blood dabbed on the Atonement Slate, leading him to govern his people out of mercy and forgiveness."[57] Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott translate ἱλαστήριον as (1) 'the mercy-seat, covering of the ark in the Holy of Holies' for Exod 25:17 (LXX), and (2) a 'propitiatory gift or offering' for Rom 3:25.[58]

Colin Brown presents the different scholarly positions on expiation-propitiation, sacrifice, and blood by Gerhard von Rad, Dodd, Morris, and others.[59] Concerning the many occurrences of ἱλαστήριον in the LXX for the Hebrew word כִּפֻּרֶת, Brown states, "The older translation 'cover' [has] no justification in usage."[60] The the NJPS, however, captures the basic sense of כִּפֻּרֶת as the cover of the ark with no modifiers in all twenty-seven occurrences throughout Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and 1 Chronicles (see especially Exod 25:17–22; Lev 16:2–15). Dunn indicates that the twenty-one occurrences of ἱλαστήριον in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers pertain to the lid of the ark, yet he describes the lid of the ark as the 'mercy seat' and the 'place of expiation.'[61] This raises the question of whether the 'mercy' and 'atonement' language reflects theological layers or stances placed onto the literal meaning of כַּפֹּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον.

Brown makes reference to another possible interpretation ofn ἱλαστήριον pertaining to the Maccabean martyrs who were regarded as having made atonement for Israel by their deaths.[62] The text 4 Macc 17:22 states, "And through the blood of those devout ones and their death as

---

[55] John E. Hartley, *Leviticus* (WBC 4; Dallas: Word, 1992), 234.

[56] Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT; eds. N.B. Stonehouse, F.F. Bruce, and G.D. Fee; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 218.

[57] Hartley, *Leviticus*, 235.

[58] Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (9th ed. with rev. suppl.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 828.

[59] Brown, "Reconciliation, Restoration, Propitiation, Atonement," *NIDNTT* 3: 151–160.

[60] Brown, *NIDNTT* 3:156.

[61] Dunn, *Romans* (2 vols; WBC 38A–38B; eds. D.A. Hubbard, G.W. Barker, and R.P. Martin; Dallas: Word, 1988), 1:170, 180.

[62] Brown, *NIDNTT* 3:157.

an atoning sacrifice [τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου αὐτῶν], divine Providence preserved Israel that previously had been mistreated" (NRSV). The scholar M. de Jonge says that 4 Macc 17:22 elucidates the meaning of Jesus' salvific death—that it was 'for others.'[63] This challenges the interpretation concerning God's vindication through Jesus' innocent suffering and death.[64]

Joseph A. Fitzmyer indicates that the two main concerns with Rom 3:25 are how to translate the verb προτίθημι and the noun ἱλαστήριον. Did God 'design [προέθετο]' Christ to be a ἱλαστήριον or did God 'put [Christ] forth on display [προέθετο]' as a ἱλαστήριον? Dunn says that προτίθημι can mean 'purpose' or 'intend' in Rom 3:25, but suggests that it most likely means 'set forth' or 'present.'[65] Fitzmyer discusses the nuances of ἱλαστήριον and allows for the possibility that Paul had in mind symbolically or figuratively the 'mercy seat' of the ark.[66] Fitzmyer also interprets the blood of Christ motif in Rom 3:25 in terms of Christ's crucifixion on the cross.[67]

These different interpretations suggest that no single English word captures the exact meaning of ἱλαστήριον. It is therefore important to point out that the context of Paul's metaphorical assertion was the Torah, specifically its intertextual references to the cover of the ark and animal blood as literal objects for Israel's sacrificial system at the tabernacle during wilderness years and, later, at the temple. Paul recognized the import of these in the whole Christ event. Expiation, propitiation, and other theological-related words have failed to capture the point of Paul's intentional use of a metaphor. The following paraphrase of Rom 3:25 illustrates that for Paul, Jesus has made obsolete the old function of the cover of the ark.

> (MET) God put forward Jesus Christ as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins. (*S* is *P*)
>
> (PAR) Jesus Christ has made the old function of the cover of the ark obsolete by becoming the new meeting point between God and sinners. (*S* is *R*)

---

[63] de Jonge, "Jesus' Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs," in *Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn* (eds. T. Baarda et al; Kampen: Kok, 1988), 147–151.

[64] de Jonge, "Jesus' Death for Others," 143–145.

[65] Dunn, *Romans*, 1:170.

[66] Fitzmyer, *Romans* (AB 33; New York, Doubleday, 1993), 349–350.

[67] Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 348–349.

Paul's metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25 calls to mind other assertives he performed concerning the effects of Christ's blood. Romans 5:9 reads, "Much more surely then, now that we have been justified by his blood, will we be saved through him from the wrath of God" (NRSV). In Eph 1:7, Paul asserted that Christ's blood grants 'redemption [τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν]' and 'the forgiveness of sins [τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων].'[68] In 1 Cor 10:16, Paul performed a rhetorical assertive in the form of two questions: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communal participation of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a communal participation of the body of Christ?"[69] Paul, in his early reference to the 'Lord's table,' advocated devotion to Christ and church unity (1 Cor 10:14–22). These themes run throughout 1 Corinthians as Paul performed several directives to urge the church members toward unity, love, and concern for one another (1 Cor 1:10–16; 3:3–4; 5:1–6:8; 8:7–13; 9:19–24; 10:1–14:40).[70] All these speech acts reinforced Paul's stance: Christ, with his own blood, made possible the benefits of justification, redemption, forgiveness of sins, communal participation, and Christian unity.

Did the blood-of-Christ language in Rom 3:25, 5:9 and 1 Cor 10:16 originate with Paul? According to Kim, "Paul mentions the blood of Christ [Col 1:20] only in the passages where he adopts traditional Christian expressions (Rom 3.25; 5.9; 1 Cor 10.16; 11.25, 27; cf. also Eph 1.7; 2.13)."[71] Assuming Paul borrowed the blood-of-Christ expression, the fact that he imported it from an early source reinforces the argument that Paul used it to shape the nascent community. Kim writes,

> At any rate, does not the fact that Paul uses the theologoumenon in the decisive argument for his doctrine of justification in Rom 3.25 prove that Paul has made it very much his own even if it was originally what he

---

[68] Some scholars question whether Paul wrote Ephesians. See Clinton E. Arnold, "Ephesians, Letter to the," *DPL* 240–242.

[69] Following Thiselton, I translate κοινωνία as 'communal participation' (*The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 762).

[70] Paul addressed the pulls that the Judean and non-Judean Christ-believers at Corinth faced in reverting back to familiar practices (e.g., idol worship and being 'partners [κοινωνοί]' of 'the altar' in eating the sacrifices and with 'demons' in 1 Cor 10:14–21). Paul appealed to 'the blood' and 'the body' of Christ in 1 Cor 10:16 and 1 Cor 11:23–27 to reinforce Christ's identity in the Christian meal for the believers struggling with idolatry, divisions, and the negligence of one another. See Lace Marie Williams-Tinajero, "Christian Unity: The Communal Participation in Christ's Body and Blood," *OiC* 40/2 (2005): 46–61.

[71] Kim, *Origin of Paul's Gospel*, 145.

> took over from others? Just as in Rom 5.1–11, so also here the motif of reconciliation and peace seems to lead Paul to emphasize the blood of Christ, for it is the means of atonement (Rom 3.25).[72]

If Paul received it as truth, it strengthens the position that others besides Paul also believed this to be the case regarding God in Jesus Christ and the efficacious aspects of Christ's blood.

3.2.3.2. *Paul's Network*

Paul's network consisted of an interconnected system of intentional states. As a monotheist, Paul possessed a set of attitudes, beliefs, and stances associated with his metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25 that pertained to the following:

> the one true God
> the Torah and scriptures
> God's righteousness
> the Passover event
> the cover of the ark
> Israel's sacrificial system
> the work of the Holy Spirit
> Christ's blood and its efficacy
> faith

Paul operated out of a transformed mindset based on his Damascus experience and the work of the Holy Spirit/Jesus' Spirit (Acts 9:1–30; 22:1–21; 26:1–23; Rom 8; 1 Cor 2:4–16; 12:1–13; Gal 1:13–17; 3:1–5, 14; 1 Thess 1:5–7; 2 Thess 2:13). Paul's reshaped network, based on a subjective, first person encounter with Christ, now accommodated his beliefs about God in Jesus Christ, Christ's blood, and justification by faith. A whole network of intentional states was in operation as Paul recalled parts of the scriptures concerning the Passover, Israel's sacrificial system, and applying animal blood to the cover of the ark. Interpreting Paul's words in Rom 3:25 as a metaphorical assertion illuminates his thought process.

I have looked at what Paul did (asserted) and the type of assertive he made (metaphorical assertion). Next is the importance of understanding Paul's metaphorical assertion and network against his background.

---

[72] Kim, *Origin of Paul's Gospel*, 145–146.

3.2.3.3. *Paul's Background*

Behind Paul's metaphorical assertion and network was a non-intentional mental feature called the background. His deep background included general know-how capacities for remembering, performing speech acts, writing, and forming intentional actions (e.g., to perform speech acts). Paul's local background consisted of specific know-how abilities that allowed him to share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures, worship the God of his ancestors (Israel), and have reshaped beliefs and stances attributed to the Christ event.

The evidence in Acts and in Paul's own writings reflects a shift in Paul's mindset after his Damascus experience (e.g., a former persecutor of Christ-believers became a called apostle to the non-Judeans; he moved away from 'righteousness under the law [δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ]' to 'the righteousness from God on the basis of faith [τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει]'n in Phil 3:6, 9; Rom 3:9–6:23; 9:30–10:13; God in Jesus Christ has redeemed sinners because of God's righteousness and justification by faith according to Rom 3:21–26).[73] Paul's metaphors concerning Jesus Christ as the cover and the role of Christ's blood to justify sinners in Rom 3:25, which he built from Israel's sacrificial system, reflect the expansion of his background to accommodate a new set of beliefs (see tables 3.1. & 3.2. for a comparison of Paul's illocutionary act and his intentionality). As a believer, Paul understood the Christ event through Judaism.

Paul, in asserting that (*p*) in Rom 3:25, opened himself up to an assessment of his propositional content. If Paul's controlling illocutionary act for the whole letter was one great assertive, then he also opened himself to an assessment of the entire letter. As Paul's assessors, who were the Romans? To what extent would the believers at Rome have understood Paul's metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25?

---

[73] Scholars differ in their interpretations of Paul's reshaped view of God's righteousness. Richard B. Hays, discusses the theme of righteousness in Romans against the background of Ps 143 ("Psalm 143 as Testimony to the Righteousness of God," pages 50–60 in *The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel's Scripture* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005]). Hays presents an interpretation by Adolf Schlatter that Ernst Käsemann followed in which Paul meant "God's *own* righteousness" as opposed to an "'alien' righteousness" that God bestows on the believer as a gift ("Psalm 143 as Testimony," 50–52). Moo draws attention to "the availability of God's righteousness to all who respond in faith" based on Paul's arguments in Rom 1–3 (*Epistle to the Romans*, 218). See also Brown's analysis of whether the righteousness-of-God phrase is a possessive genitive or a genitive of source/origin (*An Introduction to the New Testament*, 576–577).

Table 3.1. Paul's assertive in Rom 3:25

Features	Paul's assertive
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$
Illocutionary point	Paul's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$
Psychological state (sincerity condition)	Paul's belief (B)
Propositional content	that (p) [God put forward Jesus Christ as a cover through faith by his blood as proof of his righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins]
Sentence meaning (S is P)	(MET) God put forward Jesus Christ as a cover (ἱλαστήριον=cover of the ark) through faith by his blood
Speaker meaning (S is R)	(PAR) Jesus Christ has made the old function of the cover of the ark obsolete by becoming the new meeting point between God and sinners

3.2.4. *Paul's Assessors at Rome*

In Rom 3:25, the speech-act relationship consisted of Paul as assertor and the Romans as hearers and assessors. Paul wrote to an established community of believers at Rome.[74] Unbelievers were outside the original context of the letter. Opinions vary as to whether Paul wrote mainly to one group of Christ-followers at Rome (non-Judeans) or to more than one group (non-Judean and Judean believers). A. Andrew Das concludes that Paul wrote to an "almost exclusively Gentile"[75] Christ-believing group based on the following: (1) Claudius's edict to expel 'Jews' from Rome in 49 CE over the *Chrestus* controversy; (2) Paul's 'Gentile' language in Rom 1:5–6, 13–15; 11:13, 17–18, 24; and (3) Paul's references to 'impurity' and 'lawlessness' in Rom 6:17–22.[76]

[74] Brown advocates the thesis that Christianity spread to Rome from Jerusalem (*An Introduction to the New Testament*), 562–563.

[75] Das, *Paul and the Jews* (LPS; ed. S.E. Porter; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003), 66.

[76] Das considers the effects of the expulsion of 'Jews' from Rome on the early church, an event recorded by Suetonius, Orosius, and by Luke in Acts 18:2 (*Paul and the Jews*, 53–61, 63–66).

Table 3.2. Paul's intentionality in Rom 3:25

	Paul's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	Paul's belief (*S*) that (*p*) [God put forward Jesus Christ as a cover [ἱλαστήριον] by his blood through faith as righteousness on account of the passing over of formerly committed sins]	Paul's hope (*S*) that his assessors would believe (*S*) that (*p*) in Rom 3:25	Paul's intention to assert (⊢) that (*p*) in Rom 3:25
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for Paul's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – sin continued to be a reality in the world that needed to be accounted for – Paul encountered Jesus Christ – God exists and became incarnate in Jesus Christ – Christ's blood really does cover sins	for Paul's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the Romans – were Christ-believers – shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with Paul – knew the Torah – understood Paul's metaphorical assertion concerning Jesus Christ as the cover and that Christ's blood made it possible for God to pass over the sins of the people – believed that Jesus Christ superceded these OT scenes and made Israel's sacrificial system obsolete	for Paul's intention to assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) – his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert that (*p*)

Table 3.2. (*Continued*)

	Paul's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Network	Paul's interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – the one true God – the Torah and scriptures – God's righteousness – the Passover event – the cover of the ark – Israel's sacrificial system – the work of the Holy Spirit – Christ's blood and its efficacy – faith	idem	idem
Deep background	Paul's general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – write – form an intention to assert	idem	idem
Local background	Paul's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of his ancestors (Israel) – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures – attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event	idem	idem

In light of Das's assessment, the problem is what to make of Paul's overt use of the Hebraic motifs throughout his letter. Unless the non-Judean recipients were familiar with Israel's scriptures, they would have lacked understanding of Paul's references to the cover and blood motifs. Das takes up this concern.

> Paul assumes that his Roman audience knows the Scriptures. This knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures (including perhaps even the 'mercy seat' [ἱλαστήριον; NRSV: 'sacrifice of atonement'] in 3:25) can only be accounted for if the Roman Gentile Christians have been in conversation with, and have learned from, those who had participated in Jewish worship and who had been instructed in the LXX translation of the Jewish Scriptures. The LXX was not otherwise known in Greco-Roman circles.[77]

Similarly, Fitzmyer discusses the high probability that the Christ-believers at Rome would have read the Hebrew scriptures in the Greek. Fitzmyer states, "[T]he LXX use of *hilastērion* would not have been unknown to them."[78] If this was the case, then Paul's recipients perhaps understood Paul's reference to ἱλαστήριον in a metaphorical sense.[79]

To say that Judean groups had direct contact with non-Judean groups in Rome raises a question concerning the composition of Rome's population in Paul's day. The first evidence of an established 'Jewish' community and at least three synagogues in Rome were with Augustus (63 BCE–14 CE). Between 14 CE and 68 CE, different groups of Judeans in Rome have been identified as those with Roman citizenship, foreign Judeans, and Judeo-Christians. Various edicts by Tiberius and Claudius led to the expulsion of certain Judeans during this time. Then the Judean population grew as a result of the Jewish War of 66–70 CE when many Judeans were brought to Rome as prisoners.[80]

The premise for this study is that even if Paul wrote predominantly to non-Judean believers at Rome, he still had Judean believers in mind. Das recognizes that "Paul's closing admonition in Rom 15:7 suggests that the apostle has had Gentile and Jewish Christians in mind all along: 'Welcome *one another, therefore, just as* Christ has welcomed you, for *the glory of God*' [Das's italics]."[81] Paul also desired that both groups would affirm his gospel.

---

[77] Das, *Paul and the Jews*, 66.

[78] Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 350.

[79] Fitzmyer says that a symbolic or figurative use of ἱλαστήριον as the lid of the ark in Rom 3:25 is a possibility (*Romans*, 350).

[80] Samuela Rocca, "Rome, capital of Italy," *EncJud* 17:407.

[81] Das, *Paul and the Jews*, 74.

Paul opened himself up to assessment by his Judean and non-Judean assessors. He seemed to address non-Judeans and Judeans separately in the letter. He addressed his recipients as 'God's beloved [ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ]'[82] and 'called saints [κλητοῖς ἁγίοις]' in Rom 1:7. He wrote as a believer making the case for his faith to fellow believers. The question arises as to whether Paul's beliefs and gospel matched those of his recipients. Paul's rhetoric and language provide clues for discerning the nuances. He said that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23, NRSV). He also asserted that God is the God of all and that God is one (Rom 3:29–30). Paul's claims raised concerns presumably about the God-Israel relationship. "At the beginning of [Rom] 3 Paul is wrestling with the problem of the allegedly special status of the Jew before God."[83] Paul argued that true circumcision was spiritual rather than physical (Rom 2:25–3:2; see also Rom 4:9–12; Gal 5:2–12). Richard B. Hays says that this called into question 'God's integrity' with respect to Israel.[84] Paul, anticipating reactions and misunderstandings from his Judean-believing assessors, gave a series of rhetorical questions:

> Then what advantage has the Jew? Or what is the value of circumcision? (Rom 3:1 NRSV passim); What then? Are we any better off? (Rom 3:9a); Or is God the God of Jews only? Is he not the God of Gentiles also? (Rom 3:29); Do we then overthrow the law by this faith? (Rom 3:31); What then are we to say was gained by Abraham, our ancestor according to the flesh? (Rom 4:1); What then? Should we sin because we are not under law but under grace? (Rom 6:15); What then should we say? That the law is sin? (Rom 7:7); You will say to me then, 'Why then does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?' (Rom 9:19); What then are we to say? Gentiles, who did not strive for righteousness, have attained it, that is, righteousness through faith; but Israel, who did strive for the righteousness that is based on the law, did not succeed in fulfilling that law. Why not? (Rom 9:30–32a); I ask then, has God rejected his people? (Rom 11:1a); So I ask, have [the Jews] stumbled so as to fall? (Rom 11:11a)

Paul's rhetoric sheds light on the tensions that would have evolved within the minds of Judean Christ-believers because of the emerging shift in their religious beliefs and practices.

---

[82] The textual variant reads 'in God's love [εν αγαπη θεου]' and occurs in the following MSS: G, it, vg^{mss}.

[83] Hays, "Psalm 143 as Testimony," 52–53.

[84] Hays, "Psalm 143 as Testimony," 53.

Similar tensions would have occurred among the non-Judean Christ-believers, who operated out of a polytheistic mindset. This group faced tensions of being grafted into the God-Israel belief system and its customs (Rom 11:17–18), in addition to sorting out new teachings about the God of Israel revealed in Jesus Christ.[85] Paul addressed all Christ-followers in his letter, Judean and non-Judean alike, under the rubric of 'sinners.' All shared the same status as justified transgressors before God (Rom 3:9–26).[86]

Paul asserted his position from the perspective of his mission to reach the non-Judeans with the gospel. Paul's encounter with Christ on the road to Damascus was a first-hand, subjective experience, which means the Judean believers lacked the background to appreciate Paul's call to the non-Judeans. It became critical for Paul to defend his stance as a called apostle to the non-Judean world in the face of religious and cultural pulls, especially among his own kin. As a result, Paul asserted his 'apostleship [ἀποστολὴν]' for the 'non-Judeans [τοῖς ἔθνεσιν]' as coming from Jesus Christ (Rom 1:4–5, 13, 11:13; see also Rom 15:16 for Paul's calling as a 'priestly [ἱερουργοῦντα]' sort of 'minister of Christ Jesus to the nations [λειτουργὸν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη]'). Understanding that his mission was God-given, Paul reiterated his calling. Assured of his message, he spoke boldly knowing that his statements would challenge the views of his assessors.

How, then, did Paul's metaphorical assertion work? What made it possible for the Romans to recognize Paul's metaphorical intent, if indeed they did? To understand Paul, his assessors would have had to determine, compute, and restrict the possible values for *R* in Rom 3:25. Challenges arise when attempting to contrast Paul's sentence meaning with his speaker meaning while also isolating the Romans' level of understanding. The main feature of a theory of metaphor, that "similarity functions as a comprehension strategy, not as a component of meaning,"[87] can help with such a challenge.

Paul's recipients, particularly the Judean Christ-believers, would have known the history and practice of Israel's sacrificial cult, which was why Paul could build an extended metaphor upon the cover of the ark and

[85] Das, *Paul and the Jews*, 66–74.

[86] Das, in arguing that Paul wrote to a 'Gentile' audience, says Paul "never characterizes the Jews in his writings as 'lawless' and 'unclean'" (*Paul and the Jews*, 64).

[87] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 90.

blood imagery. For Paul's assessors to determine what he meant (*S* is *R*) in saying that God put forward Jesus Christ as a cover through faith by his blood (*S* is *P*), the Romans would have had to hear his reference to ἱλαστήριον in such a way that it called to mind the role of the cover of the ark and use of animal blood in the Torah. Such imagery became central for Paul's recipients to understand his new perspective about the significance of Christ and his blood in God's redemptive act.

Treating Rom 3:25 as a metaphorical assertion makes it possible for ἱλαστήριον to retain its literal value as 'cover/lid,' which honors its place in the scriptures. It forces the reader to examine the past, along with Paul, to understand its function in context. Treating Rom 3:25 as a metaphorical assertion also shows that Paul's use of ἱλαστήριον reflects a reshaped mindset.

To examine this mindset elsewhere, I consider the author of Hebrews, whose speech act about the blood of Christ in Heb 9:12 and intentionality reflect a similar reshaped mindset about God in Christ.

3.3. The Author of Hebrews and Heb 9:12

> οὐδὲ δι' αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος.
>
> [Christ] entered the sanctuary once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption (Heb 9:12).

3.3.1. *The Writer of Hebrews*

Unlike the Pauline letters that identified Paul as an apostle, slave, and prisoner of Jesus Christ, the book of Hebrews remains anonymous. Much of the scholarly work on Hebrews has focused on the authorship question. Candidates range from Paul, Apollos, Barnabas, Luke, Clement of Rome, Jude, or a combination of individuals.[88] A less popular hypothe-

[88] William L. Lane says, "Among early church traditions we find the author of Hebrews identified as Paul, Barnabas, Luke or Clement of Rome" ("Hebrews," *DLNT* 444); David Alan Black, "On the Pauline Authorship of Hebrews (Part 1): Overlooked Affinities between Hebrews and Paul" *FM* 16 (1999): 32–51; David Alan Black, "On the Pauline Authorship of Hebrews (Part 2): The External Evidence Reconsidered," *FM* 16 (1999): 78–86. Royal Sage argues that Paul or someone close to Paul wrote Hebrews as a theological

sis says that Priscilla penned Hebrews but that it circulated without her name because of her gender.[89] The author used the first person plural voice on occasion (Heb 5:11; 8:1; 13:18). Some scholars attempt to establish either Paul or Barnabas as the author by comparing the language in Paul's letters and Hebrews.[90] Friedrich Schröger says that Hebrews was an independent document that originated during the later part of the Christian-forming era and attaching Paul's name to it could assure its place in the NT canon.[91] Knut Backhaus considers the *theologischen Erbe* of Paul behind Hebrews.[92] The history of debate over its authorship and canonicity suggests the importance of attaching a prominent figure to the document. Unfortunately, these studies have provided little in the way of determining the original author.

The author knew about Judaism. Hebrews begins with an assertive about the history of Israel in relation to God: "In many and various ways God spoke to the ancestors by the prophets" (Heb 1:1). In Heb 1:2a, the author continued, "but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son." The author repeats this formula of contrasting what is 'old' or 'obsolete' (Heb 8:13) to what is 'new' or 'better' throughout Hebrews. He identified with Israel's scriptures and belief system (e.g., Jesus Christ superior to angels, Moses, and high priests in Heb 1:1–14; 3:1–6; 4:14–5:10;

---

tribute to the martyr Stephen ("Paul and the Author of Hebrews?," pages 122–126 in *The Stature of Christ: Essays in Honor of Edward Heppenstall* [eds. V. Carner and G. Stanhiser; Loma Linda, Calif.: Carner and Stanhiser, 1970]). For studies on the affinities between Alexandrian thought and Hebrews, see James H. Burtness, "Plato, Philo, and the Author of Hebrews," *LQ* 10 (1958): 54–64; A.M. Hunter, "Apollos the Alexandrian," pages 147–156 in J.R. McKay and J.F. Miller, eds., *Biblical Studies: Essays in Honor of William Barclay* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976); L.D. Hurst, "Apollos, Hebrews, and Corinth: Bishop Montefiore's Theory Examined," *SJT* 38 (1985): 505–513; Ceslaus Spicq, "L'Épitre aux Hébreux, Apollos, Jean-Baptiste, Les Hellénistes et Qumran," *RevQ* 1 (1959): 365–390.

[89] Adolf von Harnack, "Probabilia über die Adresse und den Verfasser des Hebräerbriefes," *ZNW* 1 (1900): 16–41. Charles C. Torrey finds no basis for supporting Harnack's thesis that Priscilla wrote Hebrews ("The Authorship and Character of the So-called 'Epistle to the Hebrews,'" *JBL* 30 [1911]: 137–145).

[90] Frederic Gardiner, "The Language of the Epistle to the Hebrews as Bearing upon Its Authorship," *JSBLE* 7 (1887): 1–27; Eta Linnemann, "A Call for a Retrial in the Case of the Epistle to the Hebrews," *FM* 19/2 (2002): 19–59.

[91] Schröger, "Der Hebräerbrief: paulinisch?," pages 211–222 in *Kontinuität und Einheit: für Franz Mussner* (eds. P.-G. Müller and W. Stenger; Freiburg: Herder, 1981). See also Charles P. Anderson, "The Epistle to the Hebrews and the Pauline Letter Collection," *HTR* 59 (1966): 429–438.

[92] Backhaus, "Der Hebräerbrief und die Paulus-Schule," *BZ* 37 (1993): 183–208.

7:11–28 and the superiority of Jesus' sacrificial death, blood, and covenant in Heb 8:1–10:22). Despite the anonymity of Hebrews, it is one of the most highly christological documents of the NT.[93]

3.3.2. *The Author's Illocutionary Act and Intentional States*

3.3.2.1. *The Author's Assertive Act*

Hebrews 9:12 fits the assertives class of illocutionary acts. The logical notation of an assertive is $\vdash\downarrow B(p)$. The author asserted ($\vdash$), "Christ entered the sanctuary [τὰ ἅγια] once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption." The $\downarrow$ symbolizes a word-to-world direction of fit that the author achieved provided the contents of Heb 9:12 affirm the new state of affairs concerning the person and work of Jesus Christ. The *B* stands for the author's psychological state (sincerity condition) of belief that (*p*). His belief comprised part of the meaning of his assertive. Like Heb 9:12, the majority of Hebrews fits the assertives class (Heb 1; 2:2–18; 3:3–6, 16–19; 4:2–10, 12–13, 15; 5:1–14; 6:3–20; 7:1–10:21, 26–31, 34, 36–39; 11; 12:4–6, 8–11, 17–24, 26–27, 29; 13:10–12, 14).

The author also interspersed several directives among his assertives (Heb 2:1; 3:1–2, 7–15; 4:1, 11, 14, 16; 6:1–2; 10:22–25, 32–33, 35; 12:1–3, 7, 12–16, 25, 28; 13:1–9, 13, 15–22). Some scholars classify Hebrews primarily as an urgent appeal or exhortation in the form of a homily.[94] Hebrews 13:22 supports this thesis; it reads, "I appeal to you, brothers and sisters, bear with my word of exhortation, for I have written to you briefly" (NRSV). This single verse, however, follows a series of directives and raises the question of whether the author intended his word-of-exhortation comment to fit the entire document or just the hortatory material in the final chapters.

---

[93] L.W. Hurtado, "Christology," *DLNT* 172–173; Brown, *An Introduction to the New Testament*, 684–685.

[94] Lane, "Hebrews," *DLNT* 443–458. Lane comments that Hebrews reads like a homily rather than a letter (*DLNT* 449–450). The closing remarks in Heb 13:22–25 resemble that of a letter; otherwise, the document lacks an epistolary opening.

3.3.2.2. *The Author's Belief and Hope*

The author's illocutionary act in Heb 9:12 derived from his intentionality. Certain features of the author's illocutionary act corresponded to the features of his intentionality. In performing an assertive, he had an intentional state (*S*) of belief that (*p*). The structure of his belief overlapped with the structure of his assertive. The direction of fit for the assertive in Heb 9:12 matched the author's intentional state of belief. The author's assertive had a word-to-world (↓) direction of fit and his belief had a mind-to-world (↓) direction of fit. For the author's belief to fit reality (i.e., to meet the conditions of satisfaction), it had to be the case that

- God exists;
- Jesus Christ is superior because he is God's Son;
- Christ died a sacrificial death;
- Christ's blood was superior to animal blood;
- as a Hebrew monotheist, the author understood Christ's death and blood in light of Israel's former sacrificial practices in the tabernacle.

The author had perhaps another intentional state in connection with Heb 9:12. He could have hoped that his recipients would believe that (*p*). The author achieved a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit for his intentional state of hope provided they believed that (*p*). For the author's hope to be fulfilled, it really had to be the case that the Hebrews

- were Christ-believers
- shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with the author
- knew of the Torah and scriptures
- understood the author's metaphorical assertion concerning Jesus Christ entering the sanctuary with his own blood once for all
- believed that Christ was superior to angels, Moses, and high priests
- believed that Christ's blood was superior animal blood

These conditions of satisfaction had to be met for the author to match his intentional state of hope with reality.

3.3.2.3. *The Author's Intentional Action*

The author had an intention to assert (⊢) that (*p*) in Heb 9:12. As with all causal self-referential intentional states, the author's intentional action had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓)

direction of causation. For the author's intention to be successful (i.e., to meet the conditions of satisfaction), it really had to be the case that he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) and that his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert.

3.3.3. *The Author's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background*

3.3.3.1. *The Author's Metaphorical Assertion*

Hebrews 9:12 fits the metaphorical assertion category. A study of the author's metaphorical assertion at the level of his intentionality includes his network and background. These subjective mental phenomena made it possible for the author to experience a shift in his religious beliefs based on the Christ event. The author operated out of his intentionality, network, and background to form new intentional states and to perform his speech acts as seen in Heb 9:12 concerning Jesus Christ, Christ's blood, the sanctuary, animal blood, and eternal redemption.

In Heb 9:12, the author performed a literal assertion *S* is *P* and meant metaphorically *S* is *R*. When he asserted that Jesus Christ entered the sanctuary once for all with his own blood, he did not mean that Christ walked into an actual sanctuary carrying his own blood like the high priests used to bring animal blood into the sanctuary.[95] Harold W. Attridge indicates that the author employed the blood-of-Christ motif in a metaphorical sense. Attridge says, "[T]he image should not be pressed here, or through the rest of the chapter, to mean that Christ actually brought his blood into heaven."[96] Many scholars interpret the blood language in Heb 9:12 as a metaphor either for Christ's death or the cross. Distinguishing the sentence meaning from the speaker meaning in Heb 9:12 helps to show that the author had in mind Christ's blood in a literal sense to assert the new reality of God in Jesus Christ compared against the actual sanctuary, high priest, covenant, and animal blood for the Day of Atonement ritual in Lev 16.

When the high priest would enter the Holy of Holies once a year, he would make a sin offering for himself and his own house (with the blood

---

[95] English translations of הַקֹּדֶשׁ (τὸ ἅγιον LXX) in Lev 16:2 vary: 'the holy place' (RSV); 'the sanctuary' (NRSV); 'the Most Holy Place' (NIV); 'the Shrine' (NJPS).

[96] Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Hermeneia; ed. H. Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 248.

of a bull), and then make a sin offering for all of Israel (with the blood of a goat). The high priest first killed the bull and sprinkled its blood on and in front of the ἱλαστήριον for his own sin offering. Then the high priest slaughtered the goat and sprinkled its blood in the same manner as the bull's blood (Lev 16:6–15).

> He shall take some of the blood of the bull, and sprinkle it with his finger on the front of the mercy seat, and before the mercy seat he shall sprinkle the blood with his finger seven times. He shall slaughter the goat of the sin offering that is for the people and bring its blood inside the curtain, and do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, sprinkling it upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat. Thus he shall make atonement for the sanctuary, because of the uncleannesses of the people of Israel, and because of their transgressions, all their sins; and so he shall do for the tent of meeting, which remains with them in the midst of their uncleanness. (Lev 16:15–16, NRSV)

The author of Hebrews accessed these motifs to make his case for the superiority of Christ and his blood in Heb 9:12 and the greater context.

The Hebrew word חטאת occurs nearly 300 times in the OT (mostly in Leviticus and Numbers), and is translated as 'sin/sin offering' (NIV, NRSV, NJPS). The corresponding Greek word in the LXX is ἁμαρτία. According to the NJPS, a more precise definition of חטאת is 'offering of purgation' (see its note on Lev 4:3). This captures the sense of cleansing sinners by purging them of their sins. Jacob Milgrom interprets חטאת as 'a purification-offering' (i.e., purgation) instead of 'sin offering.'[97] He distinguishes among levels of sin (e.g., 'inadvertencies communal,' 'inadvertencies individual,' and 'wanton sins') in relation to the level of contamination of the sanctuary.[98] Milgrom says that the blood of the חטאת was not a protective (i.e., covering) substance but a cleansing agent for the polluted sanctuary (where God dwelled) on account of Israel's sins.[99] In the context of חטאת, says Milgrom, כפר (i.e., *kippēr*) must mean 'purge' rather than 'cover.'[100] A similar theme of being cleansed from sin is detected in Hebrews. The author refers to ἁμαρτία twenty-five times, and at times refers to 'purification for sins [καθαρισμὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν]' (Heb 1:3,

---

[97] Milgrom, "Israel's Sanctuary: The Priestly Picture of Dorian Gray," *RB* 83 (1976): 390–399. See also Colin Brown, "Purity, Sacrifice and the Sanctuary," (photocopy of faculty working paper; School of Theology; Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif., [2001]: 1–4).

[98] Milgrom, "Israel's Sanctuary," 393–394.

[99] Milgrom, "Israel's Sanctuary," 392–398.

[100] Milgrom, "Israel's Sanctuary," 391.

NRSV) and making a 'sacrifice of atonement for the sins of the people [εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ]' (Heb 2:17, NRSV; see also Heb 5:1–3; 7:27; 9:26–28; 10:1–31; 13:11–12).

Many biblical scholars have treated the language of Christ's blood as a conceptual phrase for Jesus' death. Johannes Behm says that Christ's blood is a "graphic phrase" for Christ's death on the cross.[101] Behm writes, "The interest of the NT is not in the material blood of Christ, but in His shed blood as the life violently taken from Him."[102] F.F. Bruce seems to miss the idea of separating the event of Christ's death from his blood. He says, "When on the cross [Jesus] offered up his life to God as a sacrifice for his people's sin, he accomplished in reality what Aaron and his successors performed in type by the twofold act of slaying the victim and presenting its blood in the holy of holies."[103] The author's references to 'pouring out of blood [αἱματεκχυσία]' in Heb 9:22 and 'with [διά]' in Heb 9:12, however, suggest otherwise.

The earliest known reference to αἱματεκχυσία occurs in Heb 9:22,[104] and the only place it occurs in the NT is here, creating a *hapax legomenon*. The verse reads, "Indeed, under the law, almost everything is purified with blood, and without the shedding of blood [αἱματεκχυσία] there is no forgiveness of sins" (NRSV).[105] Many English translations read 'the shedding of blood' (NRSV, NIV, NAB, KJV). T.C.G. Thornton, in capturing the literal sense of αἱματεκχυσία, translates it as 'pouring out of blood.' Thornton says that "[i]t refers to the application of sacrificial blood to the altar to effect atonement. This 'pouring out of blood' presupposes the death of a sacrificial victim, but it does not primarily refer

---

[101] Behm, "αἷμα, αἱματεκχυσία," *TDNT* 1:174.

[102] Behm, *TDNT* 1:175. John T. Carroll and Joel B. Green address some of the historical aspects of Jesus' death such as why he was killed, what exactly killed him, and who was responsible (*The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity*, Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1995).

[103] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (rev. ed.; NICNT; ed. G.D. Fee; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 214.

[104] Thornton, "The Meaning of αἱματεκχυσία in Heb. IX.22," *JTS* 15 (1964): 63. The Greek words ἔκχυσις αἵματος appear in the LXX. In 1 Kgs 18:28 (3 Kgs 18:28, LXX), it says, "Then they cried aloud and, as was their, custom, they cut themselves with swords and lances until the blood gushed out over them [καὶ ἐπεκαλοῦντο ἐν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ καὶ κατετέμνοντο κατὰ τὸν ἐθισμὸν αὐτῶν ἐν μαχαίραις καὶ σειρομάσταις ἕως ἐκχύσεως αἵματος ἐπ᾽αὐτούς]" (NSRV, LXX). Then in Sir 27:15, it states, "The strife of the proud leads to bloodshed, and their abuse is grievous to hear [ἔκχυσις αἵματος μάχη ὑπερηφάνων, καὶ ἡ διαλοιδόρησις αὐτῶν ἀκοὴ μοχθηρά]" (NRSV, LXX).

[105] The manuscript tradition does not have 'sin [ἁμαρτία].' Hebrews 9:22 ends with οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις.

to the victim's death itself."[106] As Thornton points out, the death and the pouring out (application) of blood were separate events. The question is whether the author of Hebrews recognized this distinction when referring to Christ's blood.

The author made his case for Christ and the effects of Christ's blood in Heb 9:12 by calling to mind the tabernacle and Day of Atonement ritual in Lev 16:15–16. Then in Heb 9:18–22, the author recalled parts of another OT scene involving animal blood that preceded the tabernacle and Day of Atonement ritual. Exodus 24:1–8 records how Moses met with God and afterwards repeated all of God's words and ordinances to the people of Israel. They agreed to do what God had commanded, and burnt offerings were made. The covenant was sealed with the animal blood according to Exod 24:8: "Moses took the blood and dashed it on the people, and said, 'See the blood of the covenant that the LORD has made with you in accordance with all these words' " (NRSV). Without the blood, this covenant between God and the community could take no effect. In Heb 11:28, the importance of animal blood is seen again as the author referred to the Passover event (Exod 12:1–28).

In referring to αἱματεκχυσία in Heb 9:22, the author called attention to the pouring out of the sacrificial victim's blood for purification purposes. A death had to occur to obtain this blood. If the author intended to treat Christ's death as an event and his blood as an efficacious substance for obtaining eternal redemption for sinners, then it draws attention to the superiority of Christ's blood to animal blood because it was the blood (i.e., life) of God's son that he gave up in a sacrificial death (Heb 9:11–10:18; see also Heb 13:11–12). Attridge indicates that the blood language in Heb 9:12 refers most likely to Christ's sacrificial death, yet the " 'blood' could be the life that Christ offers eternally in heaven."[107]

Earlier in Hebrews, the author referred to ἱλάσκεσθαι when describing the way in which Christ suffered on behalf of 'the people [τοῦ λαοῦ]' (Heb 2:17–18). Hebrews 2:17 reads, "Therefore [Jesus] had to become like his brothers and sisters in every respect, so that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make a sacrifice of atonement for the sins of the people [ὅθεν ὤφειλεν κατὰ πάντα τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὁμοιωθῆναι, ἵνα ἐλεήμων γένηται καὶ πιστὸς ἀρχιερεὺς τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ]" (NRSV). In the verse, the author points to the incarnation, life, and death of Christ.

---

[106] Thornton, "The Meaning of αἱματεκχυσία," 65.
[107] Attridge, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 248.

English translations of the Greek verb ἱλάσκεσθαι in Heb 2:17 vary: 'expiation' (RSV, NAB, NJPS), 'to make a sacrifice of atonement' (NRSV), or 'to make reconciliation' (KJV). As seen in the discussion of Paul's reference to ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25, disagreements over the proper translation of ἱλάσκεσθαι in Heb 2:17 have to do with propitiation or expiation.[108] The author's metaphorical use of ἱλάσκεσθαι in a sacrificial sense corresponds to his direct or indirect references to Christ's blood throughout Hebrews (Heb 2:14; 9:12, 14; 10:19, 29; 12:24; 13:12, 20).

The author continued to build his case about the superiority of Christ's blood in chapter ten, intensifying the distinction between the sentence meaning and speaker meaning of Heb 9:12. To reinforce his position, he asserted that Christ's blood made it possible for the people to enter boldly the sanctuary (Heb 10:19). In Israel's old sacrificial system, God restricted access to the most intimate part of the sanctuary (i.e., 'the adytum'[109]). Once a year, the high priest entered the adytum with a sin and burnt offering after bathing himself in water and putting on holy garments (Lev 16). Milgrom points out that Aaron would enter the adytum three times as part of the Day of Atonement[110] ritual: to make a cloud of incense, to apply the blood of a bull for his own sins, and to apply the blood of a goat for Israel's sins.[111] The author of Hebrews, in recalling these things, performed an illocutionary act called a directive: "and since we have a great priest over the house of God, let us approach with a true heart in full assurance of faith, with our hearts sprinkled clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water" (Heb 10:21–22, NRSV).

A proper understanding of the Greek preposition διά in Heb 9:12 can illuminate the author's speaker meaning. He refers twice to the preposition διά. English translators interpret it in different ways. Hebrews 9:12 in the Greek reads, "οὐδὲ δι' αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων διὰ δὲ τοῦ

---

[108] Lane, *Hebrews* (2 vols.; WBC 47A–47B; Dallas: Word, 1991), 1:66. See also Brown's discussion of Dodd's thesis on interpreting כפר as expiation whenever the LXX renders כפר with ἱλάσκεσθαι and its cognates, as well as alternative arguments to Dodd's position (Brown, *NIDNTT* 3:151–160).

[109] Milgrom indicates that the references to הקֹדֶשׁ in Lev 16 pertain to the adytum, which is "the inner shrine containing the Ark" (*Leviticus* [3 vols.; AB 3–3B; New York: Doubleday, 1991–2001], 1:1013).

[110] Milgrom employs the alternative expression of the 'Day of Purgation' (*Leviticus*, 1:1009).

[111] Milgrom, *Leviticus*, 1:1015.

ἰδίου αἵματος εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος." Compare Heb 9:12 in the following three English translations:

> '[H]e entered once for all into the Holy Place, *taking* not the blood of goats and calves but his own blood, thus securing an eternal redemption [RSV; italics added].'
>
> '[H]e entered once for all into the Holy Place, not *with* the blood of goats and calves, but *with* his own blood, thus obtaining eternal redemption [NRSV; italics added].'
>
> 'He did not enter *by means of* the blood of goats and calves; but he entered the Most Holy Place once for all *by* his own blood, having obtained eternal redemption [NIV; italics added].'

The RSV translates only the first occurrence of διά and refers to it as 'taking' with an alternative reading of 'through' in a marginal note.

Bruce finds the 'taking' language in the RSV problematic. He says, "It is unfortunate that the RSV says that he entered 'taking not the blood of goats and calves but his own blood.'"[112] Bruce translates the Greek phrase διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος as 'by virtue of his own blood.' He foregoes a translation of the other reference to διά perhaps to avoid the awkward phrase of 'not by virtue of the blood of goats and calves.' Bruce's translation reads, "by virtue of his own blood, not the blood of goats and calves, he has entered the holy place once for all, having procured eternal redemption."[113] The NIV translates the first διά as 'by means of' and the second διά as 'by.' The NRSV says 'with' for both occurrences of διά. Attridge says that 'with' is the obvious meaning of διά in Heb 9:12.[114]

Following the NRSV and Attridge, I translate each reference to διά in Heb 9:12 as a genitive of instrument 'with.'[115] A translation of the Greek would therefore read, 'not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood [οὐδὲ δι' αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος].' Another possible translation for the second διά in Heb 9:12 is 'because of.'[116] This rendering would emphasize the special status of Christ's blood. Christ could enter the adytum because of the efficacy of his blood.

---

[112] Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 213.
[113] Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 211.
[114] Attridge, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 244, 248.
[115] The Greek preposition διά + genitive can denote 'instrumentality' or 'circumstance' (BDAG, 224).
[116] Interpreting the second διά in Heb 9:12 as 'because of' makes it a "marker of [something] constituting cause" (BDAG, 225) instead of a genitive of instrument.

Christ entering the sanctuary with his blood would have called to mind how the high priests entered the sanctuary with animal blood. The author's metaphorical purpose demonstrated the superiority of Christ and his death, blood, and new covenant. The literal translation 'with' honors the OT references and points to the limits of other translations (e.g., 'by virtue of') that fail to capture the literal value of *P* for determining the possible values for *R*.

> (MET) Christ entered the sanctuary once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption. (*S* is *P*)
>
> (PAR) Christ has made the old sacrificial system obsolete with his superior death and blood. (*S* is *R*)

In his twenty-one references to blood,[117] the author drew out at least three comparisons: Christ's blood as superior to animal blood; the blood of Jesus Christ as compared with other human blood; and the blood of the new covenant as better than that of the old covenant. In the ninth chapter alone, he referred to blood eleven times as he distinguished Christ's sacrificial blood from sacrificial animal blood. The blood language was central to the author's case that he made about Jesus Christ.

3.3.3.2. *The Author's Network and Background*

The author had an interconnected system of intentional states—his own network—associated with Heb 9:12. He had a set of attitudes, beliefs, and stances concerning the following:

> the one true God
> the Day of Atonement ritual
> God/Yahweh as Jesus Christ
> Christ's death
> Christ's blood superior to animal blood
> Israel's sacrificial system of pouring out and applying animal blood
> Christ superior to angels, Moses, and high priests
> the new or better covenant surpasses the old or first covenant
> purity and impurity
> the sanctuary
> eternity and redemption

The author's network of beliefs and stances resembled many of Paul's, although the author of Hebrews used the blood motif in a more

[117] Hebrews 2:14; 9:7, 12–14, 18–22, 25; 10:4, 19, 29; 11:28; 12:4, 24; 13:11–12, 20.

pronounced way to assert the efficacy of Christ's blood over animal blood in Israel's religious practices. The author's shift in intentionality accommodated a reshaped belief system about the superiority of Christ and his blood in Heb 9:12 and throughout Hebrews.

The author's metaphorical assertion and network of intentional states derived from his background. His deep background consisted of general know-how capacities to remember, perform speech acts, write, and form an intention to assert. The author's local background consisted of specific know-how capacities to share in the Hebrew faith and scriptures, worship the God of his ancestors (Israel), and have a reshaped mindset pertaining to Jesus Christ. The author's background expanded to accommodate a shift in his previous Hebrew mindset to a Christ-believing mindset. The author's metaphorical assertion in Heb 9:12, and the contents of his whole letter, became the expression of the new set of beliefs about God in Christ, Jesus' once for all sacrifice, and the efficacy of Christ's blood (compare the features of the author's illocutionary act with his intentionality in tables 4.1. & 4.2.).

Table 4.1. The author's assertive in Heb 9:12

Features	The author's assertive
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$
Illocutionary point	the author's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$
Psychological state (sincerity condition)	the author's belief (B)
Propositional content	that (p) [Christ has entered the sanctuary once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption]
Sentence meaning (S is P)	(MET) Christ has entered the sanctuary once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption
Speaker meaning (S is R)	(PAR) Christ has made the old sacrificial system obsolete on account of his superior death and blood

Table 4.2. The author's intentionality in Heb 9:12

	The author's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	the author's belief (*S*) that (*p*) [Christ has entered the sanctuary once for all not with blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, obtaining eternal redemption]	the author's hope (*S*) that his assessors would believe (*S*) that (*p*) in Heb 9:12	the author's intention to assert (⊢) that (*p*) in Heb 9:12
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for the author's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – God exists – Jesus Christ is superior because he is God's Son – Christ died a sacrificial death – Christ's blood was superior to animal blood – Christ really did obtain eternal salvation with his blood	for the author's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the recipients – were Christ-believers – shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with the author – knew of the Torah – understood the author's metaphorical assertion concerning Jesus Christ entering the sanctuary with his own blood once for all – believed that Christ was superior to angels, Moses, and high priests	for the author's intention to assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) – his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert that (*p*)

Table 4.2. (*Continued*)

	The author's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Conditions of Satisfaction		– believed that Christ's blood was superior animal blood	
Network	the author's interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – the one true God – Day of Atonement ritual – God/Yahweh as Christ – Christ's death – Christ's blood superior to animal blood – Israel's sacrificial system of pouring out and applying animal blood – Christ superior to angels, Moses, and high priests – the new covenant surpasses the old covenant – purity and impurity – the sanctuary – eternity and redemption	idem	idem
Deep background	the author's general know-how capacities to – remember and write – perform speech acts – form an intention to assert	idem	idem

Table 4.2. (*Continued*)

	The author's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Local background	the author's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of his ancestors (Israel) – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and Torah – attribute reshaped beliefs to the Christ event	idem	idem

3.3.4. *The Hebrews as Assessors*

The author, in asserting that (*p*) in Heb 9:12 and throughout Hebrews, opened himself up to an assessment by his recipients. They had to assess whether his assertives were true or false and whether his beliefs matched their own. Who were the author's assessors? The references to Israel's history, religious practices, and the motifs of 'our ancestors' (Heb 1:1), 'the children' (Heb 2:14), and 'the seed of Abraham' (Heb 2:16) indicate that the author had in mind Christ-believers familiar with Israel's faith tradition.

In Heb 2:14, the author compared Jesus Christ's blood to human blood.[118] Jesus shared the 'same things' as 'the children [τὰ παιδία]' by taking on human 'blood and flesh.' In the second part of the verse, the author tied the incarnational language to Jesus' death "[i]n order that through death he could destroy the one who has the power of death, that is, the devil." Ceslaus Spicq describes Jesus' act as a "binding of himself to the people by the bonds of blood."[119] This binding of Jesus to human beings included a sacrificial death, yet the incarnational aspect is strong. In Heb 2:16, the author identified 'the children' as 'the descendants of

[118] In Heb 12:24, the author compares Jesus' blood to Abel's blood. The verse reads, "and to Jesus, the mediator of a new covenant, and to the sprinkled blood that speaks a better word than the blood of Abel" (NRSV).

[119] Spicq, *L'Épître aux Hébreux* (2 vols.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1952–1953), 2:42.

Abraham [σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ].' In tying Jesus' identity to God coming in blood and flesh to share in the human condition, the author made the case (⊢) that God now related to Abraham's descendants in the incarnation—a shift that would have both challenged and reinforced the emerging religious beliefs of the author's recipients as new believers.

At issue is whether the propositional content of Heb 2:14–18 reveals anything about the previous mindsets of the recipients. If the author had in mind only Judean Christ-believers, then the question becomes what to make of his exclusion of the non-Judean Christ-believers. According to William L. Lane, "The description of the community of faith as σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ, 'Abraham's descendants,' alludes to Isa 41:8–10, where the faithful remnant is the object of God's comfort ...."[120] Lane broadens the interpretation of Heb 2:14 to say that the incarnate Son helps suffering men and women.[121] A concern is whether Lane's generalizations gloss over exclusive aspects of the passage in which the author presented God breaking in to a specific community and partaking of the same nature as the 'brothers [ἀδελφοῖς]' (Heb 2:17).[122]

Charles P. Anderson raises similar questions about the Hebrews community. "[W]hat is the assumed ethnic identity of those who are regarded in Hebrews as heirs of the new age, the descendants of Abraham? Are they Jews or [G]entiles or both?"[123] Lane leans toward a metaphorical understanding of the 'seed of Abraham' and sees a universal message. Anderson interprets 'the seed' language as the ethnic descendants of Abraham:

> Who are those to whom missionary activity should be directed according to Hebrews? Ethnically, they are the same as those indicated in Mt. 10.6: 'Go nowhere among the Gentiles, and enter no town of the Samaritans, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel'. The heirs of the new age envisaged in Hebrews are among those 'lost sheep' (cf. Heb. 13.20).[124]

The author perhaps wrote to 'Jewish' members of a community, says Lane.[125] If the author directed his message to the ethnic descendants of Abraham only, then he must have had certain intentional states for

---

[120] Lane, *Hebrews*, 1:63–64.

[121] Lane, *Hebrews*, 1:64.

[122] Richard H. Anderson describes the recipients of the Hebrews letter as 'Jewish followers of Jesus' or 'rescued orphans' who equated Jesus with the High Priest ("The Cross and Atonement from Luke to Hebrews," *EvQ* 71 [1999]: 148).

[123] Anderson, "Who are the Heirs of the New Age in the Epistle to the Hebrews?," in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament* (eds. J. Marcus and M.L. Soards; JSNTSup 24; Sheffield, Eng.: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 257.

[124] Anderson, "Who are the Heirs," 273–274.

[125] Lane, "Hebrews," *DLNT* 448.

doing so. In the overall content of the letter, the author reinforced to the Hebrews that they had access to the God of Israel through God's 'son [υἱός]' (Heb 1:2, 5; 3:6; 4:14; 5:5, 8; 7:28; 10:29)—a radical view that departed from their traditional belief system. The author referred intentionally to the God-Israel relationship throughout his letter with little or no mention of outsiders. Limiting the author's assessors to the ethnic descendants of Abraham, however, may neglect aspects of the author's less overt intentions.

The author clearly wrote to assessors who understood Israel's scriptures and worldview, yet he targeted a Christian community comprised possibly of both Judean and non-Judean converts. Craig R. Koester identifies the descendants of Abraham in Hebrews as "Israel's ancestors and the Christian community (Heb 11:39–40)."[126] Further, David A. deSilva makes the case, based on the lack of information about the author and the recipients, that the author had no intent to exclude a particular group. "The letter, unfortunately named, would be equally meaningful to Christians of any ethnic origin, since both Jewish and Gentile converts are socialized into the same Christocentric reading of the same Scriptures."[127] The author may have directed his assertives to Judean converts while building upon their familiarity with Hebrew scriptures and traditions, yet Judean and non-Judean converts would become the true assessors of the new reality of God in Christ according to the author's perspective. The speech-act relationship consisted of the author and his recipients. For understanding to take place, the Hebrews would have had to determine, compute, and restrict the possible values for *R* in Heb 9:12.

The author, having established Jesus Christ as God's son (Heb 1:1–13; Heb 3:6; 4:14; 5:5; 6:6; 10:29), reinforced a new mindset for the converts: Christ initiated a new, better, eternal covenant by means of his blood because it was the blood of God's son. In Heb 10:4, the author asserted, "For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins" (NRSV; see Heb 9:12–14; 10:1–3). In building his extended metaphor about the superiority of Christ's sacrifice in Heb 10:1–18, the author asserted that the offering of Jesus' body sanctified sinners (Heb 10:10). Christ made sanctification possible once for all by offering his body

[126] Koester, *Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 36; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 232.

[127] deSilva, *Perseverance in Gratitude: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle "to the Hebrews"* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 2, 6.

because it was the body of God's son. In Heb 10:11, the author asserted that the perpetual deaths and offerings of animals could never remove sins (see Heb 7:11, 18–19, 27–28; 9:9).

> The superior quality of Christ's sacrifice has several aspects. First, the source of the sacrifice is Christ's blood. The assumption that animal blood was of limited effectiveness is the basis for an a fortiori argument: How "much more will the blood of Christ" bring cleansing (9:14). The author did not say "how much more will the blood of a human being" or "the blood of a martyr" redeem you (4 Macc 6:29; 17:22), but emphasizes that the blood of Christ, the Son of God, is superior to any other blood, because Christ himself is superior to others.[128]

The author of Hebrews operated out of a transformed mindset as evident in the case he makes regarding Jesus Christ. Whatever encounters, events, or experiences of Christ that served as the basis for his reshaped mind, however, remain unknown. Nonetheless, his speech acts about Christ's blood converge at a central point: Christ, with his own blood, took on human blood and flesh and destroyed death and the devil (Heb 2:14), obtained eternal salvation (Heb 9:12), and cleansed consciences from dead works (Heb 9:14). The author expressed an intentional state of belief that the application of Christ's blood surpassed the application of animal blood for sins on the Day of Atonement (see also Heb 10:1–18). These verses indicate that the author geared his letter toward a community that identified with Israel's sacrificial practices. The text was part of a series of assertives the author used to challenge the community's previous way of relating to God. Each experienced a shift in intentionality as reflected in their christocentric mindsets.

3.4. Summary

Paul in Rom 3:25 and the author of Hebrews in Heb 9:12 each performed a single-level assertive called a metaphorical assertion. They performed their illocutionary acts based on a reshaped mindset. Paul asserted that Jesus Christ, with his own blood, has made justification, eternal redemption, forgiveness of sins, communal participation, and Christian unity possible. The author of Hebrews asserted that Jesus Christ took on human blood and flesh to destroy death and the devil. With his blood, Christ has obtained eternal redemption and cleansed consciences from sin.

[128] Koester, *Hebrews*, 415.

Hebrews 9:12 is an assertive with intertextual allusions to the Day of Atonement ritual outlined in Leviticus 16. Both writers had a particular set of pre-intentional or non-representational backgrounds. And as each had a network of intentional states directed formerly at God as Yahweh, then God as Jesus Christ, their metaphorical assertions would have challenged and reinforced this new belief system for their assessors.

In the end, a way is needed to transcend how the blood-of-Christ motif is limited in theological conversation to mean only his death. To Searle's credit, his categories offer a way to rethink what NT writers like Paul and the author of Hebrews meant—literally and metaphorically—when writing about Christ's blood.

CHAPTER FOUR

MULTI-LEVEL SPEECH ACTS: THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST'S BLOOD IN JOHN 6:52–59, REV 1:5B–6, AND REV 7:13–14

4.1. Introduction

Examples of multi-level speech acts are the speech acts performed by an author, the speech acts performed by the characters within that author's narrative, and the author's report of their speech acts. It is a matter of deciphering the direct and indirect speech acts and the reports by various speakers. A complete speech act consists of an utterance, a propositional, and an illocutionary act. A report, which differs from a complete speech act, consists of an utterance and a propositional act but not an illocutionary act. Searle's distinctions pertain to a speaker's intentional (with t) and intensional (with s) speech acts and mental states.[1] A speaker can perform intensional (with s) speech acts about someone's intentional (with t) speech acts (e.g., John 'reporting' verbatim what Jesus 'said'), and have intensional (with s) mental states about someone's intentional (with t) mental states (e.g., John 'believed' that Jesus 'believed' that his own flesh and blood was life-giving).

John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14 make good case studies for multi-level speech acts. In John 6:52–59, John made three direct assertives of an encounter in a synagogue at Capernaum between 'the Judeans [οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι]'[2] and Jesus (John 6:52a, 53a, 59). He also reported

[1] Searle, *Intentionality*, 17, 22–26. See Searle's chapter, "Intensional Reports of Intentional States and Speech Acts," pages 180–196 in *Intentionality*. For a condensed version, see Searle's section on "Intentionality-with-a-t and Intensionality-with-an-s," pages 174–178 in *Mind*. Austin had discussed the differences between reports or descriptions (i.e., constatives) and performatives. A reporter has a separate function than does a speaker or writer. Making a promise or naming a ship generates a different outcome than making a report or description (*How to Do Things*, 3, 5, 13, 25, 70, 79). Austin also identified three types of acts: phonetic acts (i.e., making certain sounds when speaking), phatic acts (i.e., uttering vocables or words), and rhetic acts (i.e., performing an act using words) in *How to Do Things*, 92–98, 115, 130.

[2] See n. 23 in chapter three for an explanation of my use of Judeans and non-Judeans in place of Jews and Gentiles.

the illocutionary acts of other speakers—a question asked by the Judeans of how it was possible for Jesus to give them his flesh to eat (John 6:52b), and Jesus' response in the form of direct and indirect speech acts concerning the effects of eating his flesh and drinking his blood (John 6:53b–58). In Rev 1:5b–6, John[3] performed multi-level speech acts in the form of an assertive and expressive on Christ's blood. In Rev 7:13–14, John reported the elder's illocutionary acts—a question and also an assertive concerning those who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.

The linguistic structures of all three texts reveal the complexities associated with a speech act analysis of biblical pericopes, their functions, and their meanings. How did the NT writers relate to their own words in one sense and to the words of their characters in a another? The question regarding the reports in John 6:52b, 53b–58 and Rev 7:13b, 14b is whether both Johns made the 'same'[4] illocutionary acts that the biblical characters performed (e.g., the Judeans, Jesus, and the elder). In John 6:52b, for example, did John ask the question along with the Judeans or did he only report it? The distinction calls for a proper understanding of the status of words in various contexts: the act of repeating and the act of reporting; representations and presentations of those representations. The point is to see whether these distinctions contribute to our understanding of biblical texts.

4.2. John, the Judeans, and Jesus in John 6:52–59

> Ἐμάχοντο οὖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι λέγοντες· πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἡμῖν δοῦναι τὴν σάρκα [αὐτοῦ] φαγεῖν; εἶπεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πίητε αὐτοῦ τὸ αἷμα, οὐκ ἔχετε ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ πίνων μου τὸ αἷμα ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον, κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. ἡ γὰρ σάρξ μου ἀληθής ἐστιν βρῶσις, καὶ τὸ αἷμά μου ἀληθής ἐστιν πόσις. ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ πίνων μου τὸ αἷμα ἐν

[3] I follow those scholars who say that John the evangelist was not the writer of Revelation. Richard Bauckham argues that the Beloved Disciple wrote the Gospel of John but was not part of the twelve (*Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006], 384–412; see also Bauckham, *The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007]).

[4] Searle clarifies when a reporter 'repeats' or 'reports' the same speech acts as the speaker (*Intentionality*, 183–188).

ἐμοὶ μένει κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτῷ. καθὼς ἀπέστειλέν με ὁ ζῶν πατὴρ κἀγὼ ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὁ τρώγων με κἀκεῖνος ζήσει δι' ἐμέ. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, οὐ καθὼς ἔφαγον οἱ πατέρες καὶ ἀπέθανον· ὁ τρώγων τοῦτον τὸν ἄρτον ζήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. Ταῦτα εἶπεν ἐν συναγωγῇ διδάσκων ἐν Καφαρναούμ.

Then the Judeans disputed among themselves, saying, 'How is it possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat?' Then Jesus said to them, 'Truly, truly I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise up him [or her] on the last day. For my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me and I in him [or her]. Just as the living father sent me, and I live through the father, so the one who eats me will also live through me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not as the ancestors ate and then they died. The one who eats this bread will live to eternity.' He said these things while teaching in a synagogue at Capernaum (John 6:52–59).

4.2.1. *John's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional States in John 6:52a, 53a, 59*

4.2.1.1. *John's Assertives*

John performed three brief assertives in the John 6:52–59 passage. In his first assertive, John said (⊢), "Then the Judeans disputed among themselves" (John 6:52a) because of Jesus' command to eat his flesh that is the living bread in John 6:22–51. The rest of the verse contains John's 'verbatim' report[5] of what the Judeans asked: " 'How is it possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat?' " in John 6:52b. John made a second assertive (⊢), "Then Jesus said to them" (John 6:53a), followed by another verbatim report of what Jesus said in John 6:53b–58. In his third assertive, John said (⊢) that the encounter between the Judeans and Jesus took place in a synagogue at Capernaum (John 6:59). The direction of fit for each assertive was word-to-world (↓) provided that these events took place as John said. John's psychological mode (sincerity condition) was belief (*B*) that (*p*) in John 6:52a, 53a, 59.

[5] Searle distinguishes among types of reports (e.g., 'word,' 'content,' and 'verbatim') in *Intentionality*, 185–186.

4.2.1.2. *John's Belief and Hope*

Each of John's assertives that (*p*) in John 6:52a, 53a, 59 had a word-to-world (↓) direction of fit. His intentional state of belief that (*p*) had a similar direction of fit of mind-to-world (↓). For John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality (i.e., to meet the conditions of satisfaction), it had to be the case that

- he witnessed or heard of the encounter between the Judeans and Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum;
- the Judeans heard Jesus say that he was the bread of life;
- the Judeans questioned Jesus' claim and disputed it;
- Jesus thought that his flesh and blood were unique.

John also could have hoped that his recipients would believe that (*p*) in John 6:52a, 53a, 59. His hope would have had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit depending on whether the recipients believed John. For John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that his recipients shared a common language and set of background assumptions with John, and they believed that a dialogue between the Judeans and Jesus took place in a synagogue at Capernaum.

4.2.1.3. *John's Intentional Action*

John had a causal self-referential intentional state of an intentional action to assert and report that (*p*) in John 6:52–59. His intention to assert and report had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. For John's intentional action to assert and report that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that he could form an intention to assert and report that (*p*) and that his successful assertives and reports were caused by his intention to assert and report that (*p*).

4.2.1.4. *John's Network and Background*

John's network associated with his assertives in John 6:52a, 53a, 59 consisted of an interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes relating to the following:

his role as an evangelist
the Judeans and a synagogue at Capernaum
the God-Israel relationship
Jesus and the Son of Man

flesh and blood
ingesting blood prohibited in the Noachian Laws and the Torah
eternal life, mutual abiding, and being raised up
bread from heaven
the ancestors who ate manna in the wilderness and died
Jesus sent from the Father

John's capacity to assert and report, to form intentional actions, and to have a network stemmed from his background. His deep background consisted of general knowledge of how to remember, write, perform speech acts, and form intentions to assert and to report. John's local background allowed him to have specific know-how capacities to share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures, worship the God of his ancestors (Israel), and attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event (see tables 5.1. & 5.2. to compare the structure of John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states with his intentionality).

Table 5.1. John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states in John 6:52–59

	John's assertives	John's intensional (with s) reports and states	
Features	John 6:52a, 53a, 59	of the Judeans' question in John 6:52b	of Jesus' speech acts in John 6:53b–58
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$	…	…
Illocutionary point	John's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)	…	…
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$	…	…
Intentional (with t) state	John's belief (B)	…	…
Intentional (with t) propositional content	that (p) in John 6:52a [the Judeans disputed among themselves (over Jesus' claim about his flesh being the bread of life)] that (p) in John 6:53a [Jesus responded to the Judeans]	…	…

Table 5.1. (*Continued*)

	John's assertives	John's intensional (with s) reports and states	
Intentional (with t) propositional content	that (*p*) in John 6:59 [Jesus said these things while teaching in the synagogue at Capernaum]		
Intensional (with s) state	. . .	John's belief that the Judeans desired to know that (*p*) in John 6:52b John's belief that the Judeans disbelieved Jesus' claims	John's belief that Jesus believed that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58 John's belief that Jesus hoped that the Judeans would believe that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58
Intensional (with s) propositional content	. . .	John's report that the Judeans asked that (*p*) in John 6:52b [How is it possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat?]	John's report that Jesus said that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58 [Truly, truly I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life and I will raise up him [or her] on the last day. For my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me and I in him [or her]. Just as the living father sent me, and I live through the father, so the one who eats me will also live through me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not as the ancestors ate and then they died. The one who eats this bread will live to eternity]

Table 5.2. John's intentionality in John 6:52a, 53a, 59

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in John 6:52a [the Judeans disputed among themselves (over Jesus' claim about his flesh being the bread of life)] John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in John 6:53a [Jesus responded to the Judeans] John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in John 6:59 [Jesus said these things while teaching in a synagogue at Capernaum]	John's hope (*S*) that his recipients would believe (*S*) that (*p*) in John 6:52a, 53a, 59	John's intention to assert (⊢) and report that (*p*) in John 6:52–59
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – he witnessed or heard of the encounter between the Judeans and Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum – the Judeans heard Jesus say that he was the bread of life – the Judeans questioned Jesus' claim and disputed it – Jesus thought that his flesh and blood were unique	for John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that his recipients – shared a common language and set of background assumptions with John – believed that a dialogue between the Judeans and Jesus took place in a synagogue at Capernaum	for John's intention to assert and report that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he had the capacity to form an intention to assert and report that (*p*) – his successful assertives and reports were caused by his intention to assert and report that (*p*)

Table 5.2. (*Continued*)

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Network	John's intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – his role as an evangelist – the Judeans and a synagogue at Capernaum – the God-Israel relationship – Jesus and the Son of Man – flesh and blood – ingesting blood prohibited – eternal life, mutual abiding, and being raised – bread from heaven – ancestors who ate manna in the wilderness and died – Jesus sent from the Father	idem	idem
Deep background	John's general know-how capacities to – remember and write – perform speech acts – form intentions to assert and to report	idem	idem
Local background	John's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of his ancestors (Israel) – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures – attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event	idem	idem

4.2.2. *The Judeans' Illocutionary Act and Intentional (with t) States and John's Report and Intensional (with s) States in John 6:52b*

4.2.2.1. *The Judeans' Question and John's Report*

In John 6:52b, the Judeans performed an illocutionary act in asking, "'How is it possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat?'" Their question differed from John's report of it. The linguistic evidence for John 6:52b indicates that John repeated only the utterance and propositional acts but not the illocutionary act. He directly quoted the Judeans as asking that (*p*). If John had repeated all three of the speech acts that the Judeans made (i.e., their utterance, propositional, and illocutionary acts), then John would have asked what the Judeans asked. The following modification illustrates: "Then the Judeans disputed among themselves, saying, [and I, John, ask as well] 'How is it possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat?'" Here, John would have performed the same intentional (with t) illocutionary act as the Judeans in asking that (*p*), yet John made an intensional (with s) report of the Judeans' illocutionary act. John's intensional statement represented that the Judeans asked a question and not the original representation of their inquiry.[6]

4.2.2.2. *The Judeans' Intentional (with t) States of Desire and Disbelief and John's Intensional (with s) State of Belief*

The Judeans may have had intentional states of desire and disbelief that (*p*) in John 6:52b depending on the type of question they asked. If the Judeans' desired to know how it was possible for Jesus to give them his flesh to eat, then their desire had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit provided that certain conditions were met. The Judeans' desire that (*p*) was fulfilled provided that

- they heard Jesus say that he was the bread of life that came down from heaven;
- they asked an exam question of wanting to know how it was possible for Jesus to give them his flesh to eat;
- they were with Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum.

[6] Searle, *Intentionality*, 24–25.

If the Judeans disbelieved that Jesus could give them his flesh to eat, then their disbelief had a mind-to-world (↓) direction of fit if the conditions of satisfaction were met. For the Judeans' disbelief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that

- they understood Jesus' words, yet they disbelieved that he was the bread of life that came down from heaven;
- they never directly asked Jesus for clarification but disputed among themselves;
- they were with Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum.

John had an intensional (with s) mental state of belief about the Judeans' intentional (with t) states. Four phrases illustrate:

- The Judeans' desire (intentional) to make sense of Jesus' words
- John's belief (intensional) that the Judeans desired (intentional) to make sense of Jesus' words
- The Judeans' disbelief (intentional) concerning Jesus' words
- John's belief (intensional) that the Judeans disbelieved (intentional) Jesus' words

John's intensional (with s) belief represented only that the Judeans had intentional (with t) states of desire and disbelief instead of the original representation of their states.[7]

What was the motivation for the Judeans' question? Did they ask out of wanting to understand Jesus' claims or because of doubt?[8] If the Judeans sought further knowledge, then they asked either a 'real' question or an 'exam' question. "In real questions [the speaker] wants to know (find out) the answer; in exam questions, [the speaker] wants to know if [the hearer] knows."[9] Jane S. Webster indicates that the Judeans never directed their question to Jesus but asked each other. In contrast, Jesus directed his response to the Judeans.[10] Their multifaceted question conveyed a sense of doubt about Jesus' claims. It also conveyed an attempt to understand Jesus' words in wanting to know whether Jesus knew how it was possible to give them his flesh to eat. If the Judeans attained a level of

---

[7] On the differences between representations and presentations of original representations, see Searle, *Intentionality*, 22–25.

[8] Searle deals with "the sense of 'ask a question' not in the sense of 'doubt' " (see Searle's table on the types of illocutionary acts in *Speech Acts*, 66–67).

[9] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 66.

[10] Webster, *Ingesting Jesus: Eating and Drinking in the Gospel of John* (SBLAB 6; eds. S.M. Olyan and M.A. Powell; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 80.

understanding beyond the literal meaning of Jesus' words, then perhaps they understood his words concerning eating his flesh and drinking his blood on a metaphorical level.

4.2.2.3. *The Judeans' Intentional Action*

The Judeans performed an intentional action to ask a question in John 6:52b. It had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. For their intention to ask that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that they could form an intention to ask that (*p*) and that their successful speech acts were caused by their intention to ask that (*p*).

4.2.2.4. *The Judeans' Network and Background*

The Judeans had a network of intentional states that resembled John's network. The Judeans had an interconnected system of beliefs, attitudes, and stances relating to the following:

God the Father
flesh and blood
ingesting blood prohibited in the Torah
their ancestors who ate manna and quail and drank water in the wilderness
life and death

The Judeans' deep background consisted of general know-how capacities to remember, perform speech acts, and ask questions. Their local background consisted of specific know-hows to worship the God of their ancestors (Israel) and share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures (see tables 6.1. & 6.2. to compare the features of the Judeans' question and intentionality).

Table 6.1. The Judeans' question in John 6:52b

Features	The Judeans' question
Propositional content	that (*p*) [how it is possible for this man to give us his flesh to eat]
Types of questions:	
Real	the Judeans wanted to find out the answer
Exam	the Judeans wanted to know if Jesus knew the answer
Doubt	the Judeans understood Jesus' metaphorical assertion, yet disbelieved his claims
If it was to ask for more information (i.e., not in a doubting sense), then certain rules apply:	
Preparatory	the Judeans did not know the answer, and it was unclear whether Jesus would clarify without the Judeans having to ask
Sincerity	the Judeans wanted more information
Essential	the Judeans' question counted as an attempt to elicit information from Jesus

Table 6.2. The Judeans' intentionality in John 6:52b

	The Judeans' intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Desire	Disbelief	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	the Judeans' desire (*S*) to know that (*p*) [how it was possible for Jesus to come from above and give them his flesh to eat]	the Judeans' disbelief (*S*) that (*p*) [Jesus came from above and could give them his flesh to eat]	the Judeans' intention to ask that (*p*) in John 6:52b
Direction of fit	world-to-mind ↑	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for the Judeans' desire that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that – they heard Jesus say that he was the bread of life that came down from heaven	for the Judeans' disbelief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – they heard and understood Jesus' words, yet disbelieved that he was the bread	for the Judeans' intention to ask that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – they could form an intention to ask a question and dispute Jesus' claims

Table 6.2. (*Continued*)

	The Judeans' intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Desire	Disbelief	Intentional action
Conditions of satisfaction	– they asked an exam question of wanting to know how it was possible for Jesus to give them his flesh to eat – they were with Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum	of life that came down from heaven – they never asked Jesus directly for clarification but disputed among themselves – they were with Jesus in a synagogue at Capernaum	– their successful question was caused by an intention to ask that (*p*)
Network	the Judeans' interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – God the Father – flesh and blood – life and death – ingesting blood prohibited in the Torah – their ancestors who ate manna and quail and drank water in the wilderness, and yet they died	idem	idem
Deep background	the Judeans' general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – question	idem	idem
Local background	the Judeans' specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of their ancestors (Israel) – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures	idem	idem

4.2.3. *Jesus' Illocutionary Acts and Intentional (with t) States and John's Report and Intensional (with s) States in John 6:53b–58*

4.2.3.1. *Jesus' Direct Assertives and John's Report*

John 6:53b–58 fits primarily the assertives class. In a series of statements, Jesus asserted (⊢) to the Judeans that he would give eternal life, raise up on the last day, and abide with whomever ate his flesh and drank his blood (*p*). The ↓ represents a word-to-world direction of fit provided that John 6:53b–58 reflected the new reality of life and abiding with Jesus for those who partake of his flesh and blood. Jesus' psychological state was a belief (*B*) that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58.

John's verbatim report differed from Jesus' assertive statements. The linguistic markers indicate how John repeated Jesus' utterance act and propositional act but not Jesus' illocutionary act. John quoted Jesus as saying that (*p*). If John had repeated all three of Jesus' speech acts (i.e., his utterance act, propositional act, and illocutionary act), then John would have asserted along with Jesus that (*p*):

> Then Jesus said to them, [and I, John, say as well,] 'Truly, truly I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise up him [or her] on the last day. For my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me and I in him [or her]. Just as the living father sent me, and I live through the father, so the one who eats me will also live through me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not as the ancestors ate and then they died. The one who eats this bread will live to eternity.'

These linguistic modifications indicate how John would have performed the same illocutionary act as Jesus, yet John made only an intensional (with s) report of Jesus' assertives. John's intensional (with s) statement represented only that Jesus performed a series of assertives but not their original representations.

4.2.3.2. *Jesus' Intentional (with t) States of Belief and Hope and John's Intensional (with s) State of Belief*

Jesus had an intentional (with t) state of belief associated with his assertives in John 6:53b–58. His belief had a mind-to-world (↓) direction of fit by meeting the conditions of satisfaction. For Jesus' belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that

- he came down from heaven and was sent from the Father above;
- his flesh and blood and person were unique;
- the effects of eating Jesus' flesh and drinking his blood were eternal life, being raised up on the last day, and abiding with Jesus.

Jesus could have had an intentional (with t) state of hope that the Judeans would believe that (*p*) both in John 6:53b–58 and in the surrounding context (John 6:35–51). Jesus' hope had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit provided that his hope was fulfilled. To meet the conditions of satisfaction, it had to be the case that the Judeans

- shared a common language and set of background assumptions with Jesus
- knew the significance of the manna/bread motif in the Torah
- understood Jesus' intentional use of a metaphor pertaining to eating his flesh and drinking his blood
- believed that Jesus came from above

John had an intensional (with s) state of belief concerning Jesus' intentional (with t) states of belief and hope:

- Jesus' belief (intentional) that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58
- John's belief (intensional) that Jesus believed (intentional) that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58
- Jesus' hope (intentional) that the Judeans would believe that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58
- John's belief (intensional) that Jesus hoped (intentional) that the Judeans would believe that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58

John's intensional belief represented only Jesus' intentional belief and hope and not the original representations of Jesus' intentional states.

4.2.3.3. *Jesus' Indirect Directives and Intentional State of Desire*

The surface structure of John 6:53b–58 indicates that Jesus' primary illocutionary act was a series of assertives. If Jesus also tried to get the Judeans to act, then he performed one or more secondary speech acts. In making a case about his flesh and blood (assertive), Jesus attempted to convince the Judeans to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man (directive). Jesus also committed himself to the future actions of giving eternal life, rising on the last day, and abiding with Jesus (commissive). Jesus' speech acts had the force of a direct statement, an indirect request or challenge, and an indirect promise.

The logical notation of Jesus' extended indirect directive is !↑*W*(*H* does *A*). The ! symbolizes the illocutionary point of Jesus' command to the Judeans to eat his flesh and drink his blood (Jesus' directives began earlier in the bread-from-heaven discourse where Jesus wanted 'the crowd [ὁ ὄχλος]' to understand who he was, where he came from, and why they should believe in him [John 6:22–51]). In John 6:53b–58, Jesus wished or desired (*W*) that the Judeans would obtain eternal life, be raised up on the last day, and abide with him by eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of Man (*H* does *A*). Jesus' indirect directives had a world-to-word (↑) direction of fit provided that Jesus' desire that (*p*) was fulfilled. To meet the conditions of satisfaction, it had to be the case that

- only Jesus could offer his flesh and blood for the Judeans to eat and drink;
- the Judeans understood and believed Jesus' command;
- the Judeans ate the flesh and drank the blood of the Son of Man;
- the Judeans received the promises of eternal life, being raised up on the last day, and abiding with Jesus.

John had an intensional (with s) state of belief relating to Jesus' intentional (with t) state of desire by showing Jesus' desire (intentional) that the Judeans eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man and John's belief (intensional) that Jesus desired (intentional) that the Judeans eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man.

4.2.3.4. *Jesus' Indirect Commissives and Intentional State of Intention*

Jesus also performed a series of indirect commissives in asserting that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58. The logical form for commissives is *C*↑*I*(*S* does *A*). The *C* symbolizes the illocutionary point of Jesus committing to some future action. The direction of fit is world-to-word (↑). The *I* symbolizes Jesus' intention to make good on his promises to give eternal life, raise up on the last day, and abide with whomever consume his flesh and blood (*S* does *A*). Jesus' intention that (*p*) was fulfilled given that he made a promise to do some future action and followed through and the Judeans received what Jesus promised by understanding, believing, and carrying out what Jesus said.

John's intensional (with s) belief differed from Jesus' intentional (with t) intention as exemplified by Jesus' intention (intentional) to perform some future action (*p*) and John's belief (intensional) that Jesus intended (intentional) to perform that (*p*).

4.2.3.5. *Jesus' Intentional Action*

Jesus had an intentional action to perform his direct assertives, indirect directives, and indirect commissives. His intention to perform speech acts in John 6:53b–58 had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. For Jesus' intentional action that (*p*) to be successful, it really had to be the case that he had the capacity to form an intentional action and that his successful speech acts were caused by his intention to perform speech acts.

4.2.3.6. *Jesus' Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background*

4.2.3.6.1. *Jesus' Metaphorical Assertion*

Jesus' direct assertives in John 6:53b–58 fit the metaphorical assertion category. According to Jesus, feasting on his flesh and blood was necessary to receive the life that he offered. Jesus literally said to eat his flesh and drink his blood (*S* is *P*), yet he must have meant something besides ingesting his actual flesh and blood (*S* is *R*). John was ambiguous about whether Jesus meant his words in a literal, idiomatic,[11] or metaphorical sense. If Jesus meant something other than the physical eating and drinking of his flesh and blood, then the distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning applies. With indirect speech acts, a speaker means more than what is said. With metaphors, a speaker means something other than the lexical meaning of the words.[12] Jesus performed indirect speech acts as well as an extended metaphorical assertion[13] about eating his flesh and drinking his blood.

In a literal sense, Jesus' words in John 6:53b–58 directly opposed the Noachian Laws (i.e., laws that affected non-Israelites) and the Torah that both prohibited the ingesting of blood because the life of every creature was its blood (Gen 9:4; Lev 17:14; Deut 12:23).[14] If ingesting blood was forbidden, then *a fortiori* Jesus' command to drink his blood would have

---

[11] Searle discusses idiomatic expressions as 'polite' adaptations of requesting and directing in *Expression and Meaning*, 48–51.

[12] Searle's distinguishes between speaker meaning and sentence meaning in *Expression and Meaning*, viii–ix, 143–144; Searle, *Speech Acts*, 42–50. Searle discusses metaphor at length in *Expression and Meaning*, x, 76–116, 143.

[13] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 88–90. For Searle, metaphorical assertions differ from 'assertions of similarity.'

[14] See F. Laubach's discussion on the idea of blood connected to life in Homer and the OT, as well as the nuances of the blood motif in the NT ("Blood, Sprinkle, Strangled," *NIDNTT* 1:220–224).

made little sense to his hearers (i.e., the Judeans). They would have had to interpret Jesus' words in a non-literal fashion, and how they heard Jesus' words ought to be factored in to interpretations of John 6:53b–58.

The history of scholarship on John 6 reveals different theological interpretations of Jesus' claims in John 6 (e.g., sacramental, nonsacramental, metaphorical for belief in Jesus, or metaphorical for Jesus' death). Jesus' words have tended to evoke the Lord's Supper tradition for many, raising the question of whether to interpret Jesus' words in a sacramental or nonsacramental sense. A secondary but related issue is has to do with the source behind John 6:52–59, whether it was written by the evangelist John.

The NT scholar Paul N. Anderson points out that Rudolf Bultmann's composition (i.e., source) theory of John's Gospel has generated much of the debate over the composer(s) of John's gospel and its so-called various christological perspectives. This has led some scholars to see discontinuity in John 6 when treating parts of it as redacted content.[15] George R. Beasley-Murray, however, in asking to what extent John 6 reflects the Lord's Supper tradition, argues that treating John 6:1–50 metaphorically but John 6:51–58 sacramentally goes against the author's intent. Beasley-Murray insists on keeping John 6 as a single unit whether it is interpreted in light of the Lord's Supper or not.[16] Dunn surmises that "even if the Lord's Supper itself does enter John's thought in [John 6] his message of caution and warning is not the main reason for his using this discourse."[17]

Whereas the Synoptic texts present Jesus taking the bread and a cup (two cups in Luke) and giving it to his disciples to eat and drink (Matt 26:26–28; Mark 14:22–24; Luke 22:17–20), John 6:53–58 presents Jesus offering his own flesh as 'true food' and his blood as 'true drink' (John

---

[15] Anderson discusses Bultmann's 'diachronic theory of composition' and its subsequent influence on studies of John's Gospel (*The Christology of the Fourth Gospel: Its Unity and Disunity in the Light of John 6* [WUNT 78; eds. M. Hengel and O. Hofius; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996], 5–10, 15, 26–28, 33–36, 48–53, 67–166, 211, 224–225, 252–254). See Bultmann, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (trans. G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare, and J.K. Riches; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971). On the basis of Bultmann's commentary on John's Gospel, Dwight Moody Smith attempts a reconstruction of the hypothetical sources and hypothetical original order of John (*The Composition and Order of the Fourth Gospel: Bultmann's Literary Theory* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965]).

[16] Beasley-Murray, *Gospel of Life: Theology in the Fourth Gospel* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991), 98.

[17] Dunn, "John VI—A Eucharistic Discourse?" *NTS* 17 (1971): 335.

6:55)—John's counterpart to the Lord's Supper since he records only a foot-washing scene later in John 13:1–20.[18] Jesus' flesh and blood are the central focus of John 6:53b–58.[19] Despite the absence of the bread and cup in John's account, the Roman Catholic theologian Rudolf Schnackenburg interprets Jesus' words in light of the Eucharist.[20] Likewise, R. Alan Culpepper speaks about the 'eucharistic overtones' in John 6:51–58 as being recognized universally.[21]

Not all share the same opinion. Peder Borgen, in a study of how the bread-from-heaven motif is a midrashic homily in John 6 and Philo, argues that John 6:49–58 consists of a blend of a haggadic fragment on the manna in the OT and an early eucharistic tradition.[22] Koester, a Lutheran theologian, takes a nonsacramental approach, saying that the eating and drinking motifs serve as metaphors for believing in Jesus. Koester's view is supported by passages in John's Gospel (John 6:29–30, 35, 40, 47).[23] Koester's thesis reflects the way in which John presented Jesus' use of the bread-belief motif (e.g., feeding 5,000 hungry people who realized Jesus was a prophet in John 6:1–15; see John 6:25–69 for a continuation of the bread-belief theme). The Greek verb 'believe [πιστεύω]' occurs ninety-eight times in John's Gospel. Whereas Dunn says belief in the incarnate Christ and his death are necessary for receiving eternal life,[24] a more nuanced understanding of the passage reflects belief in and reliance on Jesus as the eternal source of life and sustenance. It involves sharing in Jesus' life, not only in the afterlife but in this earthly life—a reoccurring theme throughout John 6.

---

[18] Brown sees the Lord's Supper and foot-washing as "prophetic signs" performed by Jesus, who combined "*word and action* [Brown's italics]" to teach and perform miracles. See Brown, "Jesus' Prophetic Signs," (photocopy of faculty working paper; School of Theology; Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif. [2003]: 1–2). See Robert T. Fortna's discussion of a hypothetical signs source behind John's Gospel ("Signs/Semeia Source," *ABD* 6:18–22).

[19] Dunn challenges the eucharistic interpretation. His analysis of John's use of σάρξ instead of αρτος supports the position that Jesus, not the elements of the bread and cup, is the focal point of the passage ("John VI," 333).

[20] Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to St John* (vol. 2; New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 56.

[21] Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (1st paperback ed; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 197.

[22] Borgen, *Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo* (NovTSup 10; eds. W.C. van Unnik et al; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), 87–97.

[23] Koester, *Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel: Meaning, Mystery, Community* (2d ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 103–104.

[24] Dunn, "John VI," 335, 337–338. The evangelist John distinguishes between Jesus' flesh and blood whereas Dunn leaves the αἷμα unexamined.

Though life is a strong theme in John 6, many interpreters factor in Jesus' death. Koester associates Jesus' words in John 6:53b–58 with the 'crucified Messiah.'[25] Craig S. Keener suggests that the paschal-lamb motif lies "in the background" of John 6:52–59. He says, "Here Jesus probably refers not to a sacrament in the modern sense, but to embracing his death."[26] About these common assumptions, one must ask whether Jesus had in mind his own death, and if so, whether the Judeans picked up on this, especially since Jesus was still alive.

The 'bread [ἄρτος]' motif occurs as one of Jesus' signs throughout John 6 in a nuanced pattern: physical bread for the hungry Judean crowd to eat (John 6:5–13, 23, 26), the physical bread or 'the manna [τὸ μάννα]' from heaven that the ancestors of the Judeans' ate in the wilderness but then died (John 6:31, 49, 58), Jesus' claim as the true or living bread from heaven (John 6:32–35, 41, 48, 50–52, 58). Jesus accessed the Torah to compare the manna in the wilderness to his own 'flesh [σάρξ]' (John 6:31, 48–51). Similarly, Jesus' reference to his own 'blood [αἷμα]' would have brought back stories of Yahweh forbidding the ingestion of blood because blood was life (Gen 9:4; Lev 17:10–14; Deut 12:16, 23–24). John referred to blood only six times, four of which were attributed to Jesus in John 6:53b–56. In the other two occurrences, blood was never used as a metaphor for Jesus' death. John referred to blood tied to human begetting/birth (John 1:13)[27] and to the blood and water that poured from Jesus' side after his death on the cross (John 19:34).

In asserting that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58, Jesus did not mean literally to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man. The literal value (*P*) of eating Jesus' flesh and drinking his blood differed from Jesus' speaker meaning (*R*). One explanation is that Jesus perceived he had something that earthly food and drink lacked (John 6:22–58; see also John 4:7–15). The characteristics associated with perishable food and drink—though temporary, they sustain life—reveal something about Jesus' qualities. John, the Judeans, and Jesus would have had an interest in the powerful

---

[25] Koester, *Symbolism*, 102–103.

[26] Keener, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (2 vols.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003), 1:688.

[27] John 1:12–13 reads, "But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God, who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God" (NRSV). John W. Pryor, who draws from the work of Peter Hofrichter, considers whether John 1:13 contains a reference to Jesus and the incarnation ("Of the Virgin Birth or the Birth of Christians? The Text of John 1:13 Once More," *NovT* 27 [1985]: 312–313). See Hofrichter, "'Egeneto Anthropos,' Text und Zusätze im Johannesprolog," *ZNW* 70 (1979): 214–237.

construct of what it meant to eat and drink, what it meant for their ancestors to be sustained with food and drink (John 6:27, 31, 35, 49, 58; see also John 4:13–15, 31–34; 7:37–38). These motifs would have called to mind a number of passages on God sustaining the Israelites with manna/bread, quail/flesh, and water from the rock (Exod 16:1–17:7; Num 11:4–34; 20:1–13; 21:5; Deut 8:3; 33:8; Josh 5:11–12; Pss 78:15–31; 81:7, 16; 105:40–41; 114:8).[28] A possible paraphrase that captures Jesus' speaker meaning (*S* is *R*) follows what Jesus said literally (*S* is *P*) in John 6:53b–58.

> (MET) Truly, truly I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise up him [or her] on the last day. For my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me and I in him [or her]. Just as the living father sent me, and I live through the father, so the one who eats me will also live through me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not as the ancestors ate and then they died. The one who eats this bread will live to eternity. (*S* is *P*)
>
> (PAR) Jesus has come from the Father as the true source of sustenance and eternal life compared against the temporary food—manna, quail, water—sent by God to nourish the Israelites in the wilderness. (*S* is *R*)

Identifying John 6:53b–58 as an extended metaphorical assertion elucidates the case Jesus made about himself and his flesh and blood. It also raises the question of how the Judeans heard and understood Jesus' claims.

4.2.3.6.2. *Jesus' Network and Background*

In relation to his multiple speech acts in John 6:53b–58, Jesus operated out of his particular network and background. Jesus had an interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes pertaining to the following:

> God the living Father
> God-Israel relationship
> God's prohibition against consuming blood
> the scriptures
> the Son of Man
> coming in human flesh and blood
> being sent from the father
> eating and drinking

[28] Koester says, "Readers familiar with Jewish tradition would probably have connected the bread metaphor with God's word, wisdom, and law" (*Symbolism*, 101).

living bread and blood as life
eternal life
being raised on the last day
abiding
the ancestors who ate manna in the wilderness yet perished

Jesus' deep background meant that he had the capacity to remember, perform speech acts, and form intentions. His local background consisted of specific know-how capacities to identify himself as God's incarnate Son and to share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures (for a comparison of Jesus' illocutionary acts and intentionality, see tables 7.1. & 7.2.).

Table 7.1. Jesus' direct and indirect speech acts in John 6:53b–58

Features	Direct assertives	Indirect directives	Indirect commissives
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$	$!\uparrow W(H \text{ does } A)$	$C\uparrow I(S \text{ does } A)$
Illocutionary point	Jesus' commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)	Jesus' attempt (!) to get the Judeans to do something	Jesus commits (C) to some future course of action
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$	world-to-word $\uparrow$	world-to-word $\uparrow$
Psychological state (sincerity condition)	Jesus' belief (B)	Jesus' want, wish, or desire (W)	Jesus' intention (I)
Propositional content	that (p) [Truly, truly I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life and I will raise up him [or her] on the last day. For my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. Just as the living father sent me, and I live through the father, so the one who eats me will also live through me. This is the bread that came	that the Judeans (H) do A [eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man (i.e., believe in and depend on Jesus who has come from the Father as the true source of sustenance and eternal life)]	Jesus (S) promises to do A [give eternal life, raise up on the last day, and abide with whomever eats his flesh and drinks his blood]

Table 7.1. (*Continued*)

Features	Direct assertives	Indirect directives	Indirect commissives
Propositional content	down from heaven, not as the ancestors ate and then they died. The one who eats this bread will live to eternity]		
Sentence meaning (*S* is *P*)	(MET) Jesus said to eat his flesh and drink his blood	…	…
Speaker meaning (*S* is *R*)	(PAR) Jesus has come from the Father as the true source of sustenance and eternal life compared against the temporary food—manna, quail, water—sent by God to nourish the Israelites in the wilderness	…	…

4.2.3.7. *The Judeans as Jesus' Assessors*

The Judeans who heard Jesus asked how it was possible for Jesus to come down from heaven and for them to eat his flesh (John 6:35–42, 52). With their exam questions, they were looking to Jesus to explain himself. For the speaker-hearer relationship to work, Jesus' claims would have had to make sense to the Judeans at some level.[29] Jesus opened himself up to an assessment of his metaphorical assertion that (*p*) here in John 6:53b–58 and the surrounding context.

According to John 6, Jesus' true-bread-from-heaven language and his command to eat his flesh and drink his blood sparked different reactions by the crowd. Immediately following John 6:52–59, the evangelist reported that many disciples found Jesus' words offensive and difficult to accept, and so they stopped following Jesus (John 6:60–67, NRSV). So

[29] About the speaker-hearer dynamic, Searle presents certain conditions for successful promises and other illocutionary acts (*Speech Acts*, 54–61), for speaker-meaning and hearer-understanding (*Speech Acts*, 20–21, 46–50, 60–61; *Expression and Meaning*, 30–31), and for the status of both speaker and hearer in relation to the illocutionary force of an utterance (*Expression and Meaning*, 5–6).

Table 7.2. Jesus' intentionality in John 6:53b–58

	Jesus' intentional states (*S*)	
Features	Belief	Hope
Propositional content (*p*)	Jesus' belief (*S*) that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58	Jesus' hope (*S*) that the Judeans would believe that (*p*)
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…
Conditions of satisfaction	for Jesus' belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – he was sent from the Father – his flesh and blood and person were unique – eating Jesus' flesh and drinking his blood led to eternal life, rising on the last day, and abiding with Jesus	for Jesus' hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the Judeans – shared a common language and set of background assumptions with Jesus – knew the bread motif in the Torah – understood Jesus' metaphorical assertion
Network	Jesus' inter-connected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – God the Father – God-Israel relationship – the scriptures – the Son of Man – coming from the Father in human flesh and blood – food and drink – life, being raised, and abiding – living bread – blood as life	idem
Deep background	Jesus' general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – form intentions	idem
Local background	Jesus' specific know-how capacities to – identify himself as God's incarnate Son – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures	idem

Table 7.2. (*Continued*)

Jesus' intentional states (*S*)		Causal self referential intentional state
Desire	Intention	Intentional action
Jesus' desire (*S*) that the Judeans do *A*	Jesus' intention (*S*) to do *A*	Jesus' intention to assert, direct, and promise that (*p*)
world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
…	…	mind-to-world ↓
for Jesus' desire that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that – only Jesus could offer his flesh and blood for the Judeans to eat and drink – the Judeans received what Jesus promised because they understood, believed, and carried out Jesus' command	Jesus' intention to do *A* was fulfilled provided that – Jesus promised to give eternal life, raise up on the last day, and abide with whomever ate his flesh and his drank blood – the Judeans received what Jesus promised because they understood, believed, and carried out Jesus' command	for Jesus' intention to assert, direct, and promise that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he could form an intentional action to perform his direct and indirect speech acts – his successful speech acts were caused by his intention to perform speech acts
idem	idem	idem
idem	idem	idem
idem	idem	idem

Jesus asked the twelve if they too wanted to depart from him (John 6:68–69, NRSV). Jesus, knowing that certain people wanted him dead, avoided the region of Judea by remaining in Galilee (John 7:1).

Opinions vary when it comes to the Judeans' responses in John 6:41–42, 52. Keener describes their reactions to Jesus' cannibalistic statements as disbelief, confusion, and disgust.[30] Webster and Culpepper both argue that the Judeans' response in John 6:52 reflects a misunderstanding of Jesus' death.[31] Regarding the Judeans' questioning in John 6:41, 52, Culpepper says that it "[b]ecomes typical of earthly, literal, superficial understanding: 'how?'"[32] If the Judeans understood Jesus' words in a metaphorical sense, however, then it challenges interpreters to look at John 6:52–59 in a different way.

The idea that the Judeans—upon hearing, assessing, and disputing Jesus' words—attained some degree of understanding of Jesus' metaphorical assertion challenges Keener's statement: "the 'Jews' here understand Jesus more literally than they should, ignorant of his deeper meaning."[33] On the other hand, if the Judean crowd comprehended what Jesus meant (Jesus as the eternal source of life→*S* is *R*) by what he said (my flesh as the bread of life→*S* is *P*), then their reaction was neither that of disgust nor confusion. It is also the case that the Judeans would not have interpreted Jesus' words in a eucharistic sense, for they had no awareness of the Lord's Supper. These factors ought to be taking into account when reading John 6, though some of the scholarly work proves otherwise.

As noted, the main interpretive points that tend to arise from John 6:52–59 and its surrounding context are whether to treat Jesus' words in a eucharistic sense, as a metaphor for his death, or as a metaphor for belief. Beasley-Murray says on the one hand that a eucharistic interpretation of John 6:52–59 is unnecessary, but on the other, he states, "it is evident that neither the Evangelist nor the Christians readers could have written or read the saying without conscious reference to the Eucharist."[34] It could be, however, that Jesus' words brought into perspective something that the Judeans (and John and the early believers) could relate to. Identifying the various speech acts made by Jesus in John 6:53b–58 helps to uncover the familiar motifs (e.g., life-sustaining manna for the ancestors; the

[30] Keener, *Gospel of John*, 1:684–688.
[31] Webster, *Ingesting Jesus*, 83; Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 156–157, 162–163.
[32] Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 92.
[33] Keener, *Gospel of John*, 1:688.
[34] Beasley-Murray, *Gospel of Life*, 95.

human experience of needing food and drink for sustenance and life) that Jesus' words would have called to mind for the Judeans.

So what effect did Jesus' words have on the Judeans? As hearers and assessors, the Judeans were positioned to make sense of Jesus' claims, to assess the validity of his words, to accept or reject what Jesus had to say. Their hearer understanding, as one dimension of meaning, may challenge traditional assumptions about how literally they took Jesus' words.[35] The problem identified by Searle, that "[i]n hints, insinuations, irony, and metaphor—to mention a few examples—the speaker's utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways,"[36] fits the speech act scenario between Jesus and the Judeans and between Jesus and his disciples.

As hearers, the task that the Judeans faced was to determine, compute, and restrict the possible values of *R* based on certain principles and background assumptions[37] they shared with Jesus. Further, "[i]n order to understand the metaphorical utterance, the hearer requires something more than his knowledge of the language, his awareness of the conditions of the utterance, and background assumptions that the shares with the speaker." The extra feature—calling to mind a different meaning with its truth conditions—serves as "the basic principle on which all metaphor works."[38] What did Jesus call to mind for the Judeans with his extended metaphorical assertion?

The greater context suggests that the Judeans and disciples (other than the twelve; see John 6:66–67) comprehended Jesus' metaphor. They simply found it offensive, unbelievable. Jesus never tried to clarify his metaphorical assertion, leading one to assume that the Judeans had the capacity to determine Jesus' speaker meaning. It is possible that the Judeans—who understood that the Father was the source of the manna, that the Father fed their ancestors—disbelieved outright that this same Father also sent Jesus to be an eternal source of life and sustenance (John 6:41–43, 60–71).

The overall reaction of the Judeans consisted of disbelief. They complained about Jesus' attempt to reshape their belief system (John 6:25–59; see also John 6:60–69 about some of the disciples who disbelieved and stopped following Jesus compared against those disciples who believed and stayed). Jesus claimed to have come from and seen the very God

---

[35] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 31.
[36] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 30.
[37] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 77–85, 104–105.
[38] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 85.

that they claimed to worship and know (John 6:29, 32–33, 37–40, 44–46, 50–51). Accepting Jesus' claims required an expansion of their backgrounds to form new intentional states about Jesus, that he was not just Joseph's son (John 6:42). He was from the Father above (John 6:29, 38–39, 44, 46, 57). Accepting Jesus' claims required that the hearers form new religious stances and beliefs now directed toward God in Jesus Christ. John serves as an example of one who operated out of a reshaped mindset, writing his gospel as a Christ-believer.

With the speech act relationship consisting of Jesus as speaker and the Judeans as hearers, a speech act analysis takes into account how the Judeans would have heard Jesus' claims of being the bread of life from heaven, the command to eat his flesh, to drink his blood. Even for the evangelist and his recipients, Jesus' words could have evoked images of food and drink in the ordinary sense, despite their knowledge of Jesus' death and the Lord's Supper tradition.

4.3. John and Rev 1:5b–6; John and the Elder in Rev 7:13–14

The multi-level speech acts in Rev 1:5b–6 differ from those in Rev 7:13–14. In Rev 1:5b–6, John performed an assertive and expressive concerning Christ who loves us and has freed us with his blood. In Rev 7:13–14, layers of speech acts are detected in John's assertives, the elder's question and assertive, and John's verbatim reports of what the elder asked and said concerning the martyrs with robes made white by the blood of the Lamb. The propositional contents of these texts affirm the efficacy of Christ's blood. Revelation 1:5b–6 and Rev 7:13–14 both fit the metaphorical assertion category. A speech act analysis helps to identify the speaker meaning and sentence meaning of these metaphorical assertions at the level of speaker intentionality. It accounts for the types of speech acts performed by John and the elder in the vision and how the status of John's words changed from illocutionary act to report.

4.3.1. *John and Rev 1:5b–6*

> Τῷ ἀγαπῶντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λύσαντι ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς βασιλείαν, ἱερεῖς τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας [τῶν αἰώνων]· ἀμήν.

> To him [Jesus Christ] who loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood, and has made us a kingdom, priests to his God and Father, to him be glory and power forevermore. Amen (Rev 1:5b–6).

4.3.1.1. *John as God's Slave, Prophet, and Seer*

In Revelation, John received a 'revelation of Jesus Christ [ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ].' He was God's 'slave [δοῦλος]' (Rev 1:1; 22:6, 9) and one of the 'prophets [προφήτης]' (Rev 22:6–9). Who was this John? Stephen S. Smalley argues that the author, the Beloved Disciple, was the Apostle John.[39] Ben Witherington III says, however, that John was a prophet, a 'seer' from a Johannine community who was neither the Beloved Disciple nor the author of John's Gospel and 1–3 John.[40] Richard Bauckham indicates, "Virtually all we know about John, the author of Revelation, is that he was a Jewish Christian prophet."[41] Despite the authorship question, John's function as a slave, seer, and Jewish Christian prophet are adequate for understanding his speech acts of Christ's blood and reshaped mindset of the Christ event.

4.3.1.2. *John's Assertive and Expressive Acts*

John's words in Rev 1:5b–6 fit the assertive and expressive categories of illocutionary acts. He asserted (⊢), "To him [Jesus Christ] who loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood, and has made us a kingdom, priests to his God and Father, to him be glory and power forevermore. Amen." The direction of fit is word-to-world (↓). John had a psychological state of belief (*B*) associated with his propositional content that (*p*).

John also performed an expressive in the form of a doxology in Rev 1:5b–6. David E. Aune says that John's tribute contains "the earliest doxology directed to *Christ* alone rather than to God [Aune's italics]"[42] The

---

[39] Smalley, *The Revelation to John: A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Apocalypse* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 2–3, 28. References to the Beloved Disciple occur in John 13:23; 19:26–27; 20:2–10; 21:7, 20–24.

[40] Witherington, *Revelation* (NCBC; ed. B. Witherington III; Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–3.

[41] Bauckham, *The Theology of the Book of Revelation* (NTTh; ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2.

[42] Aune, *Revelation* (3 vols.; WBC 52A–52C; eds. D.A. Hubbard, G.W. Barker, and R.P. Martin; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1997–1998), 1:46. See 2 Peter 3:18 for a doxology to the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ (cf. Rom 16:25; Jude 24–25).

logical notation is *EØ*(*P*)(*S*/*H* + property). The *E* symbolizes the illocutionary force of John's words to express a possible intentional state of gratitude to Christ. The null symbol Ø means that no direction of fit occurred with John's words because of a presupposed relationship with Christ. The (*P*) stands for John's possible psychological states. The (*S*/*H* + property) represents how John (*S* = speaker) attributed the properties of love, freedom from sin, glory, and power to Christ (*H* = hearer). John (*S*) attributed to himself and his recipients (*S*/*H*) the properties of being fashioned into a kingdom and priests by Christ. His expressive that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6 bore witness to the efficacy of Christ's person, love, and blood for worshippers.

4.3.1.3. *John's Belief and Hope*

John had certain intentional states associated with his speech acts in Rev 1:5b–6. John had an intentional state of belief that (*p*). His belief had a mind-to-world (↓) direction of fit provided that certain conditions of satisfaction were met. For John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that

- God and Father exist in Jesus Christ;
- Christ really loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood;
- Christ has made his followers into a kingdom and priests to God and Father;
- God in Christ has glory and power.

John also could have hoped that his recipients at the seven churches would believe that (*p*) Rev 1:5b–6. His hope would have had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit if the recipients believed John. For John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that his recipients shared with John a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ, knew the Torah and scriptures, and understood John's metaphorical assertion of the efficacy of Christ's love and blood as believers.

4.3.1.4. *John's Intentional Action*

John had a causal self-referential intentional state of an intentional action to assert and express that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6. His intention to assert and express had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. For John's intentional action to assert and

express that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that he could form an intention to assert and express that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6 and that his successful speech acts were caused by his intention to assert and express that (*p*).

4.3.1.5. *John's Metaphorical Assertion, Network, and Background*

4.3.1.5.1. *John's Metaphorical Assertion*

Revelation 1:5b–6 fits the metaphorical assertion category. John literally said *P* but meant *R* as he asserted and expressed that Jesus Christ loves us, has freed us from sin by his blood, and made us a kingdom and priests to God and Father. Though each of these terms had a literal value for John, his speaker meaning differed from his sentence meaning. In other words, John meant something besides just the literal sense of Christ freeing sinners with his blood, believers turning into a kingdom, believers becoming priests. John accessed familiar motifs—blood, kingdoms consisting of people, tribes, and leaders, priests who performed sacred duties, blood and life, sin and death, and God the Father—to assert and express how Christ has opened the way to God.

Two notable interpretive issues pertaining to Rev 1:5b–6 are whether to treat the language of Christ's blood solely as a metaphor for his death, and the textual variant with one of the Greek verbs in Rev 1:5b.

Concerning the variant, did John assert that Jesus Christ has 'freed [λύσαντι]' us from our sins with his blood or has 'washed [λούσαντι]' us from our sins with his blood?[43] This variant affects the interpretation of Rev 1:5b. The MSS support either reading, yet the MSS favor strongly the reading that Christ has freed[44] us by his blood. This is reflected in some of the major English translations (RSV, NRSV, NIV), in the translation for this study, and in scholarly interpretations. Bruce

[43] The verb λύσαντι (aorist, active, participle, dative, singular, masculine) comes from λύω meaning 'I loose, free, or release.' The verb λούσαντι (aorist, active, participle, dative, singular, masculine) comes from λούω, which means 'I wash' (Cleon L. Rogers Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III., "Revelation," in *The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament* [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998], 611; Gingrich, *Shorter Lexicon*, 119–120; William D. Mounce, *The Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993], 304–305).

[44] The MSS that support 'washed [λούσαντι]' include the following: P 1006. 1841. 1854. 2053. 2062 M^k lat bo. The MSS that support 'freed [λύσαντι]' are P^{18} א A C 1611. 2050. 2329. 2351 M^A h sy Prim.

M. Metzger indicates that besides the MSS evidence, λύσαντι is preferred because it echoes a portion of Isa 40:2,[45] which states that Jerusalem's 'iniquity is expiated [λέλυται αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία]' (NJPS, LXX). Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza favors λύσαντι. It supports her interpretation of redemption in an anthropological sense. Christians have been liberated "from the evil actions and deeds of their past."[46] Robert H. Mounce says, "Translations that follow the TR and read 'washed' rather than 'loosed' were probably affected by the Greek preposition normally translated 'in.'"[47]

Metzger and Bart D. Ehrman comment on the variation between λύσαντι over λούσαντι. They explain,

> The pronunciation of *ου* and of *υ* was sometimes indistinguishable and accounts for the variation in Rev. 1.5. The translators of the King James Version followed a text of this verse that had *λούσαντι* ("Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood"), whereas the text used by modern translators reads the verb *λύσαντι* ("and *freed* us from"), which is found in the earlier Greek manuscripts.[48]

Despite the different positions on the freed or washed variant, the blood-of-Christ motif in Rev 1:5b and in the greater context calls to mind Christ's death for many interpreters, including Mounce, Aune, Smalley, Witherington, and Gerhard A. Krodel.[49]

Mounce refers to Christ's blood in Rev 1:5 as an action. Christ has paid the price through his sacrificial death to free sinners from their captivity or 'bondage and misery.'[50] Later, in his analysis of Rev 5:9, Mounce reiterates that the event of Christ's death ransoms sinners. Christ's blood refers only to what Christ has accomplished in death. He says, "The worthiness of the Lamb does not at this point stem from his essential being, but from his great act of redemption."[51] The new covenant, says

---

[45] Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (2d ed.; Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 2000), 662.

[46] Schüssler Fiorenza, "Redemption as Liberation: Apoc 1:5f. and 5:9f.," *CBQ* 36 (1974): 225–226.

[47] Mounce, *The Book of Revelation* (rev. ed.; NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 49.

[48] Metzger and Ehrman, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration* (4th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 255.

[49] Krodel, *Revelation* (ACNT; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989), 85; Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 35; Witherington, *Revelation*, 76.

[50] Mounce, *Revelation*, 49.

[51] Mounce, *Revelation*, 135.

Mounce, is distinct because of Christ's death.[52] For Aune, the reference to Christ's blood in Rev 1:5 brings to mind Christ's redemptive act—his "voluntary death that frees certain beneficiaries."[53] Later, in his own translation of Rev 5:9, Aune translates blood as death.[54] He says, "αἷμα, 'blood,' means, by figurative extension, 'death.'"[55]

A speech act analysis indicates that if John, at the level of intentionality, had in mind Christ's blood as an atoning substance compared against animal blood in Israel's sacrificial system, then he perhaps distinguished Christ's blood from his death. This allows for a broader understanding of blood, that it was equated with life in the Torah. John performed a metaphorical assertion concerning Christ, who by means of his person and work, surpassed, fulfilled, and made obsolete the need to obtain animal blood for atonement.

Did John have in mind Christ's actual blood in Rev 1:5b? Is it possible that Christ's blood and death were separate for John? This calls for an inquiry into the other occurrences of blood in Revelation.

John's sole reference to Christ's blood outside his vision in Rev 1:5b relates to the other eighteen images of blood he saw during the vision (i.e., blood of Christ, martyrs, and judgment).[56] The recounting of John's vision starts in Rev 1:9. During this experience, John saw the Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered and it redeemed saints with its blood (Rev 5:6, 9), the martyrs washing and making white their robes in the blood of the Lamb (Rev 7:14), the destruction of Satan with the blood of the Lamb (Rev 12:11), and the rider of the horse, called the Word of God who wore a robe 'dipped [βάπτω]'[57] in blood (Rev 19:13).[58]

---

[52] Mounce, *Revelation*, 135.

[53] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:46.

[54] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:321.

[55] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:325 (under point 9.c.).

[56] Revelation 5:9; 6:10, 12; 7:14; 8:7, 9; 11:6; 12:11; 14:20; 16:3, 4, 6; 17:6; 18:24; 19:2, 13.

[57] Other MSS (P [1006. 1841]. 2329 *al*; Hipp) have 'sprinkled [ῥεραντισμενον]' with blood. Carroll D. Osburn notes that βάπτω reflects a text called the "Palestinian Targum Genesis 49:11," yet he favors a reading with ῥαντίζω, arguing that the 'sprinkled' imagery corresponds to Isa 63:1–6 ("Alexander Campbell and the Text of Revelation 19:13," *ResQ* 25/3 [1982]: 135, 138).

[58] Revelation 19:13 could also fit the martyrdom or judgment categories. The text never explicitly identifies whose blood, only that the Word of God has dipped his robe in it. The greater context in Rev 19:11–16 portrays a divine figure making war against the

John also saw the blood of martyrs[59] and blood as a sign of judgment in nature.[60] John literally saw images of blood in his vision.

John's metaphorical assertion in Rev 1:6 also concerned kingdoms and priests. John's assertive and expressive that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6 resembles Exod 19:6, "but you shall be for me a priestly kingdom and a holy nation" (NRSV).[61] God's chosen priests mediated between God and sinners—a system that involved blood from clean unblemished animals as God's way of purifying Israel from sin and impurity (Exod 24:5–8; Leviticus; Num 3:5–10; 5–8; 18–19; 28–29; Deut 18:3–5).[62] In the Torah, blood was connected to life (Gen 9:4; Lev 17:10–14; Deut 12:16, 23–24).[63]

If John, at the level of intentionality, had in mind Christ's blood as an atoning substance compared against animal blood in Israel's sacrificial system, then the case can be made that John saw Christ's death as a separate significant event. He specifically accessed the blood language to make a metaphorical assertion of how Christ has surpassed, fulfilled, or made obsolete the need to obtain animal blood for atonement. John, in a metaphorical assertion, accessed familiar motifs concerning sacrifices, priests, service, holiness, defilement, kingdoms, glory, power, God's chosen people. John's reshaped perspective now accounted

---

adversaries. As Aune points out, "The blood mentioned here is not primarily a metaphor for the atoning death of Christ … but rather a literal reference to the heavenly warrior whose garment is stained with the blood of those he has slain" (*Revelation*, 3:1057).

[59] The seven references to the blood of martyrs indicate God's concern for the saints (Rev 6:10; 16:6; 17:6; 18:24; 19:2).

[60] The seven occurrences of blood and judgment are Rev 6:12; 8:7, 9; 11:6; 14:20; 16:3, 4. Christ's role for justice and the controversial aspects of God's wrath, vengeance, and suffering come to forefront in these texts. William Klassen argues that "the strongest weapon [Christ] has appears to be his own authority which he has won through his suffering" ("Vengeance in the Apocalypse of John," *CBQ* 28 [1966]: 305). Schüssler Fiorenza thinks that scholars have labeled vengeance incompatible "with Christian love and forgiveness." She says, "The demand of Rev. for judgment must be understood as an outcry for justice for those who are exploited and killed today" (*The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985], 24). John A. Bollier asks whether the souls crying out to God for vengeance violates "the heart of the Gospel" ("Judgment in the Apocalypse," *Int* 7 [1953]: 18?). John Paul Heil says that the fifth seal "contains the only example of a prayer of supplication and its answer" ("The Fifth Seal [Rev 6,9–11] as a Key to the Book of Revelation," *Bib* 74/2 [1993]: 220).

[61] Krodel, *Revelation*, 85; Aune, *Revelation*, 1:47–48; Witherington, *Revelation*, 76; Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 36.

[62] In Lev 22:32, God is depicted as the agent of Israel's sanctification.

[63] Krodel, *Revelation*, 85; Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 36.

for God in Christ, who has loved, freed, and set apart a new community of saints. One possible paraphrase of John's metaphorical assertion is as follows:

> (MET) To him [Jesus Christ] who loves us and has freed us from our sins in his blood, and has made us a kingdom, priests to his God and father, to him be glory and power forevermore. Amen (*S* is *P*)
>
> (PAR) Jesus Christ, by means of his person and work, has superceded the old belief system and established a new community of believers empowered for service and glory to God. (*S* is *R*)

Interpreting Rev 1:5b–6 as a metaphorical assertion helps to identify what the case was for John. He previously had a Hebrew mindset. He experienced a reshaping of the mind and performed his speech acts as a slave, prophet, and seer of Jesus Christ.

4.3.1.5.2. *John's Network and Background*

In relation to his metaphorical assertion and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6, John had a network and background. His network consisted of an interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes in relation to the following:

> his role as God's slave and prophet
> his visionary experience of the one true God in Jesus Christ
> the efficacy of Christ's person, love, and blood to free us from sin
> the God-Israel relationship
> the Torah and scriptures
> Israel's sacrificial system
> blood and life
> power, kingdoms, and rulers

John's deep background indicates that he had the ability to remember, perform speech acts, write, and form an intention to assert and express that (*p*). His local background meant that he could share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures, worship the God of Israel, and attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event (for a comparison of John's illocutionary acts and intentionality, see tables 8.1. & 8.2.).

Table 8.1. John's assertive and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6

Features	John's assertive	John's expressive
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$	$E\emptyset(P)(S/H+\text{property})$
Illocutionary point	John's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)	John's expressive (E) that (p)
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$	null $\emptyset$
Psychological state (sincerity condition)	John's belief (B)	John's different possible states (P)
Propositional content	that (p) [Jesus Christ who loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood, and has made us a kingdom, priests to his God and father, to him be glory and power forevermore. Amen]	John (S=speaker) attributed the properties of love, freedom from sins, glory, and power to Christ (H=hearer); John (S) attributed the properties of being made a kingdom and priests by Christ both to himself and his recipients (S/H)
Sentence meaning (S is P)	(MET) Jesus Christ loves us, has freed us from sin by his blood, and has made us a kingdom and priests to God the Father	…
Speaker meaning (S is R)	(PAR) Jesus Christ, by means of his person and work, has superceded the old belief system and established a new community of believers empowered for service and glory to God	…

Table 8.2. John's intentionality in Rev 1:5b–6

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) [to Jesus Christ who loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood, and has made us a kingdom, priests to his God and father, to him be glory and power forevermore. Amen]	John's hope (*S*) that the recipients at the seven churches would believe (*S*) that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6	John's intention to assert (⊢) and express (*E*) that (*p*) in Rev 1:5b–6
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – God and Father exist in Jesus Christ – Christ really loves us and has freed us from our sins by his blood – Christ has made followers into a kingdom and priests to God and Father – God in Christ has glory and power	for John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the recipients at the seven churches – shared with John a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ – knew the Torah and scriptures – understood John's metaphorical assertion of the efficacy of Christ's love and blood – believed	for John's intention to assert and express that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he had the capacity to form an intention to assert and express that (*p*) – his successful assertive and expressive were caused by his intention to assert and express that (*p*)
Network	John's interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – his role as God's slave and prophet – his visionary experience of the one true God in Jesus Christ	idem	idem

Table 8.2. (*Continued*)

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Network	– the efficacy of Christ's person, love, and blood to free us from sin – the God-Israel relationship – the Torah and scriptures – Israel's sacrificial system – blood and life – power, kingdoms, and rulers		
Deep background	John's general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – write – form an intention to assert	idem	idem
Local background	John's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of Israel – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures – attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event	idem	idem

4.3.1.6. *John's Assessors, the Seven Churches in Asia Minor*

To understand John's metaphorical assertion in Rev 1:5b–6, the recipients at the seven churches would have had to determine, compute, and restrict the possible values for *R* based on what John literally said (*P*). John opened himself up to an assessment by his hearers. The recipients of John's book—the seven Asian churches—were John's original assessors (Rev 1:4a). These included the churches at Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamum, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Laodicea (Rev 1:11; 2:1–3:22; 22:16). This calls for a discussion of John's relationship to the churches.

John knew of the seven churches (Rev 1:4–6) and was affiliated with them. He wrote, "I, John, your brother who share with you in Jesus the persecution and the kingdom and the patient endurance" (Rev 1:9a, NRSV). Bauckham says that John functioned as a prophet in these seven Asian churches.[64] John received the vision on their behalf (Rev 1:10–11; 22:16). Revelation 2–3 contains detailed messages about the strengths and weaknesses of each church. Whether to read these messages as John's exhortations-evaluations or his report of another's exhortations-evaluations remains open. Did the recipients hear them as God's messages via John or as John's own messages?

In discussing Rev 2–3, Witherington indicates that these chapters are John's words to the churches. He says that John challenged them based on "intimate knowledge of their spiritual and social conditions."[65] The text suggests, however, that Jesus spoke through the angel so that John could address the churches not in his own words but with the individual messages received from 'the first and the last' and 'the living one' (Rev 1:11, 17–19; 2:1–3:22). Jesus was a source of John's knowledge about the personal conditions of the churches (Rev 22:16; see also Rev 1:10–11). Witherington identifies the true speaker in Rev 2–3 as Christ.[66] Krodel mentions that Christ's authority grants 'credibility' to John's communication with the seven churches.[67] Krodel says, "In these seven messages the churches hear Christ's evaluation of their present life and actions, followed by admonitions and concluded with promises about their future."[68] Smalley describes Rev 2–3 as Christ's messages to the churches "handed on through the angels and the prophet-seer."[69]

A related point is whether to treat the seven messages as isolated material, a later addition, or part of John's vision. Smalley argues for continuity between Rev 2–3 and the other chapters in Revelation, yet he acknowledges opposing arguments (e.g., Isbon T. Beckwith's proposal that Rev 2–3 is less concerned with end times than the rest of book; R.H. Charles' theory that the messages to the churches were composed and sent before the rest of Revelation was written; William M. Ramsay's view that Rev 2–3 was composed as a Christianized text and inserted

---

[64] Bauckham, *Theology of Revelation*, 2–3.
[65] Witherington, *Revelation*, 9.
[66] Witherington, *Revelation*, 14, 90.
[67] Krodel, *Revelation*, 90, 91, 101.
[68] Krodel, *Revelation*, 90–91, 99.
[69] Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 5.

into an existing Jewish-apocalyptic document).[70] About the sophisticated form of Rev 2–3, Witherington says that "this material is a literary product carefully constructed after John received his visions, rather like an author writing the introduction after having written the rest of the work."[71]

Were the messages to the seven churches part of John's original vision? The linguistic structures of Rev 1 set up John as a mediator between Christ and the churches. Whereas John performed an assertive and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6 apart from his vision, his messages to the churches in Rev 2:1–3:22 occur after his vision began. Revelation 1:1–17a contains John's introductory remarks regarding his vision (except see Rev 1:8, 11). In Rev 1:17b–22:7, John reported what he heard and saw in the vision. John's recipients would have needed the capacity to discern the various voices. From a speech act perspective, the complexities associated with the various speakers in Revelation (e.g., John, Jesus, the angel) can be detected.

It is possible that the recipients at the seven churches understood Rev 1:5b–6 as a metaphorical assertion. They shared a common language and set of background assumptions with John. As believers, they too experienced a reshaped mindset based on the Christ event.

4.3.2. *John and the Elder in Rev 7:13–14*

> Καὶ ἀπεκρίθη εἷς ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων λέγων μοι· οὗτοι οἱ περιβεβλημένοι τὰς στολὰς τὰς λευκὰς τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ πόθεν ἦλθον; καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῷ· κύριέ μου, σὺ οἶδας. καὶ εἶπέν μοι· οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἐρχόμενοι ἐκ τῆς θλίψεως τῆς μεγάλης καὶ ἔπλυναν τὰς στολὰς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐλεύκαναν αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ αἵματι τοῦ ἀρνίου.
>
> Then one of the elders began speaking to me, 'Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?' And I said to him, 'My Lord, you are the one who knows.' Then he said to me, 'These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb' (Rev 7:13–14).

[70] Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 47–48.
[71] Witherington, *Revelation*, 91.

4.3.2.1. *John's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional States in Rev 7:13a, 14a*

4.3.2.1.1. *John's Assertives*

John performed an assertive and expressive in Rev 1:5b–6 apart from his vision, yet the multi-level speech acts of John and the elder in Rev 7:13–14 occurred inside the vision. In Rev 7:13–14, John performed two brief assertives. In the first, John said (⊢), "Then one of the elders began speaking to me" (Rev 7:13a). The remainder of the verse has John's verbatim report of what the elder asked (i.e., 'Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?' in Rev 7:13b). Revelation 7:14a contains John's second assertive (⊢), "And I said to him, 'My Lord, you are the one who knows.' Then he said to me …" (Rev 7:14a). Following his assertive, John reported what the elder said to him in Rev 7:14b. The direction of fit for each assertive was word-to-world (↓) provided that the dialogue between John and the elder occurred. John had a psychological state of belief (*B*) in asserting that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a.

4.3.2.1.2. *John's Belief and Hope*

John had certain intentional states in relation to his assertives in Rev 7:13a, 14a. He had an intentional state of belief that (*p*). His belief had a mind-to-world direction of fit provided that the conditions of satisfaction were met. For John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that

- he saw in the vision a great multitude of people in white robes;
- one of the elders asked him if he knew who the ones wearing white robes were;
- he replied to the elder that he [the elder] knew the answer;
- the elder identified the ones in white robes for him.

John could have hoped that his recipients at the seven churches would believe that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a. John achieved a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit depending on whether the recipients believed his assertive. For John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that his recipients

- were Christ-believers
- understood that John saw a great multitude and dialogued with the elder in his vision
- shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with John
- knew the Torah and scriptures

4.3.2.1.3. *John's Intentional Action*
John formed an intentional action to assert that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a. His intention to assert had a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation. For John's intention to assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a and his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert that (*p*).

4.3.2.1.4. *John's Network and Background*
John had a network of intentional states, stances, and attitudes associated with his assertives in Rev 7:13a, 14a relating to the following:

his role as God's slave and prophet
his visionary experience
dialoguing with the elder
the one true God in Jesus Christ
the ones clothed in white and washing robes
the efficacy of Christ's person, blood, life, and victory over death
the Torah and scriptures
Israel's sacrificial system
the Passover event
blood of the lamb for cleansing and victory over death
the great affliction

John's deep background meant he had the general capacity to remember, perform speech acts, write, and form an intention to assert that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a. His local background consisted of specific know-how capacities to do the following:

- worship the God of Israel
- function as a prophet and seer
- share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures
- attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event and Jesus the Lamb

(See tables 9.1. & 9.2. to compare the structure of John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states with his intentionality).

Table 9.1. John's assertives, intensional reports, and intensional states in Rev 7:13–14

	John's assertives	John's intensional (with s) reports and states	
Features	Rev 7:13a, 14a	of the elder's question in Rev 7:13b	of the elder's assertive in Rev 7:14b
Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$	…	…
Illocutionary point	John's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (p)	…	…
Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$	…	…
Intentional (with t) state	John's belief (B)	…	…
Intentional (with t) propositional content	that (p) in Rev 7:13a [Then one of the elders began speaking to me (about the ones wearing white robes)] that (p) in Rev 7:14a [And I said to him, 'My Lord, you are the one who knows.' Then he said to me …]	…	…
Intensional (with s) state	…	John's belief that the elder desired to know if John knew that (p) in Rev 7:13b	John's belief that the elder believed that (p) in Rev 7:14b John's belief that the elder hoped that John would believe that (p) in Rev 7:14b
Intensional (with s) propositional content	…	John's report that the elder asked that (p) in Rev 7:13b [Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?]	John's report that the elder said that (p) in Rev 7:14b [These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb]

Table 9.2. John's intentionality in Rev 7:13a, 14a

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a [one of the elders began speaking to him (about the ones wearing white robes)] John's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in Rev 7:14a [And I said to him, 'My Lord, you are the one who knows.' Then he said to me . . .]	John's hope (*S*) that the recipients at the seven churches would believe (*S*) that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a	John's intention to assert (⊢) that (*p*) in Rev 7:13a, 14a
Direction of fit	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	. . .	. . .	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for John's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – he saw in the vision a great multitude of people in white robes – one of the elders asked him if he knew who the ones wearing white robes were – he replied to the elder that he [the elder] knew the answer – the elder identified the ones in white robes for John	for John's hope that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that the recipients at the seven churches – were Christ-believers – understood that John saw a great multitude and dialogued with the elder in his vision – shared a common language and set of background assumptions about God and Jesus Christ with John – knew the Torah and scriptures	for John's intention to assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he had the capacity to form an intention to assert that (*p*) in his vision – his successful assertive was caused by his intention to assert that (*p*)
Network	John's interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – his role as God's slave and prophet – his visionary experience – dialoguing with the elder	idem	idem

Table 9.2. (*Continued*)

	John's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Belief	Hope	Intentional action
Network	– the one true God in Jesus Christ – the ones clothed in white and washing robes – the efficacy of Christ's person, blood, life, and victory over death – the Torah and scriptures – Israel's sacrificial system – the Passover event – blood of the lamb for cleansing and victory over death – the great affliction		
Deep background	John's general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – write – form an intention to assert	idem	idem
Local background	John's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of Israel – function as a prophet and seer – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures – attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event and Jesus as the Lamb	idem	idem

4.3.2.2. *The Elder's Illocutionary Acts and Intentional (with t) States and John's Reports and Intensional (with s) States in Rev 7:13b, 14b*

4.3.2.2.1. *The Elder's Question and Assertive as distinct from John's Reports*

In Rev 7:13b, the elder performed an illocutionary act in asking, "'Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?'" Witherington suggests that the elder asked a rhetorical question and expected no 'real answer,'[72] though the linguistic evidence indicates that the elder asked an exam question. Knowing the answer to his own question (even John knew that the elder had the answer according to Rev 7:14a), the elder wanted to know if John knew that (*p*). John had just witnessed the opening of the fifth seal revealing those martyred for God who were given white robes (Rev 6:9–11). John learned more details about them from the elder. Aune points out that in Revelation John never asked for clarification of what he saw. Applied to Rev 7:13–14, Aune says, "the elder volunteers to interpret the scene for the seer, and this constitutes a variation on the motif of the *angelus interpres*, or 'interpreting angel.'"[73]

The elder's question differed from John's report of it. John repeated only the elder's utterance act and propositional act but not his illocutionary act. He made a verbatim report of the elder's inquiry. The following linguistic modification indicates how John would have asked what the elder asked (i.e., repeated his illocutionary act): "The elder asked [and I, John, too ask] 'Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?'" John's intensional (with s) report represented only that the elder asked a question as opposed to the original representation of his question.

In Rev 7:14b, the elder performed an assertive to explain who the ones in white robes were to John. In logical notation, he said (⊢), "'These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.'" His propositional content (*p*) had a word-to-world (↓) direction of fit. The expressed psychological state was his belief (*B*) that (*p*). John, however, made a verbatim report of the elder's assertive, repeating his utterance act and proposi-

[72] Witherington, *Revelation*, 138.
[73] Aune, *Revelation*, 2:472.

tional act but not his illocutionary act. Again, John made an intensional (with s) report of the elder's assertive.

4.3.2.2.2. *The Elder's Intentional (with t) States of Desire and Belief and John's Intensional (with s) State of Belief*

The elder had an intentional state of desire associated with his exam question in Rev 7:13b and an intentional state of belief for his assertive in Rev 7:14b. His desire had world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit provided that the conditions of satisfaction were met. For the elder's desire to know if John knew that (*p*) to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that

- John had a vision of people wearing white robes and speaking with one of the elders;
- the elder wondered if John knew who the people in white robes were;
- the elder knew who the people in white robes were and wanted John to know.

John had an intensional (with s) state of belief about the elder's intentional (with t) state of desire. The following two phrases illustrate:

- The elder's desire to know if John knew that (*p*)
- John's belief that the elder desired to know if John knew that (*p*)

The elder had an intentional state of belief in asserting that (*p*) in Rev 7:14b. For his belief that (*p*) to fit reality (i.e., achieve a mind-to-world [↓] direction of fit), it had to be the case that

- he saw a great multitude of people wearing white robes;
- he knew who the people were and where they came from;
- the people that he saw really did come out of the great affliction, have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.

John had an intensional (with s) state of belief concerning the elder's intentional (with t) state of belief (e.g., the elder believed that [*p*] in Rev 7:14b and John believed that the elder believed that [*p*] in Rev 7:14b). John's intensional beliefs represented only the elder's intentional desire and belief and not the original representation of the elder's inquiry and assertive.

4.3.2.2.3. *The Elder's Intentional Action*
The elder had a causal self-referential intentional state to ask and assert that (*p*) in Rev 7:13b, 14b. His intentional action achieved a world-to-mind (↑) direction of fit and a mind-to-world (↓) direction of causation provided that the conditions of satisfaction were met. For his intention to ask and assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that

- he could form an intention to ask John a question and assert to John that (*p*);
- his successful question and assertive were caused by his intention to ask and assert that (*p*);
- this encounter took place in John's vision.

4.3.2.2.4. *The Elder's Metaphorical Assertion*
The elder's assertive in Rev 7:14b fits the metaphorical assertion class. To understand the elder, John would have had to share with him a common language, set of background assumptions, and reshaped mindset of the Christ event. Who was the elder? John distinguished the 'elder [πρεσβύτερος]' from the 'angels' and the 'four living creatures' (Rev 7:11). Earlier in the vision, John saw twenty-four elders seated on thrones wearing white robes and golden crowns (Rev 4:4). John also had visions of them falling down and worshiping and singing to God and the Lamb (Rev 4:10–11; 5:8–14; 11:16–18; 19:4). It is difficult to say who the elders were. Scholars turn to OT and extra-canonical texts to identify possible candidates. Krodel describes the elders as "angelic representatives of faithful Israel and the victorious church."[74] He supports his argument with texts on supernatural beings (e.g., Isa 24:23, 1 Kgs 22:19, Ps 89:8, *1 En.* 39–40, and *2 En.* 20:22).

Aune provides a detailed survey of scholarly opinions on the identity of the twenty-four elders. These range from "heavenly counterparts of the leaders of the twenty-four priestly courses of the second temple period" to "figures from astral mythology, such as the twenty-four Babylonian star-gods of the zodiac."[75] Aune finds no parallel to the Rev 4 scene about the elders surrounding God's throne and says that John invented

[74] Krodel, *Revelation*, 155.
[75] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:288–292. For a briefer summary, see Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 116–117.

the imagery.[76] Smalley says that the elder in Rev 7:13–14 is "an angel of revelation and interpretation."[77] It is evident from Rev 7:4–17 that John distinguished the elders from other heavenly beings and the 144,000 people from Israel's twelve tribes. Perhaps John saw the elders in his vision functioning in such a way that it brought to mind 'the elders' who assisted Moses and company up Mount Sinai to see God (Exod 24:9–11) and God manifesting his glory in the presence of 'his elders' (Isa 24:23).[78]

In Rev 7:13–14 and throughout his vision, John heard of the Lamb and his blood from different speakers. In Rev 5:9, for example, the four living creatures and twenty-four elders sang about the slaughtered Lamb who ransomed people with his blood. In Rev 12:10–11, a great voice in heaven asserted that 'our brothers' have conquered Satan with the Lamb's blood. These texts correspond to John's vision of the martyrs with white robes (at the opening of the fifth seal in Rev 6:9–11) whom the elder described in Rev 7:14. The Lamb motif would have been familiar to John because of his previous Hebrew mindset.

How have scholars interpreted the motif of the Lamb's blood in Revelation? In an analysis of Rev 7:14, Aune says, "The phrase 'the blood of the Lamb' or 'the blood of Christ' (1 Cor 10:16; Eph 1:7; 2:13; 1 Pet 1:19; Heb 9:14) or 'the blood of Jesus' (1 Pet 1:2; Heb 10:19; 1 John 1:7) is metonymy for the death of Christ or more particularly the atoning death of Christ."[79] The blood-of-the-Lamb expression correlates to the blood of specific animals in Israel's cult that "[r]emoves sin and consecrates only the persons or objects to which it is *physically* applied for purposes of purification (Exod 29:12, 16, 20–21)" [Aune's italics].[80] Does this interpretation accurately reflect the meaning of the language? Other texts in Revelation illuminate how the elder, John, and the assessors at the seven churches connected the Lamb and blood themes to other things besides Christ's death.

The Lamb and blood images that John saw in his vision were detailed and specific. They would have called to mind familiar images and events in the Hebrew tradition (e.g., the Passover event in Exod 12, the use of

---

[76] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:288. Witherington also suggests that since the scene with the elders is 'new,' it may be significant for John's vision (*Revelation*, 117).

[77] Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 196.

[78] Aune says that the reference to the elders in Rev 4:4 may allude to Exod 24:9–10 and Isa 24:23, which are the only two OT texts concerning 'elders' in the presence of Yahweh (*Revelation*, 1:287).

[79] Aune, *Revelation*, 2:475.

[80] Aune, *Revelation*, 2:475.

blood for dealing with sin in Israel's temple cult, and the Isa 53:7 text of a lamb led to slaughter). Witherington says, "Though rams were used in OT sacrifices, normally lambs were offered, and lambs were eaten as part of the Passover sacrifice."[81] For Aune, Krodel, and Smalley, the Lamb imagery in Rev 5:6 relates to the paschal lamb of Isa 53:7.[82] Schüssler Fiorenza distinguishes "freedom from personal sins" in Rev 1:5 from "the ransom of slaves from the whole world and mankind" in Rev 5:9.[83] She associates the Lamb with the Passover event when lamb's blood signified Israel's liberation.[84] Aune suggests that the Passover event serves as the context for the slaughtered-Lamb image in Rev 5:6.[85] For Aune, this Lamb is an 'apocalyptic metaphor' for the 'crucified Messiah' and the '*resurrection* of Jesus' [Aune's italics].[86] Similarly, Smalley refers to the slaughtered Lamb in Rev 5:6 as Christ the 'crucified Lamb.'[87]

These explanations do not account for other possible connections that the elder and John possibly made (e.g., blood as life and an atoning substance). When John said that he "saw a Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered" (Rev 5:6, NRSV) or that he saw and heard myriads of voices singing about the slaughtered Lamb (Rev 5:12), these images were exactly what John saw and heard. His visual perceptions were neither of Jesus on the cross nor his resurrection, though these might have occurred to him. The elder could have referred to blood as a substance in Rev 7:14. The tendency among interpreters, however, is to connect references to the Lamb's blood with Christ's death.

John heard the elder literally speak about the great affliction, washed robes, and robes made white in the Lamb's blood. To make sense of the elder's words in light of the situation John and his recipients were facing (i.e., persecution and threats), John would have had to understand the elder's metaphorical assertion. Based on a shared Hebrew heritage, the elder would have called to mind for John the familiar motifs of lamb's blood in the Passover event when God delivered Israel from

---

[81] Witherington, *Revelation*, 121.

[82] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:353; Krodel, *Revelation*, 164; Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 132. Bauckham argues that the suffering Lamb imagery refers to "Christ's suffering witness and sacrificial death" (*Theology of Revelation*, 64).

[83] Schüssler Fiorenza, "Redemption," 231.

[84] Schüssler Fiorenza, "Redemption," 229.

[85] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:353. The lambs for Passover (Exod 12) are mentioned by Smalley (*Revelation to John*, 35).

[86] Aune, *Revelation*, 1:352.

[87] Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 132.

bondage in Egypt (Exod 12) and Isa 53 concerning one who suffers 'like a lamb that is led to the slaughter' on behalf of sinners (Isa 53:7, NRSV). Smalley also identifies the themes of persecuted saints because of loyalty to God (Dan 11:29–35), washing for purification before meeting with God (Exod 19:10, 14), Israel's sacrificial system for sin and forgiveness (Exod 29:10–21; Lev 4; 5), and life (Lev 17:11).[88] A possible paraphrase of the elder's speaker meaning (*R*) follows what he literally said (*P*) in Rev 7:14b.

> (MET) These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. (*S* is *P*)
>
> (PAR) Jesus' life, suffering, and victory over death have made it possible for his loyal saints to receive cleansing and final victory over persecution and death compared against the Israelites who had to be consecrated by Moses and wash their own clothes before meeting with God and the Israelites who would be martyred and purified until the end comes. (*S* is *R*)

4.3.2.2.5. *The Elder's Network and Background*

The elder had a network of intentional states associated with his metaphorical assertion that (*p*) in Rev 7:14b. He had an interconnected system of attitudes, beliefs, and stances pertaining to the following:

> his role as an elder in the vision
> dialoguing with John
> the one true God in Jesus Christ
> the ones clothed in whitened and washed robes
> the efficacy of Christ's person, blood, life, and victory over death
> the Torah and scriptures
> Israel's sacrificial system
> blood of the Lamb for cleansing and victory over death
> persecution

The elder's deep background meant that he could remember, perform speech acts, and form intentions to ask and assert that (*p*) in Rev 7:13b, 14b. His local background meant that he had specific know-how capacities to worship the God of Israel, share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures, function as an elder, and attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event and Jesus the Lamb (see tables 10.1. & 10.2. to compare the elder's illocutionary acts with his intentionality).

---

[88] Smalley, *Revelation to John*, 196–197.

Table 10.1. The elder's question in Rev 7:13b and assertive in Rev 7:14b

The elder's question		The elder's assertive	
Features	Rev 7:13b	Features	Rev 7:14b
Propositional content	that (*p*) [Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?]	Symbolic form	$\vdash\downarrow B(p)$
Type of question: Exam	the elder wanted to know if John knew the answer to his question	Illocutionary point	the elder's commitment to the truth ($\vdash$) of the expressed proposition (*p*)
		Direction of fit	word-to-world $\downarrow$
		Psychological state (sincerity condition)	the elder's belief (*B*)
		Propositional content	that (*p*) [These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb]
		Sentence meaning (*S* is *P*)	(MET) the elder said that the ones coming out of the great affliction have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb
		Speaker meaning (*S* is *R*)	(PAR) Jesus' life, suffering, and victory over death have made it possible for his loyal saints to receive cleansing and final victory over persecution and death compared against the Israelites who had to be consecrated by Moses and wash their own clothes before meeting with God and the Israelites who would be martyred and purified until the end comes

Table 10.2 The elder's intentionality in Rev 7:13b, 14b

	The elder's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Desire in Rev 7:13b	Belief in Rev 7:14b	Intentional action
Propositional content (*p*)	the elder's desire (*S*) to know if John knew that (*p*) [Who are these wearing white robes and where have they come from?]	the elder's belief (*S*) that (*p*) in Rev 7:14b [These are the ones coming out of the great affliction who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb]	the elder's intention to ask that (*p*) in Rev 7:13b and assert (⊢) that (*p*) in Rev 7:14b
Direction of fit	world-to-mind ↑	mind-to-world ↓	world-to-mind ↑
Direction of causation	…	…	mind-to-world ↓
Conditions of satisfaction	for the elder's desire to be fulfilled, it had to be the case that – John had a vision of people wearing white robes and speaking with one of the elders – the elder wondered if John knew who the people in white robes were – the elder knew who the people in white robes were and wanted John to know	for elder's belief that (*p*) to fit reality, it had to be the case that – he saw a great multitude of people wearing white robes – he knew who the people were and where they came from – the people that he saw really did come out of the great affliction, have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb	for the elder's intention to ask and assert that (*p*) to be successful, it had to be the case that – he could form an intention to ask John a question and assert to John that (*p*) – his successful question and assertive were caused by his intention to ask and assert that (*p*) – this encounter took place in John's vision
Network	the elder's interconnected system of intentional states, stances, and attitudes concerning – his role as an elder in the vision – dialoguing with John – the one true God in Jesus Christ – the ones clothed in whitened and washed robes	idem	idem

Table 10.2. (*Continued*)

	The elder's intentional states (*S*)		Causal self-referential intentional state
Features	Desire in Rev 7:13b	Belief in Rev 7:14b	Intentional action
Network	– the efficacy of Christ's person, blood, life, and victory over death – the Torah and scriptures – Israel's sacrificial system – blood of the lamb for cleansing and victory over death – persecution		
Deep background	the elder's general know-how capacities to – remember – perform speech acts – form an intention to ask and assert	idem	idem
Local background	the elder's specific know-how capacities to – worship the God of Israel – share in the customs of the Hebrew faith and scriptures – function as an elder – attribute reshaped beliefs and stances to the Christ event and Jesus the Lamb	idem	idem

4.4. Summary

Searle's philosophies of language and mind provide a way to analyze the multi-level speech acts detected in John 6:52–59, Rev 1:5b–6, and Rev 7:13–14, illuminating the different meanings associated with these texts (e.g., speaker meaning and sentence meaning). A speech act approach also helps to identify the various speakers of a particular passage (e.g., John, the Judeans, and Jesus in John 6:52–59; John and the elder in Rev 7:13–14). The status of words changed depending on whether either John was asserting or reporting. The next step worth exploring (in a separate

study) would be to identify when reports of another's illocutionary acts (e.g., John's report of Jesus' claims on the efficacy of his own flesh and blood) become personal testimony, confession, creedal assertions, which begin to forge and shape believing communities.[89]

For now, locating the speech acts of the biblical writers and characters in speaker intentionality helps to demonstrate how language is rooted in mind. The various speakers of the studied texts had their own particular networks and backgrounds. A speech act analysis can help in the interpretive process by identifying how the biblical writers accessed familiar motifs to make sense of an emerging belief system concerning Jesus Christ. With their metaphorical assertions on the efficacy of Christ's blood, the speakers called to mind the superiority of Jesus Christ, how Christ has made Israel's sacrificial system obsolete. These distinctions make way for a broader interpretation of Christ's blood beyond his death to include the person and life of Jesus Christ as God incarnate—to consider that Christ's blood was superior not only because of what Christ did (i.e., died on the cross), but because of who Christ was.

[89] Briggs's work on self-involvement and taking a stance may serve as a basis for identifying when the speech acts of the biblical writers, or their characters, become the speech acts of readers and hearers. Briggs says, "The basic point about self-involvement is that the speaking subject invests him or herself in a state of affairs by adopting a stance towards that state of affairs" (*Words in Action*, 148).

CHAPTER FIVE

SEARLE'S PHILOSOPHIES AND THE MOTIF OF CHRIST'S BLOOD: SOME PROPOSALS

5.1. General Observations

In response to the logical positivists who applied scientific data to validate statements, Wittgenstein proposed his theory of language games (i.e., the countless uses of language), and Austin developed his theories of performatives and illocutionary acts. Austin originally tried to distinguish performative language (e.g., to promise) from statements or descriptions (constatives). A problem soon emerged. Austin realized that a speaker could perform speech acts in uttering a statement or description just as when uttering a promise. Austin's way around the performative-constative dichotomy was to sort through locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts.

Searle indicates that human beings use language in five basic ways (e.g., to assert, to direct, to express, to commit, and to declare, including a subcategory to assert declare). These are dubbed illocutionary acts. He counters both Wittgenstein's theory of the limitless uses of language and Austin's collapse of English verbs with illocutionary acts. Searle bases his taxonomy of illocutionary acts on illocutionary point. For assertives, the point is to state what is the case. For directives, the point is to get the hearer to do something. For commissives, the point is to follow through on a promise, and so forth.

As presented in chapter one, philosophers such as Grice, Bach and Harnish, Motsch, Hornsby, and others have developed theories of intention and inference, reciprocity, linguistic communities, conversations, discourses, and situational contexts in speech act scenarios. With these theories less emphasis is placed on a speaker's isolated statements, as seen with Austin and Searle. With his categories of mind—intentionality, the network, and the background—Searle takes into account the biological underpinnings of language.

Searle, with his philosophy of language rooted in the philosophy of mind, recognizes that human beings have the capacity to acquire and

employ language in verbal and/or written forms. Language, says Searle, derives from human intentionality. Though neurobiologists have yet to discover the precise mechanism in the brain that makes language possible, it is accurate to say that intentionality, and therefore language, is realized in the brain. Searle clarifies that intentionality is a mental phenomenon pertaining to the directional aspect, the aim, of mental states (e.g., belief or hope in something).

Intentionality, as integral to Searle's philosophy of mind, differs from authorial intention. Intention is only one of several possible intentional states, having no special status in Searle's framework. Vanhoozer mentions intentionality in his discussion of Scripture as communicative action, though he does not distinguish it as one of Searle's categories of mind. Instead, Vanhoozer confuses intentionality for authorial intent.[1] As interest in speech act theory grows among biblical scholars and theologians, it becomes critical to distinguish intentionality from authorial intention. The distinction has import for examining the speech acts of the biblical writers at the level of mental phenomena. Each of their illocutionary acts would have had corresponding intentional sates: to assert that (*p*) was to believe that (*p*), to direct that (*H* does *A*) was to want that (*H* does *A*), to commit that (*S* does *A*) was to intend that (*S* does *A*), and so forth.

A similar distinction applies to Searle's concept of the background. In theological circles, the term 'background' connotes the *Sitz im Leben* of biblical data. For Searle, however, the background refers to a non-representational and non-intentional mental phenomenon that makes representations, intentional states, and speech acts possible. In addition to the background is another one of Searle's concepts, the network. Intentional states occur in a network, in bundles, rather than in isolation (e.g., the belief that it is raining entails other beliefs about droplets of water, clouds in the sky, etc.). To dispel confusion, biblical scholars seeking to employ Searle's categories may have to find another descriptor besides 'the background' to refer to the historicity of the biblical material.

In chapter two, I indicated that speech act theory has gained the attention of an increasing number of biblical scholars and theologians in recent decades. Notable contributions are as follows: (1) Thiselton's efforts to bridge philosophical categories and biblical hermeneutics; (2) Botha's speech act analysis of John 4 on Jesus and the Samaritan woman;

[1] Vanhoozer, "From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts," 169–170.

(3) concentration on God's scriptural speech acts by Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer; (4) Briggs's examination of forgiveness, confession, and teaching in the NT; and (5) Adams's study of Yahweh's speech acts in Isa 40–55.

Several patterns can be detected with these uses of speech act theory. First, there appears to be some misunderstanding of the role of speakers/writers and their words and actions. Many in the guild who have utilized speech act theory suggest that language performs acts, though speech act theory is concerned with speakers and writers who perform acts. Language cannot perform acts apart from the performer; it only acquires meaning based on the values that human beings assign to verbal sounds and written marks. Therefore, from a speech act perspective, it is more accurate to say that the Bible consists of the speech acts of its writers and characters as opposed to describing the Bible as "divine-human communicative action."[2] The distinction serves as a reminder that God and the Bible are not the same. Though related, God and Scripture are separate entities. There is always the question of who wrote the Bible (e.g., human beings, God, God speaking through human beings). With a speech act approach to Scripture, one cannot get around the fact that God always appears as a character within the Bible, never as an actual author.

A second trend is that no other existing works on speech act theory and Scripture or theology provide a Searlean analysis. One reads instead of a mixed approach, employing categories by many different speech act theorists, particularly when one philosopher's theories quit working (e.g., Botha's analysis of John 4 via Grice, Leech, and Bach and Harnish; Neufeld's study of 1 John via Austin, Evans, and Derrida). A related tendency, as seen with Thiselton, Neufeld, Briggs, and Adams, is to blend speech act categories with Evans's hermeneutic of (moral) self-involvement. The purpose is to explore how readers can respond to biblical texts (e.g., Briggs's work on reader-participation in certain NT themes; Adams's thesis on readers/speakers who involve themselves in Yahweh's illocutionary acts by returning to Yahweh and embracing their role as God's servants and children). Others attempt to create speech act categories out of biblical motifs (e.g., Briggs on teaching, confessing, forgiving; Vanhoozer's move from speech acts to Scripture acts). Such a combined approach runs the risk of circular reasoning. Instead, why not

[2] Vanhoozer, *God's Mighty Speech Acts*, 155, 156.

examine how these biblical themes fit into Searle's (or another philosopher's) taxonomy of illocutionary acts.

A third trend, though less obvious, is to treat biblical texts as declarations or assertive declarations rather than as assertives. In 1 Cor 4:4, Paul wrote, "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me" (NRSV). Thiselton classifies Paul's statement here as a declaration.[3] Yet to treat this verse as a declaration is to assign it features that are otherwise missing. In other words, what changes did Paul bring about in the world in saying that (*p*) in 1 Cor 4:4? What were the extra-linguistic institutions? In the surrounding context, Paul admonished the Corinthians with some strong directives because of their jealousy and quarreling over human leaders (1 Cor 3:3–4, 21; 4:1, 5). Sandwiched between are Paul's remarks in 1 Cor 4:3–4 on being judged by human beings or by the Lord, comments that fit more readily into Searle's assertives and expressives categories of illocutionary acts.

Colin Brown calls into question my classification of Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12 as assertives. He says,

> You classify Rom. 3:25 and Heb. 9:12 as 'assertives.' However, I think that they fit better into the category of 'Assertive Declarations.' (1) They issue 'an assertive with the force of a declaration.' (2) They certainly have a word-to-world fit, and may possibly have a world-to-word fit. (3) They have the character of a declaration, which is stronger than an assertion. (4) Whilst there is an overlap between an assertion and a declaration, both Rom. 3:25 and Heb. 9:12 refer intertextually to 'extra linguistic institutions,' whereas plain assertives do not necessarily relate to 'extra linguistic institutions.'[4]

Briggs also questions my treatment of Rom 3:25 as an assertive. He says,

> I am unpersuaded that the speech act of Romans 3:25 is simply an assertive. [T]his seems a thin reading of Romans 3:25 as a statement of a state of affairs, when surely part of its (apostolic) purpose is to urge a way of construing Jesus' death on the cross precisely as a wrath-averting and guilt-dispensing sacrifice. Such a claim is not (simply) a report on what is the case, but an evaluative urging (thus a directive of sorts?) as well as, in its apostolic function, perhaps having a declarative edge which texts in general do not carry in either biblical or theological tradition.[5]

---

[3] Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 284.

[4] Brown, PhD dissertation examiner report, January 29, 2008. Brown's comments are used with permission.

[5] Briggs, PhD dissertation examiner report, April 30, 2008. Briggs's comments are used with permission.

Brown and Briggs make noteworthy points. Since time is a factor with speech acts, it becomes all the more important to identify correctly the type of speech act performed. To assert that 'It is raining,' for example, is to acknowledge that the rain started before making the statement. To declare or assert declare that 'It is raining' is to cause rain to happen.[6] Is there any way to tell for sure what type of illocutionary act Paul performed in Rom 3:25? I propose that Paul performed an assertive. The next step is to see whether the linguistic markers prove otherwise.

Beginning with Briggs's first suggestion, I shall analyze Paul's illocutionary act to see how well Rom 3:25 fits Searle's directives class, and then do the same for declarations. The symbolic notation for directives is $!\uparrow W(H \text{ does } A)$. If Paul requested (!) that his hearers (H) perform some action (A); if Paul's request had a world-to-word ($\uparrow$) direction of fit in hopes of matching reality with his command; if Paul had an intentional state of W symbolizing his wish or desire that H do A—then Paul performed a directive. What was it that Paul urged his hearers to do? Unfortunately, the content of Rom 3:25 offers no clues. In the surrounding verses, Paul did speak to 'the righteousness of God' for those who believe (Rom 3:22) and to God who 'justifies' those who have faith in Jesus (Rom 3:26). Even so, Paul never issued a command in these verses. He only affirms for believers what 'has been disclosed' already (Rom 3:21). For now it remains unclear how Paul's words could fit what Briggs calls "an evaluative urging" without adding to what Paul said.

On whether Paul's propositional content in Rom 3:25 had a declarative element, further analysis is needed. For Searle, declarations are a special class requiring extra-linguistic institutions.[7] Briggs refers to Rom 3:25 in terms of "its (apostolic) purpose," "its apostolic function," though it was Paul's, not the text's, apostolic purpose or function. True, Paul called himself an apostle. It is incoherent, however, to use the extra-linguistic institution of Paul's apostleship to argue that he was performing declarations in places where the linguistic markers indicate otherwise.

The logical notation for declarations is $D\updownarrow\emptyset(p)$. If Paul had declared ($D$) that ($p$), thereby bringing about some change in the referred to object with his successful declaration;[8] if Paul's declaration had a dual direction of fit of both word-to-world and world-to-word ($\updownarrow$); if Paul had no

[6] Searle mentions supernatural declarations like when God declares 'Let there be light' (*Expression and Meaning*, 18).

[7] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 16–19, 26–27.

[8] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 17.

expressed psychological state (Ø), then Paul performed a declaration. Searle explains why declarations have no expressed psychological state (sincerity condition). He says, "[The] man who declares war or nominates you cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act."[9] With declarations, no truth conditions apply. Either a declaration is performed successfully or it fails. Examples of successful declarations include the following: war has been declared, someone has been nominated, a person had been found guilty, the meeting has been adjourned, the umpire calls the batter 'out.'

Back to Rom 3:25, it is unclear what exactly Paul declared into existence, changing the status of the referred-to object in that declarative moment. And which object? Paul referred to several: Jesus Christ, God, the cover of the ark, Christ's blood, faith, God's righteousness, divine forbearance, and sins. Why then is there hesitation to classify Rom 3:25 as an assertive? Brown and Briggs seem to suggest that treating Paul's statement as an assertive simplifies what Paul said and meant. The implication is that assertives are a weaker type of illocutionary act when it comes to Scripture. This is seen elsewhere when Briggs associates declaratives with "strongly self-involving speech acts" and assertives with "weakly self-involving speech acts."[10]

Determining the type of illocutionary act that Paul performed helps to clarify what Paul meant (literally and metaphorically), and what he believed. Just because Paul performed an assertive in Rom 3:25 in no way diminishes the importance of his words. I see Paul declaring nothing into existence as a result of his illocutionary act; rather, he acknowledges what God has already made possible through Christ.

If Paul literally asserted that God put forward Jesus Christ as the 'cover of the ark [ἱλαστήριον]' (*S* is *P*), and did so intentionally knowing the history of ἱλαστήριον for Israel, then the type of assertive Paul performed was a metaphorical assertion. Of Paul's speaker meaning (*S* is *R*), perhaps Paul thought that Jesus Christ was the new meeting point between God and sinners (see Exod 25:17–22). Stephen Finlan argues the same point in his discussion of the 'biblical mercy seat.' He says, "In [Rom] 3:25 Christ

[9] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 19–20.

[10] Briggs, *Words in Action*, 283. In his analysis of Jesus' teaching on the kingdom of God, Briggs classifies Luke 17:21 as "a strongly self-involving declaration" (*Words in Action*, 282). In this verse Jesus said, "nor will they say, 'Look, here it is!' or 'There it is!' For, in fact, the kingdom of God is among you" (NRSV). From a speech act perspective, it is unclear to me what it means exactly to describe Luke 17:21 as "a strongly self-involving declaration."

becomes the ἱλαστήριον where God cancels sins and manifests his kindly righteousness."[11] For Finlan, Paul equated Jesus to the ἱλαστήριον.

> In Romans 3:25 and 8:3 Paul takes two key terms from the Jewish sacrificial cult and applies them to Jesus, saying that Jesus was the *hilastērion* (the mercy seat, the location of the supreme cleansing action in the sacred cultic system) and *peri hamartias* (the kind of sacrifice used to purify the Temple through a sprinkling on the *hilastērion*). So Jesus is being equated with the means by which Israel believed its sin-caused impurity could be cleansed. The implication is that Jesus is the *new* mercy seat or sin offering [Finlan's italics].[12]

Searle's categories of mind are useful here for identifying Paul's network of attitudes, beliefs, and stances pertaining to God, the Torah, Israel's worship practices—familiar motifs that Paul accessed to perform his metaphorical assertion in Rom 3:25.

It is remarkable how much speculation can surround a single verse of Scripture (e.g., interpreting Rom 3:25 in a cultic or non-cultic sense; thinking that the content of Rom 3:25 either originated with Paul, was a pre-Pauline tradition that Paul borrowed, or was a non-Pauline addition by a redactor[13]). In overlooking the literal value of ἱλαστήριον, translators and interpreters miss layers of meaning associated with Paul's intentional use of a metaphor. At the very least, identifying the linguistic parameters of texts allows some things to be said with certainty. Of Paul's obscure remarks, for example, the following points can be made: (1) Paul performed an assertive act that (*p*) concerning Christ's blood; (2) Paul's corresponding intentional state was a belief that (*p*); (3) Paul's assertive fits Searle's metaphorical assertion category; (4) Romans 3:25 contains layers of meaning on the literal and metaphorical levels; (5) Paul knew the literal values of ἱλαστήριον and αἷμα, though biblical scholars emphasize Paul's non-literal uses of these terms.

The trends among biblical scholars and theologians who utilize speech act theory reveal a limited use of Searle's philosophies of language and mind. Whatever speech act theory can offer interpreters gets lost in the mix. How to make speech act theory more accessible to the wider guild,

---

[11] Finlan, *The Background and Contents of Paul's Cultic Atonement Metaphors* (ABS 19; Leiden: Brill/SBL, 2004), 148, 157.

[12] Finlan, *Options on Atonement in Christian Thought* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2007), 21.

[13] Gundry-Volf, "Expiation, Propitiation, Mercy Seat," *DPL* 282–283.

that is the question. One solution is a systematic approach to the speech acts of the biblical writers and characters. Here is where Searle's categories come in.

5.2. Summary and Synthesis: The Five Selected Texts on Christ's Blood

Searle stands by his original taxonomy of assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations (with a subcategory of assertive declarations). Despite critics who question the workability of Searle's taxonomy,[14] his classification proves to be effective in applying it to the speech acts on Christ's blood performed by the biblical writers and characters.

In my third and fourth chapters, I employed Searle's philosophies to examine four NT writers' speech acts on Christ's blood at the level of intentionality (i.e., Paul and Rom 3:25; the author of Hebrews and Heb 9:12; John the evangelist and John 6:52–59; John and Rev 1:5b–6; 7:13–14). I discovered single-level and multi-level speech acts. Paul and the author of Hebrews, discussed in chapter three, each performed a single-level assertive in saying that Christ, with his blood, has justified and redeemed sinners. Each had a corresponding intentional state of belief that (*p*) in Rom 3:25 and Heb 9:12. The type of assertive that Paul and the author of Hebrews each performed was a metaphorical assertion. Layers of meaning—speaker meaning, sentence meaning—associated with their metaphorical assertions became apparent.

In chapter four, I analyzed the multi-level speech acts of the various speakers in John 6:52–59 (John, the Judeans, and Jesus), Rev 1:5b–6 (John's assertive and expressive), and Rev 7:13–14 (John and the elder). The linguistic structures of these texts revealed direct illocutionary acts, indirect illocutionary acts, and reports. In John 6:52–59, for example,

[14] See various articles with Searle's responses in Ernest Lepore and Robert van Gulick, *John Searle and His Critics*, (PC 2; ed. E. Lepore; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991). Sadock argues that Searle's taxonomy fails to capture "ordinary acts of speech" (e.g., question asking), and attempts to correct Searle by proposing three "communicative aspects" of ordinary speech acts: an *informational, representational aspect* (INF), an *effective, social aspect* (EF), and an *affective, emotive aspect* (AF) ("Toward a Grammatically Realistic Typology of Speech Acts," 393–406). Dieter Wunderlich argues that Searle's taxonomy cannot account for certain types of speech such as rhetorical questions, warnings, proposals, etc. ("Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory," pages 291–312 in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics* [eds. J.R. Searle, F. Kiefer, and M. Bierwisch; SLL:TSLP 10; ed. J. Hintikka and S. Peters; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980]).

John performed three brief assertives of an encounter between the Judeans and Jesus (John 6:52a, 53a, 59). John then made a verbatim report of a question asked by the Judeans (John 6:52b) and a second verbatim report of Jesus' response (John 6:53b–58).

It became evident that reports are a special class. A complete speech act consists of an utterance act, a propositional act, and an illocutionary act. A report consists only of an utterance act and a propositional act. So repeating and reporting are separate acts. The distinction pertains to intentionality (with t) and intensionality (with s). John only reported the Judeans' question. He did not ask it along with the Judeans. This indicates how the status of words and mental states change depending on the context (e.g., John's report that the Judeans asked that (*p*) in John 6:52b; John's belief that the Judeans disbelieved Jesus' claims).

A question arises of whether a report of someone else's words can ever evolve into a complete speech act (i.e., an illocutionary act). At some point the words and beliefs of the biblical writers and characters became the church's prayers, creeds, confessions, doctrines. Mere reports of Jesus' assertives or assertive declarations or Paul's illocutionary acts were reshaped into something more. This linguistic shift has implications for understanding certain ontological shifts, say of 'non-believer' to 'believer,' 'sinner' to 'saint,' 'guilty' to 'forgiven,' shifts that are important, even necessary, for many believers within Christ-based faith institutions.

Concerning Jesus' multi-level speech acts in John 6:53b–58, he performed a direct assertive, indirect directive, and indirect commissive about eating his flesh and drinking his blood. Jesus' words fit the metaphorical assertion category. At the level of intentionality, Jesus accessed familiar motifs in the Hebrew scriptures to reveal how the Father has sent him from above. In literally asserting that (*p*) in John 6:53b–58, Jesus meant that he was the true source of permanent sustenance and eternal life compared against temporary manna, quail, and water sent by Yahweh to nourish the Israelites in the wilderness. In missing the literal values of bread, flesh, and blood in John 6, the layers of meaning associated with Jesus' intentional metaphors have been buried. These layers of meaning are an integral part of the hermeneutical issues of John 6 on whether to treat the chapter as one coherent unit and whether it is valid to interpret Jesus' references to bread, flesh, and blood in a sacramental sense.

The analysis of the Judeans' question in John 6:52b at the level of intentionality—how Jesus could come from above and offer his flesh as food—indicated that the Judeans and Jesus shared certain attitudes and beliefs based on a Hebrew monotheistic mindset. If Jesus called to mind

familiar motifs for the Judeans, then it is possible that they understood Jesus' speaker meaning in John 6:53b–58 and the surrounding context. Saying that the Judeans understood yet doubted and disbelieved that Jesus came from the Father as a permanent source of sustenance for life is a counterpoint to the following interpretations: the Judeans either misunderstood or were disgusted by Jesus' claims; Jesus was referring to his death in offering his blood to drink.

Briggs raises a concern about whether Searle's position on God prevents me from saying certain things about the NT speakers' networks of beliefs in God, etc. Briggs states,

> [I]t is to be noted that the kinds of components the author ascribes to (e.g.) John's network, such as 'the one true God in Jesus Christ' are more or less explicitly ruled out by Searle's view of God in his *Mind, Language and Society* (pp. 33–37) where he claims that God could only be part of the natural system. I think one can use Searle's account of language to describe aspects of (though not the whole of) the functioning of biblical language, but I am less clear that the author has demonstrated that Searle's account of language reducing to intentional states and their functions is compatible with the kinds of ways biblical authors conceive of either language or God.[15]

Briggs is referring to a section called "Beyond Atheism" in Searle's book *Mind, Language and Society*.[16] My response to Briggs starts with the position taken by Searle (and others) on the question of God's existence.

In "Beyond Atheism" Searle explains why, for him, there is simply no point in talking about 'God.' Many educated people in the West now have a 'demystified' view of the world, says Searle.[17]

> The fact that the world has become demystified to the point that religion no longer matters in the public way that it once did shows not so much that we are all becoming atheists but that we have moved beyond atheism to a point where the issues have a different meaning for us. The impatient reader may well wonder when I am going to take a stand on the existence of God.[18]

---

[15] Briggs, PhD dissertation examiner report, April 30, 2008.

[16] See Searle's section on "Beyond Atheism," pages 33–37 in *Mind, Language and Society*.

[17] Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 34.

[18] Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 36.

What about miracles, strange happenings, unexplainable events, someone may ask. Searle replies,

> We no longer think of odd occurrences as cases of God performing speech acts in the language of miracles. Odd occurrences are just occurrences we do not understand. [F]or us, if it should turn out that God exists, that would have to be a fact of nature like any other.[19]

For Searle, to be labeled an 'atheist' is irrelevant. He says, "[It] suggests that somehow or another I am engaged in the religious argument. I am not really."[20]

As difficult as it may be to set judgments of Searle aside, it is important to do so; otherwise, biblical scholars and theologians will read Searle through a filter, or avoid his philosophies altogether. Searle's contribution to our understanding of language and what makes language possible in the human brain stands on its own merits regardless of his position on God.

To answer Briggs, Searle's categories of language and mind are general categories meant to be applied to human beings as speaking/writing agents. Two questions follow: (1) Did the biblical writers think that they were writing Scripture? (2) Is the biblical language privileged just because it has been labeled 'Scripture'? The biblical writers had no way of knowing that their works (e.g., Paul's personal letters) would later be canonized and deemed more worthy than other texts. Over time, others have added layers of theological meaning onto the biblical texts, trying to make sense of them. The biblical writers were every day human beings who recorded their beliefs in and experiences of Yahweh in the languages they knew. The important task, from a speech act perspective, is to be mindful of how common words have achieved sacred status. The same applies to common everyday elements that have served a covenantal or sacramental purpose (e.g., animal blood for Israel's faith tradition; bread, wine, and water for the church).

Taking up Briggs's comment on being "less clear that the author has demonstrated that Searle's account of language reducing to intentional states and their functions is compatible with the kinds of ways biblical authors conceive of either language or God"—further clarification of Searle's categories is needed. Searle never reduces language to intentional states. Intentional states are 'pre-linguistic forms,' and human beings acquire and use language to relate their intentional states in the world

---

[19] Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, 35.

[20] Searle, e-mail message to author, February 25, 2010.

(e.g., belief/assert, desire/direct, intention/commit, etc.).[21] Searle makes a clear distinction between language and the mental phenomena that make language possible (i.e., intentionality, the network, the background). Language derives from intentionality. This is why "the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind."[22]

Although the speakers of the studied texts (i.e., Paul, the author of Hebrews, John the evangelist, the Judeans, Jesus, John of Revelation, the elder) each had a network of intentional states and a background, similarities became apparent. Each of their networks reflected the same Hebrew monotheistic mindset, reshaped by the Christ event. Each of their backgrounds consisted of general know-how capacities (e.g., to remember, to perform speech acts, to perform intentional actions) and specific know-how capacities (e.g., to worship the God of Israel, live by the Torah, accommodate a Christ-centered belief system). The study indicated that the blood-of-Christ motif was not simply a metaphor for Christ's death. It was possible that the NT speakers, in asserting the efficacy of Christ's blood, distinguished between death as an event and blood as a substance. A broader interpretation of the blood-of-Christ motif follows: the NT speakers meant blood in saying 'blood;' Christ's blood as a life-giving substance was superior to earthly food and drink; Christ's blood was superior to other types of blood because it was God's blood.

Searle's philosophies of language and mind prove to be valuable for (1) examining the speech acts performed by the biblical writers, the speech acts performed by the characters within the authors' narratives, and the authors' reports of their characters' speech acts; and (2) discerning the levels of meaning associated with texts.

What can speech act theory, à la Searle, contribute to our understanding of the blood-of-Christ theme in the broader context of the NT and NT theology?

5.3. Summary and Synthesis: Christ's Blood in the NT and NT Theology

The five texts on the blood of Christ isolated for this project belong to a larger pool of references to Christ's blood in the NT, as exhibited

[21] Searle, *Intentionality*, 169–177.
[22] Searle, *Intentionality*, 160.

in appendix 1. These many texts indicate that the NT writers wrote of the blood of Christ in association with language of covenant, life, being raised, abiding, passing over sin, justification, communal participation, reconciliation, redemption, purity, having access to God, sanctification, victory.

Several of the other NT texts on Christ's blood fit Searle's assertives class of illocutionary acts. To highlight a few, in Hebrews the author asserted that God brought Jesus back from the dead 'by the blood of the eternal covenant' (Heb 13:20, NRSV), and that Christ's blood 'purifies the conscience' (Heb 9:14). Paul too performed other assertives on being 'justified' (Rom 5:9), 'redeemed' (Eph 1:7), and 'brought near' (Eph 2:13) by Christ's blood. An intentional state of belief that (*p*) corresponded to each of these assertives.

As for Jesus, his illocutionary act concerning his own blood (and body) fits Searle's assertive declaration category ($D_a{\downarrow}{\updownarrow}B(p)$)—a subcategory of declarations that accounts for scenarios when assertives overlap with declarations.[23] The scene involves Jesus and his disciples as they celebrated the Passover (Mark 14:12–25; see also Matt 26:26–29; Luke 22:14–20). In Mark 14:24, Jesus said, " 'This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many.' " Here Jesus performed an assertive with the force of a declaration, symbolized as D_a. The set of arrows represents a word-to-world direction of fit for Jesus' assertive (↓) and a dual direction of fit for his declaration (↕). Jesus' successful performance would have had to guarantee that the propositional content of his statement corresponded to the world (i.e., if Jesus successfully performed the act of announcing that his blood was the blood of the covenant, then his blood was the blood of the covenant). The *B* stands for Jesus' expressed psychological state of belief in the expressed proposition that (*p*). As for extra-linguistic institutions, Jesus performed his assertive declaration in the context of sharing the Passover meal with his disciples—a religious institution extending back to the Exodus event (Exod 12). Jesus was also in a position of authority to perform his assertive declaration.

Such examples of how blood was associated with covenant, life, justification, etc. are important for how the blood-of-Christ motif is handled in NT theology. Biblical dictionaries point to the theological significance of blood in both the OT and NT, particularly sacrificial animal blood compared against Christ's blood. It follows that Christ's blood is typically

[23] Searle, *Expression and Meaning*, 19–20.

equated with his death or the cross. What distinguishes blood in the NT from blood in the OT is the "'precious blood of Christ,'" says Donald R. Potts. "Everything in the drama of Jesus' passion focuses on blood."[24] In *Expository Dictionary of the Bible*, a portion of the entry on 'blood' reads,

> Undoubtedly the most theologically significant usage of *haima* occurs in contexts where the 'blood of Christ' is the dominant motif. Christ's 'blood' of the new covenant is symbolized by the Passover cup, given new significance just prior to his own death.[25]

The entry also mentions Christ's 'atoning self-sacrifice on the cross' that renders the OT covenant and sacrificial system 'ineffective,'[26] a point supported by Heb 7–10.

Various atonement theories attempt to pinpoint what exactly transpired between Yahweh and the people with rituals involving animal blood.[27] These theories have a distinct vocabulary (e.g., expiation, propitiation, 'penal substitution'), and they carry over to NT theology to explain the purpose of Christ's 'sacrificial' death on the cross.[28] Of Paul's reference to ἱλαστήριον, for example, one scholar says,

> Grammatically *hilastērion* can be explained either as a neuter substantive ('means of propitiation/expiation,' or 'mercy seat'), a substantival masculine adjective ('propitiator,' 'reconciler,' 'obtainer of mercy'), or a masculine or neuter adjective ('making propitiation/expiation,' 'able to make propitiation/expiation'). If it is a masculine adjective, it modifies *hon* and the meaning is that Christ is the propitiatory/expiatory agent or object.[29]

At the heart of atonement theories is an unsolvable mystery of what actually transpired between God and sinner, of what happened to sin. Erhard S. Gerstenberger, commenting on the first sixteen chapters of Leviticus, makes a related point: "What does it really mean to 'effect atonement'?"[30] How far speech act theory can take us in answering this question remains to be seen. For starters, any theological understanding

---

[24] Potts, "Blood," *EDB* 193.

[25] Stephen D. Renn, "Blood," *EBDW* 124.

[26] Renn, "Blood," *EBDW* 124.

[27] For further discussion of atonement theories, see Finlan, *Problems with Atonement: The Origins of, and Controversy about, the Atonement Doctrine* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2005), and Finlan, *Options on Atonement*.

[28] C.M. Tuckett cautions against drawing too many parallels between sin-offerings in the OT and Jesus' death as a sin-offering ("Atonement in the NT," *ABD* 1:519).

[29] Gundry-Volf, "Expiation, Propitiation, Mercy Seat," *DPL* 279.

[30] Gerstenberger, *Leviticus: A Commentary* (trans. D.W. Stott; OTL; eds. J.L. Mays, C.A. Newsom, and D.L. Peterson; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 226.

of the blood-of-Christ language ought to factor in the possibility that the NT writers referred to Christ's blood in the literal sense.

Distinguishing Christ's blood from his death and the cross takes us back to the Torah. The Hebrew noun דם (αἷμα, LXX) is translated as 'blood' and not as 'death.' There is some dispute about how to define the Hebrew verb כפר and the Hebrew noun כַּפֹּרֶת in Leviticus 16, as indicated by the various translations of these terms. With the verb כפר, several English versions translate it with 'atone' language such as 'to make atonement,' 'atoning for,' or 'atonement shall be made' as part of the Yom Kippur ritual (NRSV, NIV, NASB, NKJV, and Amplified Bible). The NJPS translates כפר as 'to make expiation' (Lev 16:6, 10–11, 17, 24, 32–33), as 'purge' (Lev 16:16, 18, 20, 27, 33), or as making 'atonement' (Lev 16:30, 34). Some English translations omit any reference to atoning language and say instead 'to purify' oneself or 'be purified' (NLT), 'to pay for sin' (NIRV), or 'removal of sins' (NCV).

Although כפר is tied to the idea of 'covering,' as seen with the Hebrew noun כַּפֹּרֶת for the cover of the ark (ἱλαστήριον, LXX), Milgrom prefers the idea of 'purge' as opposed to 'cover' for כפר.[31] Of כַּפֹּרֶת, Milgrom says that it cannot be translated. He states,

> The term *kapporet* is untranslatable, so far. It refers to the solid gold slab (3.75 feet by 2.25 feet) atop the ark, at the edges of which were two cherubim, of one piece with it and made of hammered gold, kneeling and facing each other with bowed heads and outstretched wings so as to touch in the middle. It can hardly be rendered 'mercy seat/throne' or 'cover.'[32]

The word כַּפֹּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον does get translated, however, and in many different ways. Translations typically carry a theological layer: 'mercy seat' (Tyndale, RSV, NRSV), 'atonement cover' (NIV), 'the Atonement Slate,'[33] and 'a propitiatory sacrifice.'[34] The NJPS keeping with a literal translation of כַּפֹּרֶת, however, simply says 'the cover' that is over the ark.

An issue turns up when adding a theological layer to translations of כַּפֹּרֶת (e.g., mercy, atonement, expiation, propitiation). These translations miss the literal value of כַּפֹּרֶת as the golden slab of the ark. This has ramifications for atonement theories because retaining the literal value of ordinary objects like כַּפֹּרֶת allows for a broader understanding of the role

---

[31] Milgrom, "Israel's Sanctuary," 391.

[32] Milgrom, *Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics* (CC; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2004), 167.

[33] Hartley, *Leviticus*, 4:234.

[34] Moo, *Epistle to the Romans*, 218.

of blood in the God-Israel-sin dynamic. For Israel, the custom of applying animal blood extended beyond the slab to include other items. God appeared in a cloud above the cover of the ark that was in the innermost part of the tabernacle (Lev 16:2b). The high priest had to sprinkle bull's blood with his finger on the front of the cover and before it seven times (Lev 16:14). He was to do the same with goat's blood, sprinkling it on and before the cover to deal with Israel's transgressions and sins (Lev 16:15–16). Then the high priest had to go out to the altar and apply bull and goat blood on its horns (Lev 16:18–19). This designated priest had to 'atone' for the adytum, tent of meeting, altar, priests, and the whole assembly of people (Lev 16:20, 32–34). Blood served as a covering agent for many objects that were regarded by God as unholy on account of the people's 'uncleannesses' and 'transgressions' (Lev 16:16, 19, NRSV).

God also ordered that various items be coated with blood on other occasions besides on Yom Kippur. Such passages fit Searle's directives class of illocutionary acts, symbolized as !↑*W*(*H* does *A*). In Exod 12:7, 22, with the Passover, God commanded (!) the Israelites to take blood from an unblemished year-old male lamb and apply it on the doorposts and lintels of their houses (*H* does *A*). The blood served as a protectant from judgment and death for whoever followed God's instructions (Exod 12:5–7, 12–13). The direction of fit of God's directive was world-to-word (↑). God had an intentional state of wish or desire (*W*) that the Israelites perform the specified action (*A*).

A set of directives occurs later in Exodus when God commanded Israel to construct a tabernacle for worship. Moses received specific instructions on how to ordain Aaron and his sons as priests. Blood was part of the protocol. God ordered Moses to slaughter a bull. Moses was told to apply some its blood on the horns of the altar (Exod 29:12). Then Moses was to dash the blood from a ram on all sides of the altar. With the blood of another ram, Moses had to coat the right earlobes of Aaron and his sons, along with their right thumbs and the big toes of their right feet. The rest of the blood had to be dashed on all sides of the altar (Exod 29:19–20). Aaron, his sons, and their vestments were all made 'holy,' that is, sprinkled with a mixture of blood from the altar and anointing oil (Exod 29:21; see also Exod 30:10, 22–38).

At another time, Moses took blood from sacrificed oxen. He applied the blood on the altar and on the people of Israel (Exod 24:6, 8). The passage is vague as to why God commanded Moses to apply the oxen blood in this manner. Exodus 24:8 only indicates that God initiated 'the blood of the covenant' with Israel (NRSV).

These highlighted texts demonstrate that several other objects besides the golden slab received blood—the altar, horns, earlobes, thumbs, big toes, vestments, the people.[35] It is interesting that theological layers are never added to English translations of 'altar,' 'horns,' or 'vestments' to read 'mercy altar,' 'mercy horns,' or 'mercy vestments,' 'atonement altar,' 'atonement horns,' or 'atonement vestments.' Only the cover of the ark has been dubbed in theological terms as 'mercy seat' or 'atonement cover' despite the fact that blood was applied to many other items for the same purpose that it was applied to the ark's cover: to make holy. Likewise, Paul's reference to ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25 is often translated with a theological layer—'a sacrifice of atonement' (NRSV, NIV).

Employing Searle's philosophies of language and mind helps to raise several points of interest concerning the references to animal blood and Christ's blood in Scripture. To challenge the tendency of treating Christ's blood only as a metaphor for his death, I bring in Searle's categories to examine the motif of Christ's blood at two levels—sentence meaning (*S* is *P*) and speaker meaning (*S* is *R*). I trust that when the NT speakers chose the word blood in composing their statements, they meant blood. In Searle's scheme, it is possible to retain the sentence (i.e., literal) meaning while discovering the speaker (metaphorical) meaning. At the literal level, the NT writers had in mind Christ's blood, blood that was qualitatively different when compared to other types of blood (e.g., animal blood in Heb 9:12; Abel's blood in Heb 12:24).

If the NT speakers had in mind blood with their references to it, then one can assume that they had a purpose in choosing this word. Searle's assertive category, with its corresponding intentional state of belief, elucidates how NT writers and characters, in asserting that (*p*), believed in the effects of Christ's blood. These writers and characters would have had a whole system of beliefs extending to the role of blood, specifically animal blood, in the covenant relationship between God and Israel. This particular category of mind, the network, is an attractive feature for biblical scholars whose interests are to root NT texts in the Hebrew faith tradition.

What do such distinctions have to do with the relevance of Christ's blood for various atonement theories? For starters, while it is important to identify correlations between the role of animal blood in the OT and

[35] According to Heb 9:21, blood was applied to 'the tent and all the vessels' (NRSV). Hebrews 9:22a reads, "Indeed, under the law almost everything is purified with blood" (NRSV).

Christ's blood in the NT, it is equally important to note the limits of such correlations. Animal blood and Christ's blood are typically set side by side in theological discussions, yet there must be more than just a comparison of the two. Even though God required the blood of specific animals without blemish (Exod 12:5; Lev 1:3, 10) and Jesus 'offered himself without blemish to God' (Heb 9:14, NRSV), Christ's blood accomplished 'once for all' what animal blood could not (Heb 10:1–18). Something new had emerged for the NT writers.

If the NT speakers had in mind Christ's blood in a literal, physical sense, then atonement theories ought to distinguish Christ's blood from his death. Theologically speaking, such theories should account for Jesus Christ's identity, thereby viewing his blood as superior because it was Yahweh's blood. The implication for doctrines of atonement is that all aspects of Jesus' earthly existence are elevated—his birth, his life and ministry, his death, his resurrection—not just his death. Knowing who Jesus was becomes the new focal point.

Ultimately, speech act theory takes into account the function of speakers and writers. The biblical writers and characters had intentional states associated with their illocutionary acts, and these intentional states comprised the meaning of their sentences. The significance of this for theological reflection concerning the blood-of-Christ motif is that any interpretation must take seriously the speakers' intentional states associated with their illocutionary acts. Paul, the author of Hebrews, and John in Revelation, for example, were not writing fiction or mythology. They stated and believed that (*p*) concerning Christ and the effects of his blood stemming from a reshaped perspective of who God was.

The method of keeping with Searle's categories revealed aspects of the biblical texts and writers that were not apparent before. Speech act theory is a viable method of interpretation, especially when maintaining one philosopher's categories. For future inquiries, a great amount of work can be done on the question of how the biblical writers and characters used words.

APPENDIX 1

REFERENCES TO CHRIST'S BLOOD IN THE NEW TESTAMENT (NRSV)

1.1. Benefits of Christ's Blood

1.1.1. *Covenant [διαθήκη]*

Matt 26:28 for this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins.

Mark 14:24 He said to them, "This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many."

Luke 22:20 And he did the same with the cup after supper, saying, "This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood."

1 Cor 11:25 In the same way he took the cup also, after supper, saying, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me."

Heb 10:29 How much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by those who have spurned the Son of God, profaned the blood of the covenant by which they were sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace?

Heb 12:24 and to Jesus, the mediator of a new covenant, and to the sprinkled blood that speaks a better word than the blood of Abel.

Heb 13:20 Now may the God of peace, who brought back from the dead our Lord Jesus, the great shepherd of the sheep, by the blood of the eternal covenant,

1.1.2. *Life [ζωή], raised up [ἀνίστημι], and abide [μένω]*

John 6:53–56 So Jesus said to them, "Very truly, I tell you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood have eternal life, and I will raise them up on the last day; for my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I in them."

1.1.3. *Obtaining [περιποιέω] the church*

Acts 20:28 Keep watch over yourselves and over all the flock, of which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers, to shepherd the church of God that he obtained with the blood of his own Son.

1.1.4. *Passing Over [πάρεσις] sin*

Rom 3:25 whom God put forward as a sacrifice of atonement by his blood, effective through faith. He did this to show his righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over the sins previously committed;

1.1.5. *Justification [δικαιόω]*

Rom 5:9 Much more surely then, now that we have been justified by his blood, will we be saved through him from the wrath of God.

1.1.6. *Communal Participation [κοινωνία]*

1 Cor 10:16 The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of Christ? The bread that we break, is it not a sharing in the body of Christ?

1.1.7. *Being Brought Near [γίνομαι]*

Eph 2:13 But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ.

1.1.8. *Reconciliation [ἀποκαταλλάσσω]*

Col 1:20 and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross.

1.1.9. *Redemption [λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις]*

Eph 1:7 In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace.

Heb 9:12 he entered once for all into the Holy Place, not with the

blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus obtaining eternal redemption.

1 Pet 1:18–19 You know that you were ransomed [ἐλυτρώθητε] from the futile ways inherited from your ancestors, not with perishable things like silver or gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without defect or blemish.

1.1.10. *Purification [καθαρίζω]*

Heb 9:14 how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify our conscience from dead works to worship the living God!

1 John 1:7 but if we walk in the light as he himself is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses us from all sin.

1.1.11. *Having Access [εἴσοδον] to holy places*

Heb 10:19 Therefore, my friends, since we have confidence to enter the sanctuary by the blood of Jesus

1.1.12. *Sanctification [ἁγιάζω]*

Heb 13:12 Therefore Jesus also suffered outside the city gate in order to sanctify the people by his own blood.

1.1.13. *Foreknowledge [πρόγνωσις], holiness [ἁγιασμός], sprinkling of blood [ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος]*

1 Pet 1:2 who have been chosen and destined by God the Father and sanctified by the Spirit to be obedient to Jesus Christ and to be sprinkled with his blood: May grace and peace be yours in abundance.

1.1.14. *Being Free [λύω] from sin*

Rev 1:5 and from Jesus Christ, the faithful witness, the firstborn of the dead, and the ruler of the kings of the earth. To him who loves us and freed us from our sins by his blood,

1.1.15. *Ransoming [ἀγοράζω]*

Rev 5:9 They sing a new song: "You are worthy to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slaughtered and by your blood you ransomed for God saints from every tribe and language and people and nation;"

1.1.16. *Making White [λευκαίνω] the robes*

Rev 7:14 I said to him, "Sir, you are the one that knows." Then he said to me, "These are they who have come out of the great ordeal; they have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb."

1.1.17. *Conquering [νικάω]*

Rev 12:11 But they have conquered [the accuser] by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony, for they did not cling to life even in the face of death.

1.2. Blood and Water of Jesus Christ

1 John 5:6–8 This is the one who came by water and blood, Jesus Christ, not with the water only but with the water and the blood. And the Spirit is the one that testifies, for the Spirit is the truth. There are three that testify: the Spirit and the water and the blood, and these three agree.

John 19:34 Instead, one of the soldiers pierced [Jesus'] side with a spear, and at once blood and water came out.

1.3. Jesus Sharing in Flesh and Blood

Heb 2:14 Since, therefore, the children share flesh and blood, he himself likewise shared the same things, so that through death he might destroy the one who has the power of death, that is, the devil.

1.4. Miscellaneous References

Luke 22:44 In his anguish [Jesus] prayed more earnestly, and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground.

1 Cor 11:27 Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord.

Rev 19:13 He is clothed in a robe dipped in blood, and his name is called The Word of God.

1.5. Indirect or Ambiguous References

Matt 27:4–8 [Judas] said, "I have sinned by betraying innocent blood." But they said, "What is that to us? See to it yourself." Throwing down the pieces of silver in the temple, he departed; and he went and hanged himself. But the chief priests, taking the pieces of silver, said, "It is not lawful to put them into the treasury, since they are blood money." After conferring together, they used them to buy the potter's field as a place to bury foreigners. For this reason that field has been called the Field of Blood to this day.

Matt 27:24–25 So when Pilate saw that he could do nothing, but rather that a riot was beginning, he took some water and washed his hands before the crowd, saying, "I am innocent of this man's [Jesus'] blood; see to it yourselves." Then the people as a whole answered, "His blood be on us and on our children!"

Acts 5:28 [The high priest said,] "We gave you strict orders not to teach in this [Jesus'] name, yet here you have filled Jerusalem with your teaching and you are determined to bring this man's blood on us."

Heb 12:4 In your struggle against sin you have not yet resisted to the point of shedding your blood.

Rev 14:20 And the wine press was trodden outside the city, and blood flowed from the wine press, as high as a horse's bridle, for a distance of about two hundred miles.

APPENDIX 2

GENERAL REFERENCES TO BLOOD IN THE NEW TESTAMENT (NRSV)

2.1. Mortal Flesh and Blood

Matt 16:17 And Jesus answered him, "Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven."

John 1:12–13 But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God, who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God.

1 Cor 15:50 What I am saying, brothers and sisters, is this: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable.

Gal 1:16 to reveal his Son to me, so that I might proclaim him among the Gentiles, I did not confer with an human being [σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι]

Eph 6:12 For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places.

2.2. Blood and Health-Related Concerns

Mark 5:25 Now there was a woman who had been suffering from hemorrhages [αἵματος] for twelve years.

Mark 5:29 Immediately her hemorrhage [αἵματος] stopped; and she felt in her body that she was healed of her disease.

Luke 8:43–44 Now there was a woman who had been suffering from hemorrhages [αἵματος] for twelve years; and though she had spent all she had on physicians, no one could cure her. She came up behind him and touched the fringe of his clothes, and immediately her hemorrhage [αἵματος] stopped.

2.3. Abstaining from Blood

Acts 15:20 but we should write to them to abstain only from things polluted by idols and from fornication and from whatever has been strangled and from blood.

Acts 15:29 that you abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what is strangled and from fornication. If you keep yourselves from these, you will do well. Farewell.

Acts 21:25 But as for the Gentiles who have become believers, we have sent a letter with our judgment that they should abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what is strangled and from fornication.

2.4. Blood, Animal Sacrifice, and Covenant

Luke 13:1 At that very time there were some present who told him about the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices.

Heb 9:7 but only the high priest goes into the second, and he but once a year, and not without taking the blood that he offers for himself and for the sins committed unintentionally by the people.

Heb 9:13 For if the blood of goats and bulls, with the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, sanctifies those who have been defiled so that their flesh is purified

Heb 9:18–22 Hence not even the first covenant was inaugurated without blood. For when every commandment had been told to all the people by Moses in accordance with the law, he took the blood of calves and goats, with water and scarlet wool and hyssop, and sprinkled both the scroll itself and all the people, saying, "This is the blood of the covenant that God has ordained for you." And in the same way he sprinkled with the blood both the tent and all the vessels used in worship. Indeed, under the law almost everything is purified with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of sins.

Heb 9:25 Nor was it to offer himself again and again, as the high priest enters the Holy Place year after year with blood that is not his own

Heb 10:4 For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins.

Heb 11:28 By faith [Moses] kept the Passover and the sprinkling of blood, so that the destroyer of the firstborn would not touch the firstborn of Israel.

Heb 13:11 For the bodies of those animals whose blood is brought into the sanctuary by the high priest as a sacrifice for sin are burned outside the camp.

2.5. Blood, Killing, and Judgment

Matt 23:30 and you say, 'If we had lived in the days of our ancestors, we would not have taken part with them in shedding the blood of the prophets.'

Matt 23:35 so that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed on earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zechariah son of Barachiah, whom you murdered between the sanctuary and the altar.

Luke 11:50–51 so that this generation may be charged with the blood of all the prophets shed since the foundation of the world, from the blood of Abel to the blood of Zechariah, who perished between the altar and the sanctuary. Yes, I tell you, it will be charged against this generation.

Acts 2:19–20 And I will show portents in the heaven above and signs on the earth below, blood, and fire, and smoky mist. The sun shall be turned to darkness and the moon to blood, before the coming of the Lord's great and glorious day.

Acts 18:6 When they [the Jews] opposed and reviled [Paul], in protest he shook the dust from his clothes and said to them, "Your blood be on your own heads! I am innocent. From now on I will go to the Gentiles."

Acts 22:20 And while the blood of your witness Stephen was shed, I myself [Paul] was standing by, approving and keeping the coats of those who killed him.

Rom 3:15 Their feet are swift to shed blood

Rev 6:10 they cried out with a loud voice, "Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth?"

Rev 6:12 When he opened the sixth seal, I looked, and there came a great earthquake; the sun became black as sackcloth, the full moon became like blood

Rev 8:7–9 The first angel blew his trumpet, and there came hail and fire, mixed with blood, and they were hurled to the earth; and a third of the earth was burned up, and a third of the trees were burned up, and all green grass was burned up. The second angel blew his trumpet, and

something like a great mountain, burning with fire, was thrown into the sea. A third of the sea became blood, a third of the living creatures in the sea died, and a third of the ships were destroyed.

Rev 11:6 They have authority to shut the sky, so that no rain may fall during the days of their prophesying, and they have authority over the waters to turn them into blood, and to strike the earth with every kind of plague, as often as they desire.

Rev 16:3–4 The second angel poured his bowl into the sea, and it became like the blood of a corpse, and every living thing in the sea died. The third angel poured his bowl into the rivers and the springs of water, and they became blood.

Rev 16:6 because they shed the blood of saints and prophets, you have given them blood to drink. It is what they deserve!

Rev 17:6 And I saw that the woman was drunk with the blood of the saints and the blood of the witnesses to Jesus. When I saw her, I was greatly amazed.

Rev 18:24 And in you was found the blood of prophets and of saints, and of all who have been slaughtered on earth.

Rev 19:2 for his judgments are true and just; he has judged the great whore who corrupted the earth with her fornication, and he has avenged on her the blood of his servants.

2.6. Miscellaneous References

Acts 1:18–19 (Now [Judas] acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness; and falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out. This became known to all the residents of Jerusalem, so that the field was called in their language Hakeldama, that is, Field of Blood.)

Acts 20:26 Therefore I [Paul] declare to you [Ephesian elders] this day that I am not responsible for the blood of any of you

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Jim W. *The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40–55*. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448. Edited by Claudia V. Camp and Andrew Mein. New York: T&T Clark, 2006.

———. "Utilizations of Speech Act Theory in Old Testament Interpretation." Pages 64–86 in *The Performative Nature and Function of Isaiah 40–55*. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 448. Edited by Claudia V. Camp and Andrew Mein. New York: T&T Clark, 2006.

Anderson, Charles P. "The Epistle to the Hebrews and the Pauline Letter Collection." *Harvard Theological Review* 59 (1966): 429–438.

———. "Who are the Heirs of the New Age in the Epistle to the Hebrews?" Pages 255–277 in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament*. Edited by Joel Marcus and Marion L. Soards. Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series 24. Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989.

Anderson, Paul N. *The Christology of the Fourth Gospel*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Edited by Martin Hengel and Otfried Hofius. Vol. 78. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996.

Anderson, Richard H. "The Cross and Atonement from Luke to Hebrews." *Evangelical Quarterly* 71 (1999): 127–149.

The Anglican Catechism. A.D. 1549, 1662. Online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds3.iv.xii.html

Arnold, Clinton E. "Ephesians, Letter to the." Pages 240–242 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1993.

Attridge, Harold W. *The Epistle to the Hebrews*. Hermeneia. Edited by Helmut Koester. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989.

Aune, David E. *Revelation*. 3 vols. Word Biblical Commentary 52A–52C. Edited by Bruce M. Metzger, David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1997–1998.

———. "Romans as a *Logos Protreptikos*." Pages 278–296 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Rev. and exp. ed. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991.

Austgen, Robert J. *Natural Motivation in the Pauline Epistles*. 2d ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Austin, J.L. *How to Do Things with Words*. Edited by James O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà. 2d ed. paperback. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

———. "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways." Pages 134–153 in *Philosophical Papers*. Edited by James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J. Warnock. 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

———. "The Meaning of a Word." Pages 55–75 in *Philosophical Papers*. Edited by James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J. Warnock. 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

———. "Performative Utterances." Pages 233–252 in *Philosophical Papers*. Edited

by James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J. Warnock. 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
———. *Sense and Sensibilia: Reconstructed from the Manuscript Notes by G.J. Warnock*. First paperback ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. Repr., 1979.
Bach, Kent. "Speech Acts." Pages 81–87 in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward Craig. Vol. 9. London: Routledge, 1998.
Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979.
Backhaus, Knut. "Der Hebräerbrief und die Paulus-Schule." *Biblische Zeitschrift* 37 (1993): 183–208.
Bailey, Daniel P. "Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's Use of *Hilasterion* in Romans 3:25." Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1999.
———. "Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's Use of *Hilasterion* in Romans 3:25." *Tyndale Bulletin* 51/1 (2000): 155–158.
Barnett, Paul W. "Apostle." Pages 45–51 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1993.
Barr, James. *The Semantics of Biblical Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. Repr., 1969.
Bartholomew, Craig G., Colin Greene, and Karl Möller, eds. *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation*. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2. Edited by Craig Bartholomew and Colin Greene. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001.
Bauckham, Richard. *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006.
———. *The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007.
———. *The Theology of the Book of Revelation*. New Testament Theology. Edited by James D.G. Dunn. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Repr., 1995.
Bauer, W., F.W. Danker, W.F. Arndt, and F.W. Gingrich. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 3d revised ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Beasley-Murray, George R. *Gospel of Life: Theology in the Fourth Gospel*. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991.
Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia. Edited by Karl Elliger and Wilhelm Rudolph. 4th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1990.
Black, David Alan. "On the Pauline Authorship of Hebrews (Part 1): Overlooked Affinities between Hebrews and Paul." *Faith and Mission* 16 (1999): 32–51.
———. "On the Pauline Authorship of Hebrews (Part 2): The External Evidence Reconsidered." *Faith and Mission* 16 (1999): 78–86.
Bollier, John A. "Judgment in the Apocalypse." *Interpretation* 7/1 (1953): 14–25.
Borgen, Peder. *Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo*. Supplements to Novum Testamentum 10. Edited by W.C. van Unnik et al. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965.

Botha, J. Eugene. *Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1–42*. Supplements to Novum Testamentum 65. Edited by D.P. Moessner et al. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991.

———. "The Potential of Speech Act Theory for New Testament Exegesis: Some Basic Concepts." *Hervormde teologiese studies* 47 (1991): 277–293.

———. "Speech Act Theory and New Testament Exegesis." *Hervormde teologiese studies* 47 (1991): 294–303.

Briggs, Richard S. "The Uses of Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation." *Currents in Research: Biblical Studies* 9 (2001): 229–276.

———. *Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation: Toward a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement*. New York: T&T Clark, 2001.

Brown, Colin. "Jesus' Prophetic Signs." Photocopy of Faculty Working Paper. School of Theology. Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif. (2003): 1–2.

———. "Pistis Christou." Photocopy of Faculty Working Paper. School of Theology. Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif. (n.d.): 1–4.

———. "Purity, Sacrifice and the Sanctuary." Photocopy of Faculty Working Paper. School of Theology. Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Calif. (2001): 1–4.

Brown, Colin, ed. *New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology*. 4 vols. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975–1985.

Brown, Michael L. "*Kippēr* and Atonement in the Book of Isaiah." Pages 189–202 in *Ki Baruch Hu*. Edited by Robert Chazan, William W. Hallo, and Lawrence H. Schiffman. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1999.

Brown, Raymond E. *An Introduction to the New Testament*. Anchor Bible Reference Library. New York: Doubleday, 1997.

Bruce, F.F. *The Epistle to the Hebrews*. Rev. ed. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by Gordon D. Fee. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.

Brümmer, Vincent. *Theology and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982.

Bultmann, Rudolf. *The Gospel of John: A Commentary*. Translated by G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare, and J.K. Riches. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971.

Burkhardt, Armin, ed. *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle*. Foundations of Communication and Cognition. Library Edition. Edited by Roland Posner and Georg Meggle. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.

Burtness, James H. "Plato, Philo, and the Author of Hebrews." *Lutheran Quarterly* 10 (1958): 54–64.

Callan, Terrance D. *Psychological Perspectives on the Life of Paul: An Application of the Methodology of Gerd Theissen*. Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 22. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

Carroll, John T., and Joel B. Green. *The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995.

Crosby, John F. "Speech Act Theory and Phenomenology." Pages 62–88 in *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John*

R. Searle. Edited by Armin Burkhardt. Foundations of Communication and Cognition. Library Edition. Edited by Roland Posner and Georg Meggle. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.

Cross, F.L. and E.A. Livingstone, eds. "Apostle." Pages 88–89 in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church: Major New Edition of the Acclaimed Authority on the Church*. 3d ed. Edited by E.A. Livingstone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

———. "Catechism, Prayer Book." Page 299 in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church: Major New Edition of the Acclaimed Authority on the Church*. 3d ed. Edited by E.A. Livingstone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

———. "Common Prayer, The Book of." Pages 384–385 in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church: Major New Edition of the Acclaimed Authority on the Church*. 3d ed. Edited by E.A. Livingstone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Culpepper, R. Alan. *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design*. First paperback ed. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987.

Das, A. Andrew. *Paul and the Jews*. Library of Pauline Studies. Edited by Stanley E. Porter. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003.

deSilva, David A. *Perseverance in Gratitude: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle "to the Hebrews."* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000.

Dodd, C.H. "Atonement." Pages 82–95 in *The Bible and the Greeks*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1935. Repr., of "Hilaskesthai, Its Cognates, Derivatives, and Synonyms, in the Septuagint." *Journal of Theological Studies* 32 (1931): 352–360.

Donfried, Karl P., ed. *The Romans Debate*. Rev. and exp. ed. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991.

Du Plessis, J.G. "Speech-Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation with Special Reference to G.N. Leech's Pragmatic Principles." Pages 129–142 in *Text and Interpretation: New Approaches in the Criticism of the New Testament*. Edited by Patrick J. Hartin and J.H. Petzer. New Testament Tools and Studies 15. Edited by Bruce M. Metzger. New York: E.J. Brill, 1991.

Duffy, Mervyn. *How Language, Ritual, and Sacraments Work: According to John Austin, Jürgen Habermas and Louis-Marie Chauvet*. Tesi Gregoriana Serie Teologia 123. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 2005.

Dunn, James D.G. "John VI—A Eucharistic Discourse?" *New Testament Studies* 17 (1971): 328–338.

———. *Romans*. 2 vols. Word Biblical Commentary 38A–38B. Edited by David A. Hubbard, Glenn W. Barker, and Ralph P. Martin. Dallas: Word, 1988.

———. *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.

Edmonds, David, and John Eidinow. *Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers*. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.

Edwards, Paul, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 8 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Ellis, E. Earle. "Pastoral Letters." Pages 658–666 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne and Ralph P. Martin. Downers Grove, 1993.

Elugardo, Reinaldo. "Searle, John Rogers (1932–)." Pages 2175–2181 in vol. 4 of *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*. Edited by John R. Shook et al. 4 vols. Bristol, Eng., Thoemmes, 2005.

Esler, Philip F. *Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul's Letter*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.

Evans, Donald D. *Faith, Authenticity, and Morality*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

———. *The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator*. The Library of Philosophy and Theology. Edited by John McIntyre and Ian T. Ramsey. London: S.C.M. Press, 1963.

———. *Struggle and Fulfillment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality*. Cleveland, Ohio: Collins, 1979.

Ferré, Frederick. *Language, Logic and God*. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.

Finlan, Stephen. *The Background and Contents of Paul's Cultic Atonement Metaphors*. Academia Biblica Series 19. Leiden: Brill/SBL, 2004.

———. *Options on Atonement in Christian Thought*. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2007.

———. *Problems with Atonement: The Origins of, and Controversy about, the Atonement Doctrine*. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2005.

Fish, Stanley. *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *Romans*. Anchor Bible 33. New York: Doubleday, 1993.

Forguson, L.W. "Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." Pages 160–185 in *Essays on J.L. Austin*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Fortna, Robert T. "Signs/Semeia Source." Pages 18–22 in vol. 6 of *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Edited by David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 1992.

Franklin, Karl J. "Speech Act Verbs and the Words of Jesus." Pages 241–261 in *Language in Context: Essays for Robert E. Longacre*. Edited by Shin Ja J. Hwang and William R. Merrifield. Summer Institute of Linguistics and the University of Texas at Arlington Publications in Linguistics 107. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics and the University of Texas at Arlington, 1992.

Freedman, David Noel, ed. *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. 6 vols. New York: Doubleday, 1992.

Friedman, Michael. *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Funk, Robert W. *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God: The Problem of Language in the New Testament and Contemporary Theology*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Furberg, Mats. *Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts*. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1963.

———. *Saying and Meaning*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1971.

Gager, John G. *Reinventing Paul*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Gardiner, Frederic. "The Language of the Epistle to the Hebrews as Bearing upon Its Authorship." *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* 7 (1887): 1–27.

Gerstenberger, Erhard S. *Leviticus: A Commentary*. Translated by Douglas W. Stott. Old Testament Library. Edited by James L. Mays, Carol A. Newsom, and David L. Peterson. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996.

Glock, Hans-Johann. "Ludwig Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*." Pages 71–91 in *Central Works of Philosophy Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Moore to Popper*. Edited by John Shand. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.

Gregory, Richard L., ed. "Intentionality." Pages 383–386 in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Grice, H. Paul. "Logic and Conversation," Pages 22–40 in *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

———. "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning." Pages 117–137 in *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. Repr. of pages 54–70 in *The Philosophy of Language*. Edited by John R. Searle. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Edited by Geoffrey J. Warnock. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Gundry-Volf, Judith M. "Expiation, Propitiation, Mercy Seat." Pages 279–284 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne and Ralph P. Martin. Downers Grove, 1993.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Comments on John Searle: Meaning, Communications, and Representation." Pages 17–29 in *John Searle and His Critics*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick. Philosophers and their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

Hancher, Michael. "Performative Utterance, the Word of God, and the Death of the Author." *Semeia* 41 (1988): 27–40.

Hare, R.M. *The Language of Morals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Harnack, Adolf von. "Probabilia über die Adresse und den Verfasser des Hebräerbriefes." *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche* 1 (1900): 16–41.

Hartley, John E. *Leviticus*. Word Biblical Commentary 4. Dallas, Tex.: Word, 1992.

Hawthorne, Gerald F., Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid, eds. *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1993.

Hays, Richard B. "Psalm 143 as Testimony to the Righteousness of God." Pages 50–60 in *The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel's Scripture*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.

Heil, John Paul. "The Fifth Seal (Rev 6,9–11) as a Key to the Book of Revelation." *Biblica* 74/2 (1993): 220–243.

High, Dallas M. *Language, Persons, and Belief: Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses of Language*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Hofrichter, Peter. "'Egeneto Anthropos.' Text und Zusätze im Johannesprolog." *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 70 (1979): 214–237.

Hornsby, Jennifer. "Illocution and its Significance." Pages 187–207 in *Foundations of Speech-Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives*. Edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis. London: Routledge, 1994.

Hunter, Archibald M. "Apollos the Alexandrian." Pages 147–156 in *Biblical Studies: Essays in Honor of William Barclay*. Edited by Johnston R. McKay and James F. Miller. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976.

Hurst, L.D. "Apollos, Hebrews, and Corinth: Bishop Montefiore's Theory Examined." *Scottish Journal of Theology* 38 (1985): 505–513.

Hurtado, L.W. "Christology." Pages 172–173 in *Dictionary of the Later New Testament and Its Developments*. Edited by Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids. Downers Grove, 1997.

Jonge, M. de. "Jesus' Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs." Pages 142–151 in *Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn*. Edited by T. Baarda et al. Kampen: Kok, 1988.

Keener, Craig S. *The Gospel of John: A Commentary*. 2 vols. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003.

Kim, Seyoon. *The Origin of Paul's Gospel*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Edited by Martin Hengel and Otfried Hofius. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1981. Repr., 2007.

———. *Paul and the New Perspective: Second Thoughts on the Origin of Paul's Gospel*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.

Kittel, G., and G. Friedrich, eds. *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–1976.

Klassen, William. "Vengeance in the Apocalypse of John." *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 28 (1966): 300–311.

Koester, Craig R. *Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*. The Anchor Bible 36. New York: Doubleday, 2001.

———. *Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel: Meaning, Mystery, Community*. 2d ed. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.

Krodel, Gerhard A. *Revelation*. Augsburg Commentaries on the New Testament. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989.

Kruse, Colin G. "Servant, Service." Pages 869–871 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1993.

Lacey, Alan R. "Intensionality and intentionality." Pages 158–162 in *A Dictionary of Philosophy*. 3d ed. London: Routledge, 1996.

Lane, William L. "Hebrews." Pages 443–458 in *Dictionary of the Later New Testament and Its Developments*. Edited by Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids. Downers Grove, 1997.

———. *Hebrews*. 2 vols. Word Biblical Commentary 47A–47B. Dallas, Tex.: Word, 1991.

Lapointe, Roger. "Hermeneutics Today." *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 2 (1972): 107–154.

Leech, Geoffrey N. *Principles of Pragmatics*. Longman Linguistics Library 30. New York: Longman, 1983.

Lepore, Ernest, and Robert Van Gulick, eds. *John Searle and His Critics*. Philosophers and Their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

Levinson, Stephen C. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics. Edited by B. Comrie et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1985.
Liddell, Henry G., and Robert Scott. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. with rev. suppl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Linnemann, Eta. "A Call for a Retrial in the Case of the Epistle to the Hebrews." *Faith and Mission* 19/2 (2002): 19–59.
Lundin, Roger, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton. *The Promise of Hermeneutics*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.
Lundin, Roger, Anthony C. Thiselton, and Clarence Walhout, eds. *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985.
Mauws, Michael K., and Nelson Phillips. "Understanding Language Games." *Organization Science* 6/3 (1995): 322–334.
Martinich, A.P. "Sacraments and Speech Acts." *Heythrop Journal* 16 (1975): 289–303, 405–417.
McClendon, James Wm. Jr., and James M. Smith. *Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism*. Rev. ed. Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press, 1994. Rev. of *Understanding Religious Convictions*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975.
McRay, John. *Paul: His Life and Teaching*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2003.
Metzger, Bruce M. *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*. 2d ed. Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 2000.
Metzger, Bruce M., and Bart D. Ehrman, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Meyers, Robert B. and Karen Hopkins. "A Speech-Act Theory Bibliography." *Centrum* 5/2 (1977): 73–108.
Michalson, Carl. "The Ghost of Logical Positivism." *The Christian Scholar* 43 (1960): 223–230.
Milgrom, Jacob. "Israel's Sanctuary: The Priestly Picture of Dorian Gray." *Revue biblique* 83 (1976): 390–399.
———. *Leviticus*. 3 vols. Anchor Bible 3–3B. New York: Doubleday, 1991–2001.
———. *Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics*. Continental Commentaries. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2004.
Moo, Douglas J. *Encountering the Book of Romans: A Theological Survey*. Encountering Biblical Studies. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002.
———. *The Epistle to the Romans*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by Ned B. Stonehouse, F.F. Bruce, and Gordon D. Fee. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.
Morris, Leon. *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972.
Motsch, Wolfgang. "Situational Context and Illocutionary Force." Pages 155–168 in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics* Edited by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch. Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 10. Edited by Jaakko Hintikka and Stanley Peters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.
Moulin, Bernard, and Daniel Rousseau. "An Approach for Modelling and Simulating Conversations." Pages 175–205 in *Essays in Speech Act Theory*. Prag-

matics and Beyond. New Series 77. Edited by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002.
Mounce, Robert H. *The Book of Revelation*. Rev. ed. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.
Mounce, William D. *The Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993.
Murphy, Nancey. "Postmodern Philosophy of Language and Textual Relativism." Pages 131–151 in *Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
Nerlich, Brigitte, and David D. Clarke. "Language, Action and Context: Linguistic Pragmatics in Europe and America (1800–1950)." *Journal of Pragmatics* 22 (1994): 439–463.
Neufeld, Dietmar. *Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John*. Biblical Interpretation Series 7. Edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Rolf Rendtorff. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.
Novum Testamentum Graece. Edited by Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. Metzger. 27th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1993. Repr., 2001.
Nowell-Smith, Patrick. *Ethics*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1954.
Osburn, Carroll D. "Alexander Campbell and the Text of Revelation 19:13." *Restoration Quarterly* 25.3 (1982): 129–138.
Passmore, John. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
Porter, Stanley E. "Hermeneutics, Biblical Interpretation, and Theology: Hunch, Holy Spirit, or Hard Work?" Pages 97–127 in I. Howard Marshall. *Beyond the Bible: Moving from Scripture to Theology*. Acadia Studies in Bible and Theology. Edited by Craig E. Evans and Lee M. McDonald. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2004.
Potts, Donald R. "Blood." Page 193 in *Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible*. Edited by David Noel Freedman, Allen C. Myers, and Astrid B. Beck. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000.
Pryor, John W. "Of the Virgin Birth or the Birth of Christians? The Text of John 1:13 Once More." *Novum Testamentum* 27 (1985): 296–318.
Recanati, François. *Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances*. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Originally published as *Les Enoncés performatifs*. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981.
Reid, Daniel G. "Prison, Prisoner." Pages 752–754 in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*. Edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1993.
Renn, Stephen D., ed. "Blood." Pages 122–124 in *Expository Dictionary of Bible Words: Word Studies for Key English Bible Words Based on the Hebrew and Greek Texts*. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2005.
Robinson, James M. "Jesus' Parables as God Happening." Pages 134–150 in *Jesus and the Historian: Written in Honor of Ernest Cadman Colwell*. Edited by F. Thomas Trotter. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968.

Rocca, Samuela. "Rome, capital of Italy." Pages 406–417 in vol. 17 of *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. 22 vols. 2d ed. Jerusalem: Keter, 2007.

Rogers, Cleon L. Jr., and Cleon L. Rogers III. *The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.

Sadock, Jerrold M. "Toward a Grammatically Realistic Typology of Speech Acts." Pages 393–406 in *Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives*. Edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis. London: Routledge, 1994. Repr., 2002.

———. *Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Sage, Royal. "Paul and the Author of Hebrews." Pages 122–126 in *The Stature of Christ: Essays in Honor of Edward Heppenstall*. Edited by Vern Carner and Gary Stanhiser. Loma Linda, Calif.: Carner and Stanhiser, 1970.

Satterthwaite, Philip E., and David F. Wright, eds. *A Pathway into the Holy Scripture*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994.

Schnackenburg, Rudolf. *The Gospel According to St. John*. Vol. 2. New York: Crossroad, 1980.

Schröger, Friedrich. "Der Hebräerbrief: paulinisch?" Pages 211–222 in *Kontinuität und Einheit: für Franz Mussner*. Edited by Paul-Gerhard Müller and Werner Stenger. Freiburg: Herder, 1981.

Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. *The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.

———. "Redemption as Liberation: Apoc 1:5 f. and 5:9 f." *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 36 (1974): 220–232.

Searle, John R. "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts." Pages 1–29 in *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Repr., 1999. Repr. of pages 344–369 in *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*. Edited by K. Gunderson. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.

———. "Animal Minds." Pages 61–76 in *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Repr. of *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 19 (1994): 206–219.

———. "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." Pages 141–159 in *Essays on J.L. Austin*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Repr. of *Philosophical Review* 77 (1968): 405–424.

———. "The Background." Pages 141–159 in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1999.

———. "The Background of Meaning." Pages 221–232 in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics*. Edited by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch. Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 10. Edited by Jaakko Hintikka and Stanley Peters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.

———. "Common Misunderstandings of the Background." Pages 191–196 in *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Paperback ed. Representation and Mind. Edited by Hilary Putnam and Ned Block. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.

———. *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

———. *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press, 1995.
———. *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Repr., 1999.
———. *Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power*. Columbia Themes in Philosophy. Edited by Akeel Bilgrami. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Originally published as *Liberté et neurobiologie*. Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2004.
———. "How Performatives Work." Pages 156–179 in *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Repr. of *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12 (1989): 535–558.
———. "Individual Intentionality and Social Phenomena in the Theory of Speech Acts." Pages 142–155 in *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
———. "Intensional Reports of Intentional States and Speech Acts." Pages 180–196 in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1999.
———. "Intention and Action." Pages 79–111 in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1999.
———. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1999.
———. "The Intentionality of Perception." Pages 37–78 in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Repr., 1999.
———. "Intentionality-with-a-t and Intensionality-with-an-s." Pages 174–178 in *Mind: A Brief Introduction*. Fundamentals of Philosophy Series. Edited by John Martin Fischer and John Perry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
———. "Literal Meaning." Pages 117–136 in *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Repr., 1999.
———. "Metaphor." Pages 76–116 in *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Repr., 1999.
———. *Mind: A Brief Introduction*. Fundamentals of Philosophy Series. Edited by John Martin Fischer and John Perry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
———. *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*. MasterMinds. New York: Basic Books, 1998.
———. "Minding the Brain." *The New York Review* (November 2, 2006): 51–55.
———. *The Mystery of Consciousness*. New York: New York Review of Books, 1997.
———. *Rationality in Action*. The Jean Nicod Lectures. Edited by François Recanati. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001.
———. *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Paperback ed. Representation and Mind. Edited by Hilary Putnam and Ned Block. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.
———. "Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action." Pages 289–299 in *John Searle and his Critics*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick.

Philosophers and their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

———. "Response: Meaning, Intentionality, and Speech Acts." Pages 81–102 in *John Searle and His Critics*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick. Philosophers and their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

———. "Response: The Mind-Body Problem." Pages 141–146 in *John Searle and his Critics*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick. Philosophers and their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

———. "Some Arguments for the Hypothesis of the Background." Pages 178–186 in *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Paperback ed. Representation and Mind. Edited by Hilary Putnam and Ned Block. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.

———. *Speech-Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Repr., 1999.

———. "What is a Speech Act?" Pages 39–53 in *The Philosophy of Language*. Edited by John R. Searle. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Edited by Geoffrey J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Repr. of pages 221–239 in *Philosophy in America*. Edited by Max Black. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965.

Searle, John R., ed. *The Philosophy of Language*. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Edited by Geoffrey J. Warnock. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Searle, John R., Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch, eds. *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics*. Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 10. Edited by Jaakko Hintikka and Stanley Peters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.

Searle, John R., and Daniel Vanderveken. *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes. Edited by Alfred Rahlfs. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. 1979.

Smalley, Stephen S. *The Revelation to John: A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Apocalypse*. 2005.

Smith, Barry. "Towards a History of Speech Act Theory." Pages 29–61 in *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle*. Edited by Armin Burkhardt. Foundations of Communication and Cognition. Library Edition. Edited by Roland Posner and Georg Meggle. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.

Smith, Dwight Moody. *The Composition and Order of the Fourth Gospel: Bultmann's Literary Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

Spicq, Ceslaus. *L'Épître aux Hébreux*. 2 vols. *Etudes bibliques*. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1952–1953.

———. "L'Épitre aux Hébreux, Apollos, Jean-Baptiste, Les Hellénistes et Qumran." *Revue de Qumran* 1 (1959): 365–390.

Spinks, D. Christopher. *The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the Theological Interpretation of Scripture*. London: Continuum, 2007.

Stiver, Dan R. "Felicity and Fusion: Speech Act Theory and Hermeneutical Philosophy." Pages 146–156 in *Transcending Boundaries in Theology and*

Philosophy: Reason, Meaning and Experience. Edited by Martin Warner and Kevin Vanhoozer. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2007.

Stoecker, Ralf. "Interview mit Professor John R. Searle." January 2000. Online: http://www.unibielefeld.de/ZIF/Publikationen/00–1-Stoecker.pdf

Strawson, Peter F. "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts." Pages 23–38 in *Philosophy of Language*. Edited by John R. Searle. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Repr., 1974. Originally published in *Philosophical Review* 73 (1964): 439–460.

Stroud, Barry. "The Background of Thought." Pages 245–258 in *John Searle and His Critics*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick. Philosophers and their Critics 2. Edited by Ernest Lepore. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991.

Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures: The New JPS Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985.

Theissen, Gerd. *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*. Translated by John P. Galvin. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987.

Thiselton, Anthony C. "Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and Theological Hermeneutics." Pages 133–239 in *The Promise of Hermeneutics*. By Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.

———. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000.

———. *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007.

———. "The Hermeneutics of Word and Sacraments: Baptism and the Lord's Supper or the Eucharist." Pages 509–540 in *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007.

———. "The New Hermeneutic." Pages 308–333 in *New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and Methods*. Edited by I. Howard Marshall. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977. Repr., 1985.

———. *New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992.

———. "The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs's Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy." *Scottish Journal of Theology* 23 (1970): 437–468.

———. "Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, and the Parables of Jesus." Pages 79–113 in *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics*. Edited by Roger Lundin, Anthony C. Thiselton, and Clarence Walhout. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985.

———. "Speech Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorff's *Divine Discourse*." *Scottish Journal of Theology* 50 (1997): 97–110.

———. "The Supposed Power of Words in Biblical Writings." *Journal of Theological Studies* 25 (1974): 283–299.

———. *The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980.

———. "The Use of Philosophical Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics." *Churchman* 87 (1973): 87–100.

Thornton, T.C.G. "The Meaning of *αἱματεκχυσία* in Heb. IX.22." *Journal of Theological Studies* 15 (1964): 63–65.

Tobin, Thomas H. *Paul's Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of Romans*. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004.

Torrey, Charles C. "The Authorship and Character of the So-called 'Epistle to the Hebrews.'" *Journal of Biblical Literature* 30 (1911): 137–156.

Tsohatzidis, Savas L., ed. *Foundations of Speech-Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives*. London: Routledge, 1994. Repr., 2002.

Tuckett, C.M. "Atonement in the NT." Pages 518–522 in vol. 1 of *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Edited by David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 1992.

Urmson, James O. "Austin, John Langshaw." Pages 211–215 in vol. 1 of *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Paul Edwards. 4 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Vanderveken, Daniel. "Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory." Pages 25–62 in *Essays in Speech Act Theory*. Edited by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo. Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series 77. Edited by Andreas H. Jucker. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002.

Vanderveken, Daniel and Susumu Kubo, eds. *Essays in Speech Act Theory*. Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series 77. Edited by Andreas H. Jucker. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. "From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant." Pages 159–203 in *First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002. Rev. of pages 1–49 in *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation*. Edited by Craig G. Bartholomew, Colin Greene, and Karl Möller. Scripture and Hermeneutics 2. Edited by Craig Bartholomew and Colin Greene. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001.

———. "God's Mighty Speech Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today." Pages 127–158 in *First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002. Repr. of pages 143–181 in *A Pathway into the Holy Scripture*. Edited by Philip E. Satterthwaite and David F. Wright. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994.

———. *Is There A Meaning in this Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.

Wakeman, John and Stanley Kunitz, eds. *World Authors, 1970–1975: A Biographical Dictionary*. Wilson Authors Series. Bronx, N.Y.: H.W. Wilson, 1980.

Webster, Jane S. *Ingesting Jesus: Eating and Drinking in the Gospel of John*. Academia Biblica Series 6. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003.

White, Alan. "Speech Acts." Pages 403–404 in *A Dictionary of Philosophy*. Edited by Thomas Mautner. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

White, Hugh C. "Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism." *Semeia* 41 (1988): 1–24.

———. "The Value of Speech Act Theory for Old Testament Hermeneutics." *Semeia* 41 (1988): 41–63.

White, Hugh C., ed. *Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism* [*Semeia* 41]. Decatur, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1988.

Williams-Tinajero, Lace Marie. "Christian Unity: The Communal Participation in Christ's Body and Blood." *One in Christ* 40/2 (2005): 46–61.

Witherington, Ben, III. *Revelation*. The New Cambridge Bible Commentary. Edited by Ben Witherington III. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation*. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3d ed. Malden, Maine: Blackwell, 2001. Repr., 2003.

———. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. First paperback ed. New York: Routledge, 1974. Repr., 1994.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. *Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

———. "The Promise of Speech-Act Theory for Biblical Interpretation." Pages 73–90 in *After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation*. Edited by Craig G. Bartholomew, Colin Greene, and Karl Möller. Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2. Edited by Craig Bartholomew and Colin Greene. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001.

Wright, N.T. "Redemption from the New Perspective? Towards a Multi-Layered Pauline Theology of the Cross." Pages 69–100 in *The Redemption: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on Christ as Redeemer*. Edited by Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, Gerald O'Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Wunderlich, Dieter. "Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory." Pages 291–312 in *Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics*. Edited by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch. Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 10. Edited by Jaakko Hintikka and Stanley Peters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.

Young, Richard A. "A Classification of Conditional Sentences Based on Speech Act Theory." *Grace Theological Journal* 10/1 (1989): 29–50.

INDEX OF AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS

Page numbers in italics refer to tables

Adams, Jim W., xxii, 52, 63, 68–69, 173
Alston, William, 62
ancestors, xxiv, 89, *92*, 97, 107, *110*, 110–112, 117, 119, *120*, *122*, 125, *127*, 128, 134–136, *137*, 140–141
Anderson, Charles P., 97 n. 91, 111
Anderson, Paul N., 132
Anderson, Richard H., 111 n. 122
Anglican Catechism, 13–14
animals
  blood of, xxii–xxv, 83–88 passim, 96, 99–100, 103, 106–107, *108–109*, 113, 147–148, 163, 181–188 passim
  death (sacrifice) of, xxiii, 83–84, 113
  minds of, 32 n. 161
Arnold, Clinton E., 87 n. 68
assertive declarations
  and biblical texts, 73–74, 174, 183
  extra-linguistic institutions for, 74
  of Jesus, 179, 183
  logical notation of, 18–19, *41*
  reports of, 179
  Searle's category of, 17–19, 24, *41*, 65, 178
assertives
  of the author of Hebrews, xxiv, 20, 67, 70, 73, 97–100, *107–108*, 110–114, 174, 178
  biblical texts and, 59, 67, 174, 176
  of the elder, xxiv, 73, 116, 142, 160–162, *166–167*
  of Jesus, xxiv, 72, 128–129, 131, *136–137*, 179
  of John (the evangelist), xxiv, 20, 72, 115, 117–119, *119–121*, 178–179
  of John (of Revelation), xxiv, 20, 72–73, 116, 142–143, 148, *150–151*, 154–156, *157–158*, 178
  logical notation of, 17, *40*
  of Paul, xxiii, xxiv, 20, 64, 70, 73, 77–89, *90–91*, 113–114, 174–178, 183
  Searle's category of, xxi, 17, 24–25, 30, *40*, 65, 78–79, 171, 178
atonement (atone, atoning)
  blood for, 83, 88, 101–104, 147–148, 184–188
  Day of. *See* Day of Atonement
  כִּפֻּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον (and cognates) translated as, 82, 85, 88, 93, 101–104, 185, 187
  Maccabean martyrs and, 85–86
  sin and, 82–83, 101–103, 184–186
  theories of, xxii, 184–188, 184 n. 27
Attridge, Harold W., 100, 103, 105
Aune, David E., 78, 143, 146–148, 160, 162–164
Austgen, Robert J., 76
Austin, J.L.
  language, philosophy of, xxi, 1, 3–15, *12*, 23, 26, 171
    biblical scholars (theologians), interest in, 52–58, 62–65, 173
    Searle's restructuring of, 16–17
  other philosophers and, 45–50 passim
authorial discourse, 62

Bach, Kent, 4 n. 15, 46, 60, 171, 173
background
  of the author of Hebrews (and assessors), 67, 99, 100, 106–107, *108–110*, 114, 182

background *(continued)*
of the elder, 162, 165, *168*, 182
as historical context of biblical texts, 89 n. 73, 134, 172
of Jesus (and assessors), 129, 131, 135–136, *138*, 182
of John (the evangelist) and assessors, 118–119, *121–122*, 182
of John (of Revelation) and assessors, 144–145, 149, *151–152*, 154–156, *158–159*, 162, 182
of the Judeans, 125, *127*, 129, 141–142, 182
of Paul (and assessors), 80–81, 88–89, *91–92*, 95, 114, 182
Searle's concept of, xxi, 20–22, 32, 34–38, *42*, 47–48, 65, 171–172, 182
Backhaus, Knut, 97
Bailey, Daniel P., 82
Barnett, Paul W., 75 n. 19
Barr, James, 56, 58
Barth, Fredrik, 76 n. 23
Bauckham, Richard, 116 n. 3, 143, 153, 164 n. 82
Beasley-Murray, George R., 132, 140
behabitives
Austin's category of, 10–11, *12*, 13, 16
Evans's use of, 53
belief (intentional state of)
assertive declarations and, 19, *41*
assertives and, 17, *40*
of the author of Hebrews, 67, 72, 98–100, 106–107, *107–110*, 110, 113, 178
of the elder, 160–161, 165, *166–168*
Israel, system of, 95, 97, 112
of Jesus, 128–130, *136*, *138*, 179, 183
of John (the evangelist), 117–119, *119*, *121–122*
intensional (with s) state of, 119, *119–120*, 123–124, 128–130, 179
of John (of Revelation), 143–144, 149, *150–152*, 155–156, *157–159*
intensional (with s) state of, 156, *157*, 160–161
of Paul, 72, 79–80, 88–89, *90–92*, 94, 177–178, 183
Searle's theory of, 17, 19, 28–37 passim, *40–42*, 172, 181–182, 187
Berlin, Isaiah, 15
biological naturalism, Searle on, 31–32, 71–72
Black, David Alan, 96–97 n. 88
blood
of animals. *See under* animals
of Christ. *See under* Jesus Christ
flesh and, 60, 119, *121–122*, 125, *127*, 135, *138*, 179
human (mortal), xxii, 106, 110, 113, 134–135, *138*
judgment and, xxii, 147–148, 186
life and, xxiv, 102–103, 115, 117, 120, 131–136 passim, *136*, *138*, 145, 147–149, *152*, 164, 169, 182–183, 188
as a metaphor for Christ's death (cross), xxii, xxiv–xxv, 73, 86, 100, 102–103, 114, 132, 134, 140, 145–148, 163–164, 169, 182–188
pouring out of, xxiii, 102–103, 106, *109*, 134, 183
substance of, xxii–xxiii, xxv, 103, 147–148, 164, 182
Bollier, John A., 148 n. 60
Book of Common Prayer (1662), 14
Borgen, Peder, 133
Botha, J. Eugene, xxii, 59–61, 69, 172–173
brain, the, 28–29, 31–32, 38–39, 65, 79, 172, 181
Braithwaite, Richard B., 2

bread, xxiv, 87, 117–142 passim, *119–122*, *126*, *136–138*, 179, 181
Briggs, Richard S., xxii, 4 n. 15, 52, 63, 67–70, 169 n. 89, 173–176 passim, 180–181
Brown, Colin, 75 n. 17, 85, 101 n. 97, 104 n. 108, 133 n. 18, 174–176
Brown, Michael L., 83–84 n. 53
Brown, Raymond E., 75 n. 18, 89 n. 73, 90 n. 74
Bruce, F.F., 102, 105
Brümmer, Vincent, 52 n. 4
brute facts, 66–67
Bultmann, Rudolf, 55, 63–64, 132
Burkhardt, Armin, 45
Burtness, James H., 96–97 n. 88

Callan, Terrance D., 76 n. 22
Carroll, John T., 102 n. 102
causal self-referential intentional states, Searle on
  direction of causation (mind-to-world; world-to-mind), 33–34, *42–43*
  direction of fit (mind-to-world; world-to-mind), 33–34, *42–43*
  types of (intentional actions; memories; perceptions), 33–34, *42–43*
Chomsky, Noam, xxi
Christian meal, xxii, xxii n. 5, 87 n. 70
Clarke, David D., 4 n. 15
commissives
  Austin's category of, 10–11, *12*, 16
    Evans's use of, 53–54
  Bach and Harnish's category of, 60 n. 50
  of Jesus, xxiv, 72, 129–131, *136–137*, 179
  logical notation of, 18, *40*
  Searle's category of, xxi, 17–18, 24, 30, *40*, 178
communicative action, 48, 62, 172–173
consciousness, Searle on, 29–31, 34, 71–72
constatives
  Austin's theory of, 5, 7–11, 115 n. 1, 171
  Bach and Harnish's theory of, 60 n. 50
conventions
  alternative theories to, 45–50 passim
  Austin's theory of, 6, 9–10, 15, 23 n. 111, 58
  Bach and Harnish's theory of, 60
  Searle's theory of, 26–27, 30
conversational implicature, Grice on, 45, 59–60
Cooperative Principle, Grice on, 45, 60
covenant, *12*, *109*
  blood of, 85, 98, 100, 103, 106, 112, 183–184, 186–187
  elements and, 181
  in the God-Israel relationship, 85, 103, 186–187
  institutional facts and, 66–67
  of Jesus Christ (new; better), xxii, 67, 98, 106, 112, 146–147, 183–184
  tablets of the, 85
cover (lid) of the ark
  כַּפֹּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον, translated as, xxiii, 81–86 passim, *90*, 95–96, 176, 187
  in Israel's faith tradition, 73, 82–88, 95–96, 185–186
Crosby, John F., 45 n. 209
Culler, Jonathan, 65, 73
Culpepper, R. Alan, 60, 133, 140

Das, A. Andrew, 90, 93, 95 n. 86
Day of Atonement, xxiii, 73–74, 82–84, 100–101, 103–104, 106, *109*, 113–114
de Jonge, M. *See* Jonge, M. de
de Saussure, Ferdinand. *See* Saussure, Ferdinand de
death
  of animals. *See under* animals
  of Jesus. *See under* Jesus Christ

declarations
Austin's theory of, 11
biblical texts and, 174–176
direction of fit (dual), 18–19, *41*
logical notation of, 18–19, *41*, 175
as performatives, 24
Searle's category of, xxi, 17–19, 24–25, *41*, 73–74, 175–176, 178
supernatural, 24, 27 n. 135, 175 n. 6
deconstructionism, 56–57 n. 31, 64
Derrida, Jacques, 63, 173
deSilva, David A., 112
desire (intentional state of)
of the elder, *157*, 161, *167–168*
of God, 186
of Jesus, 129–130, *136*, *138–139*
of the Judeans, *120*, 123–124, *126–127*
Searle's theory of, 17–18, 28–35 passim, *40*, *42*, 47, 182
direction of causation. *See under* causal self-referential intentional states; intentional actions
direction of fit
Austin's theory of, 14–15
Searle's theory of:
for illocutionary acts (word-to-world; world-to-word), 15, 17–19, *40–41*
for intentionality:
causal self-referential intentional states (mind-to-world; world-to-mind), 33–34, *43*
intentional states (mind-to-world; world-to-mind), 29, 32–33, *42*
directives
of the author of Hebrews, 98, 104
Bach and Harnish's theory of, 60 n. 50
of God, 186
of Jesus, xxiv, 72, 129–131, *136–137*, 179
logical notation of, 17–18, *40*
of Paul, 87, 174
Searle's category of, xxi, 17–18, 24, 30, *40*, 171, 178
disbelief (intentional state of)
of the Judeans, 123–124, *126–127*, 140–142, 179–180
Dodd, C.H., 83, 85
Du Plessis, J.G., 46
Duffy, Mervyn, 63 n. 66
Dunn, James D.G., 76–77, 83, 85–86, 132–133

Ebeling, Gerhard, 55
Eco, Umberto, xxi, 65
Edmonds, David, 2
effectives, Bach and Harnish on, 60 n. 50
Ehrman, Bart D., 146
Eidinow, John, 2
Ellis, E. Earle, 75 n. 18
Elugardo, Reinaldo, 15 n. 67
Esler, Philip F., 76 n. 23, 77 n. 27, 82
Eucharist, xxii n. 5, 133, 140
Euripides, 14
Evans, Donald D., xxii, 52–57, 63–69 passim, 173
exercitives
Alston's category of, 62
Austin's category of, 10–11, *12*, 16, 53
Evans's use of, 53
expiation (expiate)
atonement, theory of, 184–186
כִּפֻּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον (and cognates) translated as, xxiii, 82–83, 85–86, 104, 184–186
expositives
Austin's category of, 10–11, *12*, 13, 16, 53
Evans's replacement of, 53
expressives
biblical texts and, 59, 64–66, 174
of John (of Revelation), xxiv, 72, 116, 142–145, 148–149, *150–151*, 154–155, 178
logical notation of, 18, *41*, 66
of the psalmist, 65–66

Searle's category of, xxi, 17–18, 24, *41*, 171, 178
extra-linguistic institutions, 19, 24–25, *41*, 66–67, 74, 174–175, 183

Ferré, Frederick, 52 n. 3
Finlan, Stephen, 176–177, 184 n. 27
Fish, Stanley, 56–57 n. 31
Fishbane, Michael, 73 n. 11
Fitzmyer, Joseph A., 86, 93
flat constatives, Evans on, 53
flesh, 60
as food for Israelites, 135
human (mortal), xxii, 110–111, 113, 135, *138*
of Jesus, xxiv, 44, 110–119 passim, *119–122*, 123–125, *126–127*, 128–137, *136–139*, 142, 169, 179
Forguson, L.W., 16 n. 73
Fortna, Robert T., 133 n. 18
Fowl, Stephen E., 62 n. 65
Franklin, Karl J., 59 n. 44
Frei, Hans, 73 n. 11
Friedman, Michael, 4 n. 16
Fuchs, Ernst, 55, 57
Funk, Robert W., 55–57, 69
Furberg, Mats, 3 n. 11

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 57, 63–64
Gager, John G., 77 n. 25
Gamaliel, 76, 84
Gardiner, Frederic, 77 n. 90
Gentiles, 72 n. 9, 76, 89–90, 93–95, 111–112, 115 n. 2
Gerstenberger, Erhard S., 184
Glock, Hans-Johann, 4
Green, Joel B., 102 n. 102
Grice, H. Paul, xxi, 15, 45–46, 59–60, 62, 171, 173
Gundry-Volf, Judith M., 83 n. 46, 177, 184

Habermas, Jürgen, 24–25
Hancher, Michael, 59
Hare, R.M., 53
Harnack, Adolf von, 97 n. 89
Harnish, Robert M., 46, 60, 171, 173
Hartley, John E., 85
Hays, Richard B., 89 n. 73, 94
Heidegger, Martin, 55, 57, 63–64
Heil, John Paul, 148 n. 60
hereby (test), 23–25 passim, 73–74
High, Dallas M., 3 n. 11, 56
Hippolytus, 14, 66
Hofrichter, Peter, 134 n. 27
holy of holies, xxiii, 85, 100–102
hope (intentional state of)
of the author of Hebrews, 99, *108–110*
of Jesus, *120*, 128–129, *138*
of John (the evangelist), 118, *121*
of John (of Revelation), 144, *151–152*, 155, *158–159*
of Paul, 79–80, *91–92*
Searle's theory of, 17–18, 32, 35, 172
Hopkins, Karen, 45 n. 211
Hornsby, Jennifer, 48, 171
How to Do Things with Words, xxi, 5
Hunter, Archibald M., 96–97 n. 88
Hurst, L.D., 96–97 n. 88
Hurtado, L.W., 98 n. 93
Husserl, Edmund, 64

IFIDs. *See* illocutionary force indicating devices
illocutionary acts
Austin's theory of, xxi, 9–10, 16, 46
of the author of Hebrews. *See* under assertives
as conventional acts, 10, 46, 60
direction of fit (word-to-world; world-to-word) of, 17–19, *40–41*
of the elder. *See under* assertives; questions
of Jesus. *See under* assertives; commissives; directives
of John (the evangelist). *See under* assertives

illocutionary acts *(continued)*
of John (of Revelation). *See under* assertives; expressives
of the Judeans. *See under* questions
of Paul. *See under* assertives
Searle's theory of, xxi–xxii, 16–20, 25–28, 30, *40–41*, 47, 49
of Yahweh, 68–69
See also language; speech acts
illocutionary force, 59
Austin's theory of, 10
Searle's theory of, 17, 25, 49
Vanderveken's theory of, 26
illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs), 28
illocutionary logic, 26, 49
illocutionary point, Searle on, 17–19, 25, *40–41*, 171
implicit acts, 26
implied authors, readers, 60, 68
indirect commissives. *See* commissives: of Jesus
indirect directives. *See* directives: of Jesus
indirect speech acts
of Jesus, xxiv, 72, 115–116, 129–131, *136–137*, *139*, 178–179
Searle's theory of, 20, 25
inner-textuality, 73 n. 11
institutional facts, Searle on, 64, 66–67
intensional (with s) states. *See under* belief
intensionality-with-an-s, Searle on, 29, 39, 44, 115
intention (intentional state of)
of Jesus, 130–131, *136*, *139*
Searle's theory of, 18, 29–30, 34, 37, *40*, *43*, 47, 172, 182
intention-and-inference model, Bach and Harnish on, 46, 50, 171
intentional actions
of the author of Hebrews, 99–100, *108–110*, 182
of the elder, 162, *167–168*, 182
of Jesus, 131, *139*, 182
of John (the evangelist), 118–119, *121*, 182
of John (of Revelation), 144–145, *151–152*, 156, *158–159*, 182
of the Judeans, 125, *126–127*, 182
of Paul, 81, 89, *91–92*, 182
Searle's theory of, 32, *42–43*, 81 n. 38
direction of causation, 33–34, *42–43*
direction of fit, 33–34, *42–43*
See also causal self-referential intentional states
intentional (with t) states
of the author of Hebrews. *See under* belief; hope
of the elder. *See under* belief; desire
of Jesus. *See under* belief; desire; hope; intention
of John (the evangelist). *See under* belief; hope
of John (of Revelation). *See under* belief; hope
of the Judeans. *See under* desire; disbelief
network of, 32, 34–35, *42–43*, 73
of Paul. *See under* belief; hope
Searle's concept of, 29–39, *42–43*, 44, 73
See also intentionality; network
intentionality
of the author of Hebrews, 96, 99–100, *108–110*, 113, 178
biology of, 29–30 n. 147
consciousness and, 30–31
of the elder, *167–168*
of Jesus, *138–139*, 179
of John (the evangelist), *121–122*, 178
of John (of Revelation), 147–148, *151–152*, *158–159*, 178
of the Judeans, *126–127*
language and, xxi, 15, 28, 55
of the NT writers (speakers), xxv, 71–72

of Paul, 79–81, *91–92*, 178
Searle's structure of. *See* Searle: mind, philosophy of
intentions, authorial, 46, 62, 172
intertextuality, 73
intra-textuality (intralinguistic), 73
Israel (Israelites; the Judeans)
faith tradition of, xxii, 73, 76 n. 23, 82–110 passim, 177, 181
sacrificial system of, xxii–xxiii, xxv, 73, 83–106 passim, 113, 147–149, 156, 163–165, 169, 186–187
Torah and scriptures of:
the author of Hebrews and the, 99, *108–110*, 112, 182
blood motif in the, 83–88 passim, 96, 148, 185
cover (lid) of the ark in the, xxiii, 83–88 passim, 96, 185
the elder and the, 165, *168*, 182
Jesus and the, 129, 131, 134–136, *138*, 179, 182
John (the evangelist) and the, 119, *122*
John (of Revelation) and the, 144, 147–149, *151–152*, 155–156, *158–159*, 182
the Judeans and the, 125, *127*, 182
Paul and the, 75, 80, 88, *91–92*, 177, 182

Jesus Christ
blood of, xxii–xxv, 23, 44, 55, 71–114, 115–169, 176–188
death (sacrifice) of, xxii–xxv, 67, 86, 98–99, 102–103, 106, *107–109*, 110, 133–134, 140, 142, 146–147, 164 n. 82, 174, 184, 188
as Son of Man, 30, 117–118, *120*, *122*, 128–135, *136*, *138*, 189
speech acts of, xxiv, 72
Jews, the, 72 n. 9, 76 n. 23, 90, 94–95, 111, 115 n. 2, 140
Jonge, M. de, 86
Judeans, the, xxiv, 44, 72, 76 n. 23, 115–142 passim, 168, 178–180, 182
as Christ-believers, 87 n. 70, 90, 93–95, 111

Keener, Craig S., 134, 140
Kim, Seyoon, 76–77, 87–88
Klassen, William, 148 n. 60
Koester, Craig R., 112–113, 133–135 passim
Krodel, Gerhard A., 146, 148, 153, 162, 164
Kruse, Colin G., 75 n. 19
Kubo, Susumu, 44

Lacey, Alan R., 39 n. 201
Lamb, blood of the, xxv, 44, 116, 142, 147, 154, 156, *157*, *159*, 160–165, *166–167*
See also Jesus Christ: blood of
Lane, William L., 96 n. 88, 98 n. 94, 104, 111
language
Austin's philosophy of. *See under* Austin
biological aspects of, 28, 31, 171–172
intentionality and, xxi, 15, 28, 55
magical perceptions of, 56, 58
Searle's philosophy of. *See under* Searle
theological (spiritual), 13–14, 55–58 passim, 67, 85
See also illocutionary acts; speech acts
language-event, 55–57
language games, Wittgenstein on, xxi, 2–3, 49, 171
Lapointe, Roger, 57–58 n. 37
Last Supper, xxii n. 5
Laubach, F., 131 n. 14
Leech, Geoffrey N., 60, 173
Lepore, Ernest, 178 n. 14
Levinson, Stephen C., 3–4, 8, 48, 59
liberation theologies, 64, 148 n. 60
Liddell, Henry G., 85

Lindbeck, George, 73 n. 11
linguistic acts, 54
Linnemann, Eta, 97 n. 90
locutionary acts, Austin on, 9–11, 16, 171
logical positivism, 4
logos protreptikos, 78
Lord's Supper, xxii n. 5, 132–133, 140, 142

manna, xxiv, 119, *122*, 125, *127*, 129, 133–137, 140–141, 179
Martinich, A.P., 56
Mauws, Michael K., 2–3 n. 8
McClendon, James Wm., Jr., xxi, 56–57, 69
McRay, John, 82
meaning
  layers of, sentence (literal) and speaker (metaphorical)
    of the author of Hebrews, xxiii–xxiv, 73, 100–104, *107*, 178
    of the elder, 162, 164–165, *166*
    of Jesus, xxiv, 124–125, 131–135, *136–137*, 179–180
    of John (of Revelation), xxiv–xxv, 145, 148–149, *150*
    of Paul, xxiii–xxiv, 73, 81–86, *90*, 95–96, 176–178
  location of, 46
  Searle's theory of. *See* Searle: on meaning
  See also metaphorical assertions
mental states. *See* intentional (with t) states
mercy seat, 82, 85–86, 93, 101, 176–177, 184–185, 187
metaphorical assertions
  of the author of Hebrews, xxiii, 20, 73, 100–107, *107*, 113–114, 178
  of the elder, xxiv–xxv, 20, 142, 162–165, *166*, 168
  of Jesus, xxiv, 20, *126*, 131–135, *136–137*, 137, 140–142, 168, 179–180
  of John (of Revelation), xxiv–xxv, 20, 142, 144–149, *150*, 152, 154, 168
  of Paul, xxiii, 20, 73, 81–89, *90*, 93–96 passim, 113–114, 176–178
  Searle's theory of, 20–23, 81 n. 39
Metzger, Bruce M., 145–146
Meyers, Robert B., 45 n. 211
Michalson, Carl, 52
Milgrom, Jacob, 101, 104, 185
mind (mindset)
  brain, distinct from, 28–29 n. 142
  Evans's philosophy of, 53–54
  reshaped, of the NT writers (speakers), xxv, 66, 72, 88–89, 96, 107, 113, 119, 141–143, 148–149, 154, 156, 162, 165, 179, 182, 188
  Searle's philosophy of. *See under* Searle
mind-body problem, Searle on, 32
Moo, Douglas J., 77 n. 28, 82, 85, 89 n. 73, 185
Morris, Leon, 83, 85
Motsch, Wolfgang, 47–48, 171
Moulin, Bernard, 49–50
Mounce, Robert H., 146–147
Mounce, William D., 145 n. 43
multi-level speech acts. *See under* speech acts
Murphy, Nancey, 56–57 n. 31

Nerlich, Brigitte, 4 n. 15
network
  of the author of Hebrews, 67, 100, 106–107, *109*, 113–114
  of the elder, 165, *167–168*
  of intentional states. *See under* intentional (with t) states
  of Jesus, 131, 135–136, *138*
  of John (the evangelist), 118–119, *122*
  of John (of Revelation), 145, 149, *151–152*, 156, *158–159*
  of the Judeans, 125, *127*
  of the NT writers (speakers), 71

of Paul, 81, 88–89, *92*, 113–114, 177
Searle's concept of, xxi, 32, 34–35, 38, *42–43*, 71, 73, 171–172, 182
See also intentional (with t) states; intentionality
Neufeld, Dietmar, xxii, 52, 63, 69, 173
Noachian Laws, 119, *122*, 131–132
non-Judeans, the, 76, 76 n. 23, 93
as Christ-believers, 76 n. 23, 87 n. 70, 90, 93–95, 111–112
Nowell-Smith, Patrick, 53

onlooks, 52 n. 4, 54
Osburn, Carroll D., 147 n. 57

parables, as language-event, 55, 57
Passmore, John, 3 n. 11
Passover, 73–74, 83–84, 88, *92*, 103, 156, *159*, 163–165, 183–184, 186
Pears, David, 15
performances
Austin's theory of, 7, 9–10, 14
of Jesus, 183
of Paul, 78, 80–81
Searle's theory of, 16–17, 19, 23, 34, *41*, 176
performatives
Austin's theory of, 5–11, *12*, 23, 47, 52–58, passim, 171
Evans's theory of, 53
hereby test for, 23–25, 73
Sadock's theory of, 46 n. 216
Searle's theory of, 23–25, 66–67
perlocutionary acts (aims)
Austin's theory of, 9–11, 56 n. 25, 171
Hornsby's theory of, 48
Searle's theory of, 30
phatic acts, 1, 56 n. 25, 115 n. 1
Phillips, Nelson, 2–3 n. 8
phonetic acts, 1, 56 n. 25, 115 n. 1
Popper, Karl, 2
Porter, Stanley E., 62
Potts, Donald R., 184
predicates, Searle on, 21–28 passim
Principle of Expressibility, 16
propitiation (propitiate)
atonement, theory of, 184–186
כפֹּרֶת/ἱλαστήριον (and cognates) translated as, xxiii, 82–83, 85–86, 104, 184–186
propositional acts
for complete speech acts, 25, 115, 179
of the elder, 160
of Jesus, 128
Searle's concept of, 25–26, 115
Pryor, John W., 134 n. 27
psychological states (modes). *See* intentional (with t) states

quail, 125, *127*, 135, *137*, 179
questions
by the elder, xxiv, 73, 142, *157*, 160–162, *166–167*
by the Judeans, xxiv, 72, 124–125, *126–127*, 137, 179
Searle on types of:
doubt, 124
exam, 124
real, 124

Rad, Gerhard von, 85
reader involvement (response), xxii, 51, 56–57 n. 31, 63–70 passim, 173
Recanati, François, 46–47, 64, 66
reciprocity, 48, 50, 171
Reid, Daniel G., 75 n. 19
Reid, Thomas, 45
Reinach, Adolf, 45
Renn, Stephen D., 184
reports, 25–26
Austin's view of, 4–5, *12*, 115 n. 1
by John (the evangelist), xxiv, 70, 72, 115–119, *119–122*, 123, 128, 137, 168–169, 178–179
of John (of Revelation), xxiv, 70, 72–73, 116, 142, 153–156, *157*, 160–161, 168
Searle's view of, 25–26, 39, 44, 115 n. 1, 116 n. 4, 117 n. 5

representations
of John (the evangelist), the Judeans, and Jesus, 116, 123–124, 128–129
of John (of Revelation) and the elder, 160–161
Sadock's theory of, 178 n. 14
Searle's theory of, 30–31, 38, 58, 124 n. 7, 172
rhetic acts, 1, 56 n. 25, 115 n. 1
Ricoeur, Paul, 62
Riffaterre, M., 73
Robinson, James M., 56
Rocca, Samuela, 93
Rogers, Cleon L., III, 145 n. 43
Rogers, Cleon L., Jr., 145 n. 43
Rousseau, Daniel, 49–50
Russell, Bertrand, 4

S is *P* and *S* is *R*. *See under* Searle: on meaning
Sadock, Jerrold M., 24, 46, 117 n. 14
Sage, Royal, 96–97 n. 88
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 63
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 64
Schnackenburg, Rudolf, 133
Schröger, Friedrich, 97
Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth, 146, 148 n. 60, 164
Scott, Robert, 85
Searle, John R.
on God (religious experience), 24, 27 n. 135, 71–72, 71 n. 3, 175 n. 6, 180–181
language, philosophy of, xxi, 1, 3, 15–29, *40–41*, 44–50 passim, 171–172, 178
biblical scholars (theologians), interest in, 59–67 passim
on meaning
S is *P* (sentence, literal) and *S* is *R* (speaker, metaphorical), 16, 20–23, 81 n. 39
mind, philosophy of, xxi–xxiii, 1, 15, 29–39, *42–43*, 44, 55, 81 n. 38, 171–172
biblical scholars (theologians), interest in, 59–67 passim
other philosophers and, 45–50 passim
self-involvement
Evans's theory of, xxii, 52–55
biblical scholars, interest in, xxii, 52, 57, 63–69, 169 n. 89, 173, 176
of God, 54
See also reader involvement (response)
semiotics, 64
similes, 21, 22
single-level speech acts. *See under* speech acts
Smalley, Stephen S., 143, 146, 148, 153–154, 162–165 passim
Smith, Barry, 45 n. 209
Smith, Dwight Moody, 132 n. 15
Smith, James M., xxi, 56–57, 69
Son of Man. *See under* Jesus Christ
speech act theory, 48, 69
Austin's contribution to. *See* Austin: language, philosophy of
biblical studies (theology) and, xxii, xxv, 1, 51–70, 172–188 passim
other contributors to, 39, 44–50
Searle's contribution to. *See* Searle: language, philosophy of
speech acts
complete, 25, 115, 179
conversations and, 49, 171
of God (Yahweh), 62, 69, 173, 181
happy, 5–8, 10, 58
multi-level, xxiv, 70, 72–73, 115–169, 179
in Scripture, xxi–xxv passim, 58–69 passim, 173
Searle's theory of, 29
self-involving, 55 n. 22, 169 n. 89, 173, 176
single-level, xxiv, 70, 71–114
situational contexts of, 47, 50

types of:
by Austin, 1, 23 n. 111, 56 n. 25
by Searle, xxv, 25–28, 49
by Wunderlich, 178 n. 14
See also illocutionary acts; language; speech act theory
Spicq, Ceslaus, 96–97 n. 88, 110
Spinks, D. Christopher, 62
Still, Judith, 73
Stiver, Dan R., 62
Stoecker, Ralf, 15 n. 68
Strawson, Peter F., 15, 46 n. 217
Stroud, Barry, 38 n. 197
subjectivity
of the author of Hebrews, 100
of the NT writers (speakers), 72
of Paul, 81, 88, 95
Searle's theory of, 31–32, 34, 72

Theissen, Gerd, 76
Thiemann, Ronald, 73 n. 11
Thiselton, Anthony C., xxii, 52–58 passim, 61 n. 56, 63–67, 69–73 passim, 87 n. 69, 172–174 passim
Thornton, T.C.G., 102–103
Tobin, Thomas H., 77 n. 28
Torah. *See under* Israel (Israelites; the Judeans)
Torrey, Charles C., 97 n. 89
Tsohatzidis, Savas L., 44
Tuckett, C.M., 184 n. 28

Urmson, James O., 4
utterance acts
for complete speech acts, 25, 115, 179
of the elder, 160
of Jesus, 128
Searle's concept of, 25–26, 115
utterance-origin, Austin's theory of, 55

Van Gulick, Robert, 178 n. 14
Vanderveken, Daniel, xxi, 26, 44, 47–49
Vanhoozer, Kevin J., xxii, 56, 61–62, 69–70, 172–173
verdictives
Austin's category of, 10–11, *12*, 16
Evans's use of, 53–54, 64
Bach and Harnish's category of, 60 n. 50

water, 35, *42*, 104, 125, *127*, 134–135, *137*, 172, 179, 181
Webster, Jane S., 124, 140
White, Alan, 4 n. 15
White, Hugh C., 58–59
Williams, Bernard, 15
Williams-Tinajero, Lace Marie, 87 n. 70
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, xxi, 1, 2–4, 16, 49–65 passim, 171
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, xxii, 61–62, 69, 173
Worton, Michael, 73
Wright, N.T., 77 n. 25
Wunderlich, Dieter, 178 n. 14

Yom Kippur. *See* Day of Atonement
Young, Richard A., 59

INDEX OF SCRIPTURE AND OTHER ANCIENT TEXTS

Old Testament

Genesis
9:4 131, 134, 148

Exodus
12 163, 164 n. 85, 165, 183
12:1–28 103
12:5 188
12:5–7 186
12:7 84, 186
12:12–13 186
12:13 84
12:22 186
12:23 84
16:1–17:7 135
19:6 148
19:10 165
19:14 165
24:1–8 103
24:5–8 148
24:6 84, 186
24:8 84, 103, 186
24:9–10 163 n. 78
24:9–11 163
25:17 84, 85
25:17–22 xxiii, 84, 85, 176
25:22 82
26:34 84
29:10–21 165
29:12 163, 186
29:16 163
29:19–20 186
29:20–21 163
29:21 186
30:10 186
30:22–38 186

Leviticus
1–16 184
1:3 188
1:10 188
4 165
4:3 101
5 165
16 82, 83, 100, 104, 104 n. 109, 185
16:1–19 84
16:2 82, 100 n. 95
16:2b 186
16:2–5 84
16:2–15 85
16:6 185
16:6–14 83 n. 52
16:6–15 101
16:10–11 185
16:12–16 84
16:14 186
16:15 83 n. 52
16:15–16 101, 103, 186
16:16 185, 186
16:17 185
16:18 185
16:18–19 186
16:19 186
16:20 185, 186
16:24 185
16:27 185
16:30 185
16:32–33 185
16:32–34 186
16:33 185
16:34 185
17:10–14 134, 148
17:11 165

Leviticus (continued)
17:14 131
22:32 148 n. 62

Numbers
3:5–10 148
5–8 148
7:89 xxiii, 82, 84
11:4–34 135
18–19 148
20:1–13 135
21:5 135
28–29 148

Deuteronomy
8:3 135
12:16 134, 148
12:23 131
12:23–24 134, 148
18:3–5 148
33:8 135

Joshua
5:11–12 135

1 Kings
18:28 102 n. 104
22:19 162

Psalms
18:1 65–66
78:15–31 135
81:7 135
81:16 135
89:8 162
105:40–41 135
114:8 135
143 89 n. 73

Isaiah
24:23 162, 163, 163 n. 78
40–55 68–69, 173
40:2 146
41:8–10 111
41:21–29 68–69
49:1–6 68–69
50:4–11 68–69
52:13–53:12 68–69
53 165
53:7 164, 165
63:1–6 147 n. 57

Daniel
11:29–35 165

New Testament

Matthew
10:6 111
16:17 195
18:6 65
23:30 197
23:35 197
26:26–28 132
26:26–29 183
26:28 189
27:4–8 193
27:24–25 193
28 64

Mark
5:25 195
5:29 195
14:12–25 183,
14:22–24 132
14:24 183, 189

Luke
8:43–44 195
11:50–51 197
13:1 196
17:21 176 n. 10
22:14–20 183
22:17–20 132

22:20 189
22:44 192

John
1:12–13 134 n. 27, 195
1:13 134, 134 n. 27
4 172, 173
4:1–42 60
4:7–15 134
4:13–15 135
4:31–34 135
6 132–134, 137, 140, 179
6:1–15 133
6:1–50 132
6:5–13 134
6:22–51 117, 130
6:22–58 134
6:23 134
6:25–59 141
6:25–69 133
6:26 134
6:27 135
6:29 142
6:29–30 133
6:31 134, 135
6:32–33 142
6:32–35 134
6:35 133, 135
6:35–42 137
6:35–51 129
6:37–40 142
6:38–39 142
6:40 133
6:41 134, 140
6:41–42 140
6:41–43 141
6:42 142
6:44 142
6:44–46 142
6:46 142
6:47 133
6:48 134
6:48–51 134
6:49 134, 135
6:49–58 133
6:50–51 142
6:50–52 134
6:51–58 132, 133
6:52 137, 140
6:52a 115, 117–122, 179
6:52b 116, 117, 119–120, 123–127, 179–180
6:52–58 xxiv
6:52–59 xxiii–xxv, 19–20, 44, 70, 72, 115–142, 168–169, 178–180
6:53a 115, 117–122, 179
6:53b–58 116, 117, 119–120, 128–141, 179–180
6:53–56 189
6:53–58 132
6:55 132–133
6:57 142
6:58 134, 135
6:59 115, 117–122, 179
6:60–67 137
6:60–69 141
6:60–71 141
6:66–67 141
6:68–69 140
7:1 140
7:37–38 135
11:21 59
13:1–20 133
13:23 143 n. 39
19:26–27 143 n. 39
19:34 134, 192
20:2–10 143 n. 39
21:7 143 n. 39
21:20–24 143 n. 39

Acts
1:18–19 198
2:19–20 197
5:28 193
7:54–8:1 76
8:3 76
9:1–2 76
9:1–19 75, 75 n. 20
9:1–30 88
9:2 76
9:13 76
9:17–18 75

Acts (continued)
9:21 76
13:9 76
15:20 196
15:29 196
18:2 90 n. 76
18:6 197
20:26 198
20:28 190
21:25 196
22:1–21 88
22:3 76, 84
22:4 76
22:4–5 76
22:6–16 75
22:20 197
23:6 76
24:14 76
26:1–23 88
26:4–5 76, 84
26:9–11 76
26:12–18 75

Romans
1–3 89 n. 73
1:1 75, 78
1:3 78
1:4–5 95
1:5–6 90
1:7 94
1:9 78
1:11 78
1:13 95
1:13–15 90
1:15–16 78
1:9–13 77
2:16 78
2:25–3:2 94
3:1 94
3:9a 94
3:9–26 95
3:9–6:23 89
3:15 197
3:21 175
3:21–26 89
3:22 175
3:23 94
3:25 xxiii–xxv, 19–20, 70, 72, 72 n. 8, 73–74, 75, 77, 78–96, 104, 113, 174–178, 187, 190
3:26 175
3:29 94
3:29–30 94
3:31 94
4:1 94
4:9–12 94
5:1–11 88
5:9 84, 87, 183, 190
6:15 94
6:17–22 90
7:7 94
8 88
8:3 177
9:3–4 76
9:19 94
9:30–32a 94
9:30–10:13 89
11:1 76
11:1a 94
11:11a 94
11:13 90, 95
11:17–18 95
15:7 93
15:15–21 78
11:17–18 90
11:24 90
15:16 95
15:22–32 77
16:25 78, 143 n. 42

1 Corinthians
1:1 75
1:8 65
1:10–16 87
2:4–16 88
3:3–4 87, 174
3:21 174
4:1 174
4:3–4 174
4:4 64, 174
4:5 174
5:1–6:8 87

8 65
8:7–13 87
9:1 75 n. 20
9:1–2 75
9:19–24 87
10:1–14:40 87
10:14–21 87 n. 70
10:14–22 87
10:16 87, 87 n. 70, 163, 190
11:23–27 87 n. 70
11:25 87, 189
11:27 87, 193
12:1–13 88
15:8 75 n. 20
15:9 75, 76
15:50 195

2 Corinthians
1:1 75
11:5 75
11:21–22 76
12:11–12 75

Galatians
1:1 75
1:6–9 78
1:11–17 75
1:13 76
1:13–17 88
1:14 76
1:16 195
1:21–23 76
2:1 78
3:1–5 88
3:14 88
5:2–12 94

Ephesians
1:1 75
1:7 84, 87, 163, 183, 190
2:13 87, 163, 183, 190
6:12 195

Philippians
1:1 75
3:4–6 76
3:6 89
3:9 89

Colossians
1:1 75
1:20 87, 190

1 Thessalonians
1:5–7 88

2 Thessalonians
2:13 88

1 Timothy
1:1 75
1:12–15 76

2 Timothy
1:1 75

Titus
1:1 75

Philemon
1 75

Hebrews
1 98
1:1 97, 110
1:1–13 112
1:1–14 97
1:2 112
1:2a 97
1:3 101–102
1:5 112
2:1 98
2:2–18 98
2:14 104, 106 n. 117, 110, 111, 113, 192
2:14–18 111
2:16 110–111
2:17 102, 103–104, 111
2:17–18 103
3:1–2 98

Hebrews (continued)
3:1–6 97
3:3–6 98
3:6 112
3:7–15 98
3:16–19 98
4:1 98
4:2–10 98
4:11 98
4:12–13 98
4:14 98, 112
4:14–5:10 97
4:15 98
4:16 98
5:1–3 102
5:1–14 98
5:5 112
5:8 112
5:11 97
6:1–2 98
6:3–20 98
6:6 112
7–10 184
7:1–10:21 98
7:11 113
7:11–28 98
7:18–19 113
7:27 102
7:27–28 113
7:28 112
8:1 97
8:1–10:22 98
8:13 97
9–10 xxii
9:1–7 82
9:5 82
9:7 106 n. 117, 196
9:9 113
9:11–10:18 103
9:12 xxiii–xxv, 19–20, 70, 72, 73–74, 96–114, 174, 178, 187, 190–191
9:12–14 106 n. 117, 112
9:13 196
9:14 104, 113, 163, 183, 188, 191
9:15–22 67
9:16 67
9:18–22 103, 106 n. 117, 196
9:19 84 n. 54
9:21 84 n. 54, 187 n. 35
9:22 102, 102 n. 105, 103
9:22a 187 n. 35
9:25 106 n. 117, 196
9:26–28 102
10:1–3 112
10:1–18 112, 113, 188
10:1–31 102
10:4 106 n. 117, 112, 196
10:10 112
10:11 113
10:19 104, 106 n. 117, 163, 191
10:21–22 104
10:22–25 98
10:26–31 98
10:29 104, 106 n. 117, 112, 189
10:32–33 98
10:34 98
10:35 98
10:36–39 98
11 98
11:28 103, 106 n. 117, 196
11:39–40 112
12:1–3 98
12:4 106 n. 117, 193
12:4–6 98
12:7 98
12:8–11 98
12:12–16 98
12:17–24 98
12:24 104, 106 n. 117, 110 n. 118, 187, 189
12:25 98
12:26–27 98
12:28 98
12:29 98
13:1–9 98
13:10–12 98
13:11 197
13:11–12 102, 103, 106 n. 117
13:12 104, 191

13:13 98
13:14 98
13:15–22 98
13:18 97
13:20 104, 106 n. 117, 111, 183, 189
13:22 98
13:22–25 98 n. 94

1 Peter
1:2 163, 191
1:18–19 191
1:19 163

2 Peter
3:18 143 n. 42

1 John
1:1–4 63 n. 67
1:7 163, 191
2:18–24 63 n. 67
4:1–6 63 n. 67
4:16 63 n. 67
5:6 63 n. 67
5:6–8 192

Jude
24–25 143 n. 42

Revelation
1 154
1:1 143
1:1–17a 154
1:17b–22:7 154
1:4a 152
1:4–6 153
1:5 146, 147, 164, 191
1:5b 145–147
1:5b–6 xxiii–xxv, 19–20, 70, 72, 115, 116, 142–154, 155, 168–169, 178
1:6 148
1:8 154
1:9a 153
1:10–11 153
1:11 152, 153, 154
1:17–19 153
2–3 153–154
2:1–3:22 152, 153, 154
4 162
4:4 162, 163 n. 78
4:10–11 162
5:6 147, 164
5:8–14 162
5:9 146–147, 147 n. 56, 163, 164, 192
5:12 164
6:9–11 160, 163
6:10 147 n. 56, 148 n. 59, 197
6:12 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60, 197
7:4–17 163
7:11 162
7:13a 155–159
7:13b 116, 155, 157, 160–168
7:13–14 xxiii–xxv, 19–20, 44, 70, 72–73, 115, 116, 142, 154–169, 178
7:14 147, 147 n. 56, 163, 164, 192
7:14a 155–159, 160
7:14b 116, 155, 157, 160–168
8:7 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60
8:7–9 197–198
8:9 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60
11:6 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60, 198
11:16–18 162
12:10–11 163
12:11 147, 147 n. 56, 192
14:20 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60, 193
16:3 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60
16:3–4 198
16:4 147 n. 56, 148 n. 60
16:6 147 n. 56, 148 n. 59, 198
17:6 147 n. 56, 148 n. 59, 198

Revelation (continued)
18:24 147 n. 56, 148 n. 59, 198
19:2 147 n. 56, 148 n. 59, 198
19:4 162
19:11–16 147–148 n. 58
19:13 147, 147 n. 56, 147–148 n. 58, 193
22:6 143
22:6–9 143
22:9 143
22:16 152, 153

Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha

1 Enoch
39–40 162

2 Enoch
20:22 162

4 Maccabees
6:29 113
17:22 85–86, 113

Sirach
27:15 102 n. 104